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ABSTRACT

Despite advances in neuroscience some sceptics, e.g., David Chalmers, Colin McGinn
and Thomas Nagel, contend that we are no nearer to achieving a scientific understanding
of phenomenal consciousness. These sceptics claim that naturalising consciousness, i.e.,
subsuming it under our scientific theories, is either impossible, at least without radically
reforming our current scientific practices, or perhaps beyond our cognitive grasp. Their
scepticism is based on what is called the 'problem of consciousness' or the 'hard problem'.
I argue that their pessimism is unwarranted. Their conclusion is based on adopting a nonnaturalistic attitude, according to which our scientific theories must accommodate our
intuitive understanding of phenomena. Adopting this attitude, I argue, is a bad policy
quite generally as it is liable to lead to unconstrainable metaphysical claims. Our best
policy is to adopt a naturalistic attitude instead, characterised by thinking of philosophy
as continuous with science, as W.V. Quine urged. And from this naturalistic perspective
explaining consciousness in scientific terms is possible. Our phenomenological, i.e., firstpersonal, understanding of consciousness is based on qualia which, I argue, are
unnaturalisable. However, there are two ways in which we understand consciousness,
namely, naturalistically in terms of behaviour and physiology and phenomenologically,
and I argue that although it may seem contradictory these ways of understanding
consciousness are mutually dependent. Consequently, consciousness as it is understood
naturalistically is bound up with our phenomenological understanding of it. Therefore,
inasmuch as consciousness understood naturalistically is subsumable under our scientific
theories so consciousness simpliciter is naturalisable.
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INTRODUCTION

As our understanding of the brain, and of cognition more generally, has advanced some
have begun seriously to try to explain mental phenomena, that is, to offer a viable theory
of mind. These efforts find support among many philosophers of mind; perhaps the most
notable of whom are Daniel Dennett and Paul and Patricia Churchland. There could
almost be said to exist a partnership between neuroscientists and philosophers in this
respect.1 At the same time, however, other philosophers see the possibility of a
neuroscientific theory of mind as either extremely problematic or downright mistaken.
This scepticism originates, most notably, with the work of Thomas Nagel (1974) and
Frank Jackson (1982). Other more recent sceptics include David Chalmers (1996), Colin
McGinn (1991), Galen Strawson (1994). Their concerns focus on phenomenal
consciousness. They argue that our inability to think of consciousness in physical terms
either demonstrates or strongly suggests that it is not a physical property and as such it is
beyond the limits of science, at least as it is currently practised. In this dissertation I

1

This partnership has led to the publication of many popular books expounding such
theories, e.g., Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error (1994), Daniel Dennett's
Consciousness Explained (1991) and Nicholas Humphrey's A History of the Mind (1994),
and more recently G.M. Edelman and G. Tononi's A Universe of Consciousness (2000)
and Christof Koch's The Quest for Consciousness (2004).
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consider the philosophical reasoning behind this scepticism about the possibility of
naturalising phenomenal consciousness, i.e., capturing it in our scientific theories.
Phenomenal consciousness (henceforth 'consciousness') is that property constitutive
of our phenomenal experiences, e.g., our seeing a blue sky, our smelling the fragance of a
flower, our hearing the musical notes of a composition etc. In seeing a blue sky we do not
simply see the sky as blue, but rather -we feel it as such. Consciousness concerns how
things feel or seem to us in this sense. Without consciousness, we suppose, perceiving the
world would be mechanical; that is to say, there would be nothing more to seeing,
hearing, touching things etc. than bodies reacting to these things in ways that could be
wholly described in mechanical terms. And this is not how we think our experiences go.
Our experiences are alive, they are conscious or felt. Pain, for example, is not merely a
mechanical reaction to bodily damage, it also has the qualitative character of hurtfulness;
besides involving a set of behavioural dispositions such as avoidance and exclamations,
pain experiences have a raw feel to them.
We think of consciousness, therefore, as comprising the qualitative character of our
phenomenal experiences. Each of the properties that characterise experience in this
qualitative sense is often referred to as a 'quale'. Experiences differ to the extent that their
qualia differ. For example, my experience of looking at a ripe red tomato differs from
that of looking at an unripe green tomato at least to the extent that the former has a red
quale while the latter has a green quale. Likewise, the experiences of a tingling and of a
dull pain at least differ in having distinct qualia whatever behaviour is exhibited.
Only the person having some experience with these distinguishing properties can be
acquainted with them. However hard we might observe another person we cannot be
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acquainted with the qualitative character of their experiences as we suppose we can each
be in our own case. I feel a toothache I am having, say, and no one else can do so. This
fact about our experiences seems obvious enough. And because qualia are private in this
way we understand them to be peculiar or special. All other properties in the world are
publicly apprehensible. For example, the property of being a cat, call it 'catness', under
certain conditions is apprehensible by me, you, and anyone else who grasps the concept.
Most publicly accessible properties can be analysed in terms of other publicly accessible
properties. For example, we can explain catness in terms of being furry, having four legs,
and in other much more specialised terms concerning such things as having a certain type
of DNA. Qualia, it would seem, are not open to analysis in this way.
This peculiarity of qualia, and consciousness more generally, points to the problem of
consciousness. In various ways many have argued that if, as physicalism claims,
everything is physical, then there should in principle be some way of understanding
qualia, i.e., analysing them in terms of physical properties.2 However, physical properties
are quintessentially publicly accessible, that is, to be a physical property is to be
apprehensible by anyone, either directly or indirectly; and so, if qualia cannot in principle
be apprehended publicly, then they appear not to be reducible to physical properties.
Qualia seem to be incommensurable with physical properties. This suggests, therefore,
that qualia are not physical. Indeed, qualia are essentially thought of as perspectival in
nature, that is, they exist for the subject rather than being something that the subject
happens to apprehend. So, for example, a red quale can be described as the 'what it is like'
2

Notable examples, discussed later, are Thomas Nagel (1974), Frank Jackson (1982),
and David Chalmers (1996).

4

for the subject to see something as red. Qualia are the subjective aspects of our
experiences in this sense. Moreover, this incommensurability between qualia and
physical properties is suggested in another way.
As Chalmers observes, it is commonly supposed that consciousness is caused
physically even though "we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises"
(1995, 201). Or as he otherwise phrases the puzzle: "Why should physical processing
give rise to a rich inner life at all?" (ibid). Here, by 'rich inner life' Chalmers is alluding to
the peculiarly subjective nature of consciousness. His point is simple: qualia seem
completely distinct from physical properties so that there is no clear way at all of relating
them. Often Chalmers describes this incommensurability in terms of our always being
able to conceive of consciousness independent of any physical properties. Thus, to the
extent that conceivability is the same as logical possibility it is logically possible that
qualia are distinct from physical properties. Assuming this is so, Chalmers argues, qualia
are not identical with physical properties, i.e., they are not ontologically reducible to
physical properties. That is because identity is a necessary relation, that is, if two things
are identical then it is logically impossible for them to be distinct.
This, the problem of consciousness, is usually delineated in terms of its being a
problem for physicalism, especially since it leads to the denial that everything is
ontologically reducible to physical properties. However, as adumbrated earlier, I want to
focus on the problem as it concerns the possibility of explaining consciousness
naturalistically. If consciousness is not reducible to physical properties, then it is not
3

Here Chalmers follows Saul Kripke's well-known argument against the identity
theory (see Kripke 1980, 150-53).
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naturalisable; and so it must remain forever a mystery to us. We will never be able to
provide a theory of consciousness, and consequently we will never come to understand
what it is in terms of the natural properties from which it seems to arise and on which it
seems to depend. By this measure, however, there appears to be no way of understanding
consciousness as a natural property; at most we think of it as natural insofar as it is
ontologically dependent on physical properties.
While many take the problem of consciousness seriously, that is, they suppose that
unless we can understand consciousness as a physical property there is no hope of our
being able to explain it scientifically, others do not think the problem is a barrier in this
sense. Rather, as noted earlier, these others take the view that scientific investigations of
consciousness, e.g., through neurophysiology and cognitive science, will eventually lead
us to a fuller understanding of it.4 Valerie Hardcastle succinctly describes the reasoning
behind this view.5 She contends that there is no good reason why we cannot suppose that
consciousness is identical with neurophysiological properties. According to Hardcastle
scepticism about the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, namely, by
those who take the problem of consciousness seriously, is motivated by the assumption
that such explanations must allow us to understand why such an identity is true. But she
observes that it is not the role of science to provide such explanations. She likens such a
sceptic to what she calls a life-mysterian', that is, a person imagined to doubt that some
set of biological features, e.g., reproducibility and metabolism, is identical with, i.e.,

4

This general position includes a variety of views, such as those advanced by the
Churchlands, Daniel Dennett, Owen Flanagan, Valerie Hardcastle, and others.
5
See Hardcastle 1996, 7-13.
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constitutive of, the property of being alive. The life-mysterian demands an epistemically
satisfactory account of why this identity holds. That is, she asks that scientists show how
it is impossible to conceive of being alive independent of these biological features.
However, Hardcastle contends that the scientist does not have such an aim. She argues
that the sceptics are analogously consciousness-mysterians - in like manner they demand
that science provide an epistemically satisfactory account of why consciousness is
identical with the neurological features with which it covaries. Effectively, Hardcastle
reasons, these sceptics antecedently reject the possibility of naturalising consciousness,
i.e., explaining it scientifically, and this reveals a fundamental difference in attitude.
Moreover, she sees little chance of getting such sceptics to change their attitude.
Hardcastle concludes that "[t]here are few useful conversations" (1996, 7), that is, there is
little one could say to persuade the sceptics that the project of explaining consciousness
in naturalistic terms is presently feasible.
Hardcastle helpfully identifies the root cause of this disagreement with respect to the
problem of consciousness. However, I think that her conclusions are amiss in two very
important ways. First, she is not correct to claim that being a consciousness-mysterian,
i.e., a sceptic, is analogous to being a life-mysterian. The concept of consciousness,
unlike concepts such as life, is distinguished by our peculiar phenomenological
understanding of it, i.e., how we understand it in terms of qualia. In this sense the sceptics
do not antecedently reject the possibility of naturalising consciousness as Hardcastle
claims, rather they simply cannot see how consciousness understood in terms of qualia
can be explained in physical terms in the way Hardcastle assumes they can. Second, I
reject Hardcastle's assumption that it is impossible to overcome the difference in attitudes
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that marks the disagreement between these disputants. There are ways to show that the
sceptics' concerns are misplaced. In essence this dissertation centres on the issues
surrounding these two points.
Overall, I argue that we should not endorse any metaphysical claims based on a priori
reasoning, and which appeal to our intuitions, that contradict our scientific theories. Such
a policy is liable to lead to extravagant metaphysical claims, i.e., claims which are
essentially unfalsifiable. Our best policy is to accept that the ultimate authority vis-a-vis
our theories quite generally is the tribunal of our senses. This is to adopt a naturalistic
attitude to philosophical inquiry - to think of philosophy as continuous with science, as
W.V. Quine urged. I argue that from this naturalistic perspective explaining
consciousness in scientific terms, i.e., naturalising consciousness, does not concern our
intuitive understanding of it. Therefore, insofar as consciousness is naturalisable it is so
solely in terms of our naturalistic understanding of it, i.e., in terms of physiology and
behaviour. Moreover, it is this naturalistic understanding of consciousness that allows us
to share the concept, that is, for us to have a concept of consciousness at all. The concept
of consciousness is nonetheless dependent on our phenomenological understanding of it.
Thinking of consciousness requires thinking of it in both these ways, that is, we cannot
think of it either solely in naturalistic terms or solely in phenomenological terms. These
two ways of understanding consciousness are mutually dependent. They constitute a
single concept in the sense that the one way of understanding consciousness presupposes
the other. We cannot therefore think of consciousness only in terms of qualia. Indeed I
argue that qualia are unindividuable, that is, there is no criterion by which we can
determine whether two qualia are identical with or distinct from one another. We can still
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make sense of the idea that qualia are properties, I argue, if we think of them as
epistemically originating, that is, as the properties we each realise by which we
apprehend things in the world. In this way we cannot expect to be able to apprehend
qualia themselves, hence their unindividuability. Thinking of consciousness in this way
allows us to overcome the problem of consciousness. While consciousness understood in
terms of qualia is unnaturalisable, it is naturalisable in terms of our naturalistic
understanding of it; and since these two understandings concern the same concept, we
can say that neuroscience does offer the promise of a theory of consciousness after all.
In chapter 11 begin by asking what is involved in naturalising a phenomenon quite
generally. The answer one gives, I argue, depends on which of two different
philosophical approaches one adopts. This difference in approach centres on how
metaphysical considerations inform scientific claims. A scientific claim is held true on
the strength of the empirical evidence for it - so long as our observations do not
contradict the claim vis-a-vis its predictions within a theory, the claim is taken to be true.
However, it is often assumed, in philosophical circles especially, that insofar as some
claim is true it is so independently of the empirical evidence for it. By this measure no
claim held true on scientific grounds in this sense guarantees that it is true as such. In
other words, empirical evidence does not count as the ultimate arbiter of truth. If some
scientific claim is contradicted by metaphysical considerations in particular, then we have
grounds for doubting it. Let us call this the non-naturalistic attitude. Opposed to this nonnaturalistic attitude is an attitude based on the assumption that there is no higher authority
than the tribunal of the senses. Our best hope for holding some hypothesis about the
world true is that it agrees with our observations as determined by our best scientific
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theories. Thus, to the extent that a scientific claim is held true metaphysical
considerations cannot undermine this. In other words, metaphysical claims cannot
overrule the empirical evidence that science is founded on.
This naturalistic attitude, I contend, has an overwhelming advantage over the nonnaturalistic attitude of the sceptics. The non-naturalistic attitude has intolerable
consequences. It leads to metaphysical claims that cannot in principle be either confirmed
or disconfirmed. I illustrate this point using two renowned historical episodes involving
the denial of scientific hypotheses on metaphysical grounds, namely, Rene Desacartes'
anti-atomism and George Berkeley's rejection of calculus. I characterise the naturalistic
attitude as being guided by a precept, namely, that appeal to intuitions cannot play a
determinative role in formulating our understanding of natural phenomena in terms of the
theories postulated to explain them.
Then I turn my attention to the problem of naturalising consciousness and the
limitations that the sceptics David Chalmers and Colin McGinn put on this possibility.
Both these philosophers, I argue, adopt a non-naturalistic attitude and consequently their
claims are at bottom unfounded. Chalmers hypothesises that consciousness as we realise
it might arise from irreducible, i.e., fundamental, protophenomenal properties; where
these properties are not observable and are perhaps ubiquitous. But as Chalmers admits
himself, the hypothesis is empirically untestable. Therefore, it can only ever be held true
on faith - there are no independent reasons for holding it true. Colin McGinn claims that
we are inherently unable to explain consciousness in scientific terms. This, I suggest, is a
further intolerable consequence of adopting a non-naturalistic attitude.
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In chapter 21 focus on critically evaluating a collection of now classic anti-physicalist
arguments, which if successful would preclude the possibility of naturalising
consciouness. The arguments I look at are Thomas Nagel's, as presented in his "What Is It
Like to Be a Bat?", Frank Jackson's knowledge argument and Chalmers' updated version
of the conceivability argument based on the supposed possibility of phenomenal zombies.
While Nagel's argument is not strictly anti-physicalist it can be construed as such. It
appears to undermine physicalism insofar as it is impossible to understand what it is like
to be an alien creature such as a bat. I argue that there is no sense in which we can think
of what it is like to be a bat. This is not something we can conceive of in any meaningful
way, and so we must suspect it constitutes a pseudo-thought. Because the impossibility of
understanding what it is like to be another creature is only apparent it does not threaten
physicalism. Objections to both the early Jackson's knowledge argument and Chalmers'
conceivability argument have been numerous. With respect to the former, I agree with
Churchland's charge that Jackson equivocates between propositional knowledge
concerning qualia and acquaintance with them. In the case of the latter, I agree with Peter
Carruthers' objection to Chalmers' insistence on the metaphysical possibility of
phenomenal zombies, namely, that the notion of property that Chalmers operates with is
not naturalistic and as such should be rejected. Chalmers essentially equates properties
with concepts which is contrary to the naturalistic notion of properties as existing
independently of how we think of them. And this concurs with my earlier observation
that Chalmers adopts a non-naturalistic attitude. All three arguments, therefore, fail to
demonstrate the falsehood of physicalism. Hence, their authors do not provide any a
priori reasons for denying the possibility of naturalising consciousness.
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Chapter 3 starts with an analysis of the concept of qualia. I argue that qualia are
properties that are self-evident in the sense that we do not posit their existence in virtue of
needing to explain something in or about the world. This is a crucial fact about qualia.
But also I argue that they are unindividuable, that is, there cannot be a criterion by which
we can judge whether two qualia are identical with or distinct from one another. The
perspectival nature of qualia and their self-evident existence point to their being
constitutive of the subject. That is to say, we can explain the peculiar nature of qualia in
these respects by understanding them not as properties the subject apprehends, but rather
as properties which collectively make up the phenomenal subject, i..e, the subject
understood as that which undergoes experiences. Understanding qualia in this way
implies that they are not apprehensible even by the subject said to have them. Hence
qualia cannot be individuated.
The unindividuability of qualia, I argue, is also suggested by Dennett. However,
Dennett goes on to argue that their unindividuability implies the very concept is
incoherent, and therefore we should abandon it altogther, i.e., we should repudiate qualia.
I reject this conclusion, given that qualia self-evidently exist and that we can explain their
unindividuability if we understand them as constitutive of the subject.
The second half of the chapter is dedicated to the objection that qualia are
individuable so long as we take them to be identical with physical properties. Here I look
in particular at the views of Owen Flanagan, David Papineau and Clyde Hardin. In
agreement with some of Dennett's observations I contend that their argument for the
individuability of qualia is unconvincing because it is ultimately question begging. They
each present evidence for thinking that experiences are identical with brain states.
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However, they cannot assume experiences are identical with brain states unless it is
already assumed qualia are individuable to begin with, hence their argument is circular.
In chapter 41 address the worry that it is precisely consciousness understood
phenomenologically that demands being naturalised. If this is not naturalisable then it is
unclear how consciousness is naturalisable. My response is to argue that this
phenomenological understanding of consciousness is dependent on our naturalistic
understanding of it. This naturalistic understanding concerns how we understand others to
be conscious, namely, in terms of their physiology and behaviour. I argue that it seems
prima facie possible to think of someone being conscious, as measured by behaviour and
physiology, independently of being conscious phenomenologically understood in terms
of realising qualia, but this is not in fact possible; that is to say, they are two aspects of a
single concept in the sense that the one way of understanding consciousness presupposes
the other. This mutual dependence follows from the fact that we cannot acquire the idea
of being conscious in the one sense without the idea of being conscious in the other. So,
even though consciousness is only naturalisable in terms of a naturalistic understanding
of consciousness, this fact does not make our phenomenological understanding of
consciousness irrelevant. Our having a naturalistic understanding of consciousness
requires this other kind of understanding.
In Chapter 5 I begin by considering two worries about the position I defend, namely,
that it either implies property dualism or it amounts to a pernicious form of mysterianism.
In reply, I argue that my position is not threatened by dualism, whether property or
substance, because I take qualia to be unindividuable. Their unindividuability means that
we can neither think of them as physical, and therefore falling under the laws of physics,
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nor as non-physical. Also, I argue that from a naturalisitic attitude there is no room for
the mysterianism thought to threaten my position. The mysterianism is motivated by the
assumption that there is a transcendent viewpoint from which to evaluate our theories. No
such viewpoint exists for the naturalist. As epistemically originating properties we can
understand how qualia are prior to the individual points of view by which we ultimately
determine our theories to be true or false, i.e., through the senses. Therefore, we can
understand why qualia are unnaturalisable. Hence no mystery threatens to make my
position implausible.
Next I ask how it is that qualia are presumed to be real but are nevertheless
unnaturalisable. Elaborating on an earlier suggestion that qualia are constitutive of the
phenomenal subject I suggest that qualia are best thought of as epistemically originating
properties, that is, not as properties we come to know, i.e., from the first-person
viewpoint, but as properties by which we come to know things. More precisely, an
epistemically originating property is a property realised by human beings, for example, in
virtue of which they apprehend some aspect of the world. If a person, S, apprehends
something as yellow, i.e., something seems yellow to S, say, then S realises a yellow
quale. This yellow quale is epistemically originating because only in virtue of realising it
does S apprehend something in the world as yellow. We know these properties to be real
because without them we would not apprehend anything. What it is like for me to see red,
for example, is therefore not something that I apprehend, rather it is that by which I
apprehend. Thinking of qualia as epistemically originating properties enables us to
understand how they are real but unnaturalisable.
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All said, I conclude that from a naturalistic perspective the problem of consciousness
can be seen to dissolve. While acknowledging that qualia are an essential aspect of our
conception of consciousness, the perspective allows us to understand how they are
unindividuable and consequently unnaturalisable, but still maintain that consciousness is
naturalisable.

Chapter 1
Naturalism and Consciousness

That was an excellent observation. Measure the stone by the mason's rule, not the rule by
the stone. But the Stoics, not applying dogmas to facts but facts to their own preconceived
opinions, and forcing things to agree that do not by nature, have filled philosophy with
many difficulties,...
Plutarch, 'How one may become aware of one's progress in virtue'6

The overall question being asked is whether it is possible to naturalise consciousness, that
is, to subsume it under our scientific theories. But in order to answer this question we
need a firm understanding of what it is to naturalise a phenomenon in general. That is the
central undertaking of this chapter.
What will become clear in the subsequent discussion is that there are two distinct
philosophical attitudes towards naturalising phenomena, only one of which, I argue, is
naturalistic. Here it is crucial to distinguish between naturalism as an attitude or approach
to philosophical inquiry and naturalism as a philosophical doctrine. The latter might be
defined as the view that all phenomena are in principle naturalisable, in other words, that
there are no supernatural phenomena. Naturalism as an attitude, on the other hand, is
based on assuming that there is no higher authority vis-a-vis our judgments than our

6

The Project Gutenberg's EBook Plutarch's Morals, p.78
(http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=631311&pageno=78).
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senses; consequently, any conception of a phenomenon that does not fit with our
empirically testable scientific theories should be revised. This is essentially
epistemological naturalism. It is important to note that our concern here is strictly with
natural phenomena, that is, phenomena that unequivocally concern the natural sciences.
Crucially, consciousness is assumed to be a legitimate natural phenomenon in this sense.
This naturalistic attitude can be usefully thought of as an approach to philosophical
inquiry based on treating philosophy as continuous with science. Its most notable
advocate is probably W.V.Quine. I argue that it is this attitude that provides the best
approach to overcoming the problem of consciousness, i.e., the hard problem. How this
attitude applies to the problem is the topic of the rest of the dissertation. Opposed to this
is a non-naturalistic attitude, that is, an attitude that treats our intuitive understandings of
phenomena as the grounds for evaluating the success or failure of attempts to naturalise
these phenomena. It is to insist, in the case of consciousness, that any scientific theories
concerning it must accommodate our intuitive understanding of it, as determined by the
first-person perspective.
In this chapter, then, I focus on delineating the distinction between these
philosophical attitudes. In section 1.11 show why adopting a naturalistic approach to the
problem of naturalising any phenomenon is the best policy. This is done by looking in
detail at two examples in history of challenges by philosophers to attempts to naturalise
phenomena on the grounds that these attempts contradict our intuitive understandings of
the phenomena in question. In other words, we shall look at the non-naturalistic
philosophical approach taken by these philosophers and see how and why they have
ultimately failed to undermine the scientific theories they aimed to refute. In the sections
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that follow this I consider the applications of this non-naturalistic approach to the
problem of consciousness specifically. Here I look at the views of Chalmers and McGinn
in turn. Both these philosophers embrace the doctrine of naturalism, that is, they hold that
consciousness is in principle naturalisable. Accordingly, in order to resolve the problem
of consciousness they focus on either reforming science or, in the case of McGinn,
postulating a limit on our innate cognitive capacities to naturalise consciousness. I argue
that the non-naturalistic attitude of both these philosophers leads to their holding
extremely implausible views that contradict the naturalism they claim to endorse. My
overall aim in this chapter is to show that adopting a naturalistic attitude is a promising
way to overcome the problem of consciousness; and it is this attitude I shall adopt in the
chapters to follow where I look in detail at the problem.

1.1 Naturalism
The philosophical naturalism I shall countenance is not a doctrine, but rather it is an
attitude towards or an approach to philosophy. A naturalist in this sense is someone who
treats philosophy as continuous with science. The conclusions of philosophical inquiry,
by this measure, can never overrule our scientific theories. This general naturalistic
attitude is exhibited by Plutarch in the quote at the beginning of the chapter, where he
criticises the stoics for attempting to fit the facts to their preconceived notions of how
things should be, as opposed to altering their views to fit with nature as we find it. The
result, Plutarch declares, is that philosophy is filled with unnecessary difficulties. As we
shall see many of the difficulties concerning how to explain consciousness are similarly
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the result of not heeding Plutarch's general advice, namely, of failing to adopt a
naturalistic attitude.
In general, we are never justified in revising any of our scientific theories because
some metaphysical claim contradicts it. This is because insofar as philosophy aims to fix
on reality, to quote Quine, "the most we can reasonably seek in support of an inventory
and description of reality is testability of its observable consequences in the time-honored
hypothetico-deductive way" (2004, 276), and testability so defined is the cornerstone of
science. In other words, given that we hold our scientific theories to be true in virtue of
their having been tested, and that such testing is our ultimate measure of truth, no claims
derived by any other authority, in particular philosophical claims, can falsify these
theories.7 This continuity between science and philosophy also implies that scientific
theories can inform philosophical theories.8 We have seen a good example of this in
mathematics, viewed as a science, regarding Euclidean geometry. Immanuel Kant
famously assumed that Euclidean geometry is the one true description of space. He
7

For example, concerning the conservation laws governing energy, charge, etc.,
Kenneth W. Ford remarks that "we have theoretical reason to believe that these laws are
absolute.. .But experiment is the final arbiter. No amount of beautiful theory trumps
experiment. Calling these conservation laws absolute must be as tentative as every other
firm pronouncement about nature" (Ford 2004, 160).
8
It is important to distinguish naturalism from scientism. Scientism is characterised
by the attitude that assimilates philosophy with science. It can be expressed by the
application of the exacting rigour of science to philosophical inquiry. More generally,
scientism is the view that the methods of science provide the ultimate measure of truth.
Accordingly, no philosophical claim can be determined to be true unless it is consistent
with our scientific theories. Thus, science is seen as epistemically superior to philosophy.
Logical postivism is scientistic for this reason. The naturalism I am urging does not
assume this. Naturalism only denies that philosophical claims can be epistemically
superior to scientific claims. So, for example, if some ethical, i.e., philosophical, claim
cannot be shown to be consistent with our scientific theories the naturalist does not
suppose that the claim must be false. It only denies that philosophical claims could ever
overrule our scientific theories. For an excellent discussion of scientism see Bernard
Williams 2006, 180-199.
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thought of space and time as intuitions, i.e., space and time represent how the world must
be presented to us; and these intuitions, he supposed, are governed by the Euclidean
geometry; in other words, we cannot conceive of Euclid's fifth postulate, concerning
parallel lines, as being false. However, in the nineteenth century Nikolai Lobachevski and
Georg Riemann showed that we can construct a consistent geometry (indeed a set of nonEuclidean geometries) in which the fifth postulate is denied. Hence, Kant's original claim
came to be seen as false. Very generally, therefore, naturalism can be described as the
denial that there can be a more secure independent philosophical viewpoint from which
science and other knowledge claims can be evaluated.
Because naturalism is defined by practice, i.e., as an approach to doing philosophy,
the best way to understand its justification is to consider historical examples of
philosophers' attempts to circumscribe scientific inquiry. How these attempts have failed
illustrates why naturalism is good practice. We shall look at two cases. The first example
concerns Descartes' scepticism about experiments concerning vacua; where Descartes
argUed on metaphysical grounds that it is impossible for there to be empty space. The
second concerns Berkeley's sceptical attack on infinitesimal calculus, despite calculus's
obvious fecundity as a tool of the physical sciences. These examples will be presented in
what at first might seem like excessive detail. But this detail is necessary because of the
central role of these examples in the overall argument of this chapter.
Rene Descartes famously tried to apply a mathematical method to science, as outlined
in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Very briefly, assuming an epistemological
foundationalism he thought that scientific knowledge (scientia) can be acquired by a
bottom-up process. This process involves first determining those truths we can hold with
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certainty - these being intuitively self-evident according to Descartes - and these
revealed truths are then used to deduce how things are in the world in a very general
sense, e.g., in terms of laws of nature, or as he calls it "the truth of things" (1985, 15).
Thus, Descartes conceived of science as being an axiomatic system analogous to
Euclidean geometry. The wrongheadedness of this approach is illustrated by his
disagreement with Blaise Pascal and other pioneering experimental physicists regarding
their attempts to produce a vacuum. Two of Descartes' metaphysical claims are relevant
to this debate.
First, Descartes held that space is necessarily instantiated by corporeal substance (as
distinguished from non-spatial mental substance). In Principles of Philosophy he stated:
"It is easy for us to recognize that the extension constituting the nature of a body is
exactly the same as that constituting the nature of space" (ibid, 227). He seems to have
taken this to be self-evidently true, appealing to our intuitive understanding of space. He
acknowledged that we can conceive of space independently of any particular body (ibid,
228). For example, we understand a stone as occupying some space, but we can imagine
the same space remaining after the stone is removed from that place. However, Descartes
insisted that this space, formerly occupied by the stone, still exists in its absence insofar
as it is instantiated by some matter, e.g., air. A vacuum, on the other hand, is understood
as space independent of any corporeal substance at all. Descartes thought that this is an
incoherent idea. Thus, if in a sealed vessel, say, it were possible to remove all matter such
that it could be said to be a void, then, according to Descartes, we would have to
conclude that there is no distance between the sides of the vessel.
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The second metaphysical claim relevant to the debate is his denial of atomism. The
impossibility of atoms follows from space being necessarily instantiated by corporeal
substance. Any body is continuously extended, i.e., there are no gaps, since gaps or voids
occupy no space. Hence, every body must be perfectly dense in this sense. Perfect density
of bodies requires, according to Descartes, that they are infinitely or indefinitely divisible
- essentially, in order to ensure that no gaps exist (ibid, 239). Atoms, thought of as finite
packets of discrete matter, therefore cannot in principle exist. Descartes thought that these
claims about nature are logically entailed by self-evident truths and so they are
indubitable - they amount to genuine knowledge.
Many of Descartes' contemporaries, however, did endorse some sort of atomism.
Atomism suggests the possibility of vacua, at least to the extent that it is most plausible to
assume that there is empty space between atoms. Accordingly, attempts were made to
create a vacuum. One such early experiment was by Evangelista Torricelli, a student of
Galileo, who used a long glass tube with mercury and a bowl containing water with a
layer of mercury at the bottom. He carefully covered the one open end of the tube, turned
it downward and immersed it in the mercury at the bottom of the bowl. After uncovering
the end he observed the mercury drop part way down the tube leaving behind nothing,
since no gases were observed to bubble up to fill the empty space.9 Intrigued by reports
about this experiment Blaise Pascal conducted a very similar test on top of the mountain
Puy-de-D6me some years later. He reasoned that the lower atmospheric pressure at the
greater altitude would result in the mercury dropping farther down the tube than at close

9

A detailed account of these experiments and the ensuing debate is given by Daniel
Garber in his book Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (see especially Garber 1992, 136143).
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to sea level, which indeed it did. There was nothing to show at least that a vacuum was
not really present in the top of the tube.
Descartes' reaction to these experiments was interesting. Despite his holding that
vacua are in principle impossible, he took the relatively agnostic position that he might
accept the presence of a vacuum in the tube if enough evidence was presented to him.
Pascal never gave him a report detailing such evidence, so Descartes remained
unconvinced. Moreover, Descartes argued that the space at the top of the tube was in fact
filled with an infinitely fine ether that occupies any potential gaps, including pores in the
glass through which it permeated the inside of the tube. Thus, he believed that there was
no vacuum present.
His anti-atomism is a philosophical theory in virtue of the fact that it is justified a
priori, that is, solely in terms of an intuitive understanding of space and material bodies.
At no point did he concern himself with how well his theory fitted with experience. His
thought would seem to have been that what we observe must agree with his theory
because it is deduced from certain knowledge, i.e., that which cannot in principle be
doubted, hence his overall lack of concern with the fact that the experiment's suggestion
that vacua are possible. More generally, because Descartes did not propose his antiatomism in order to explain any phenomena he did not seriously consider its predictive
efficacy. However, he seemed to be cognisant of the fact that his theory should be able to
explain phenomena, hence his attempt to explain the appearance of a vacuum in terms of
the space at the top of the tube really being instantiated by an infinitely fine ether.
Descartes' argument against the possibility of vacua, in light of this contrary
experimental evidence, did not convince these early scientists to give up atomism. The

23

reason is that, unlike Descartes, their main interest did not appear to be to develop a
theory that accommodated our intuitions about space and matter, however strong these
intuitions might be. Instead, their concern was more precisely to see how well atomism
agreed with the empirical evidence, hence their interest in the experiment. Thus, their aim
was crucially different from Descartes'.10 The sort of a priori justifications Descartes had
for his claims were irrelevant to these scientists. This point can be generalised: The
purpose of a scientific theory is to explain phenomena, and as such a theory is held true
so long as it succeeds in this, regardless of whether or not it conflicts with our intuitions.
That is to say, if a scientific theory is very successful at explaining relevant phenomena
and is predictively powerful but nonetheless conflicts with our intuitions, then so much
the worse for our intuitions. Insofar as philosophical claims are ultimately justified only
in terms of our intuitions, therefore, they cannot undermine our scientific theories.
That said, sometimes our intuitions seem so strong that when a theory contradicts
them we cannot help but think that the theory is in some sense ad hoc, that is, we feel that
the price of accepting the theory is that we must ignore its inability to accommodate some
of our most basic beliefs. In this way a theory can seem mysterious to us despite its
strengths and usefulness. In such circumstances the scientists' response is to urge us to let
go of the intuitions in question. A good example of this sort of assault on our intuitions
and the above type of response concerns the advent of infinitesimal calculus, as originally
developed in its modern formulation by Gottfried Leibniz and Isaac Newton
independently of each other in the latter half of the seventeenth century.
10

That is not to suggest that Descartes' thinking was primitive in comparison to some
of his contemporaries. No one at that time could be described as having a modern
scientific attitude, but in this instance Descartes' thoroughly metaphysical approach was
problematic.
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Clearly calculus, as a branch of mathematics, is not directly concerned with
observation in the same way as atomism. The theories of calculus cannot be confirmed or
disconfirmed by experimentation. However, the theories of calculus are nonetheless
indispensable to natural sciences, especially physics. Indeed, without calculus the present
day natural sciences would not exist. Thus, the consequences of denying the truth of
calculus quite generally would be pretty dire - it would effectively rob us of the principal
justification for a great many of the claims made by the natural sciences. The usefulness
and applicability of modern calculus to the sciences was obvious to its creators and many
of their contemporaries.
The calculus of Leibniz and of Newton originated from a tradition dating back to the
Ancients of the analysis of space and motion in terms of its parts. Pythagoras, or his
followers, employed what was called a process of exhaustion to calculate the areas of
various shapes for example. That is to provide closer and closer approximations to the
areas of different shapes by 'filling in' some area with a greater number of ever smaller
shapes with calculable areas, e.g., squares and triangles. It was the development of
Cartesian coordinates, many years later, that allowed both Newton and Leibniz to analyse
space and time in this way more effectively. For example, the motion of a body can be
described by a curve plotting time elapsed, t, against distance traveled, s. Moreover, the
tangent at any point along such a curve gives us the velocity of the body at that instant.
Again we can think of this body as traveling a constant velocity for a brief period, At,
covering a distance As and then instantaneously changing velocity. This approximation to
the continuous motion of a body could describe a discrete curve, as it were, comprising
segments of straight line joined end to end. The velocity of the body over each brief
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period is equal to the tangent of the particular segment of straight line, i.e., As/At. The
continuous motion of a body is therefore represented by the aggregate of such segments
over infinitesimally brief periods of time, i.e., at each instant; where an infinitesimal
quantity in general is conceived as some indivisibly small quantity that is nonetheless
greater than zero. At each instant in the motion of a body, therefore, its velocity is As/At
where As and At are thought of as infinitesimal. In the now standard Lebnizian notation
this ratio, known as a derivative, is written as ds/dt and it represents the velocity of a
body in continuous motion at a particular instant, i.e., at the limit as As and At approach
zero.
Both Leibniz and Newton contended that this limit should not be thought of as ever
being reached, since at that point the derivative would absurdly be the indeterminate ratio
0/0. However, insofar as we think of motion as continuous the differentials ds and dt at an
instant, represented as a point on a continuous curve, cannot be distinguished from those
of their neighbouring instant except by supposing them to be at their limit, rather than
merely approaching it. This is essentially the problem concerning Zeno's paradox as
described in terms of the motion of an arrow. Zeno noted that an arrow's motion in flight
is infinitely divisible, assuming that motion is continuous, such that it ultimately
comprises a sequence of distinct infinitesimal instants, each effectively being of no
duration. But, if at each instant no time elapses then the arrow does not move. Hence, the
arrow's motion thought of as the aggregate of these infinitesimal instants can only add up
to zero; that is to say, the arrow is in fact motionless, a similarly absurd result. Newton's
characterisation of the differentials, or 'fluxions' as he called them, does not help to
overcome this difficulty. He described fluxions as evanescent quantities, that is, thought
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of in terms of the senses, quantities that begin to vanish at the very moment that they
arise; consequently, he explained, "those ultimate ratios with which such quantities
vanish are not truly the ratios of the ultimate quantities but the limits to which the ratio of
quantities, decreasing without end, always converge" (Boyer 1959, 216). But these
infinitesimal differentials, of which derivatives are ratios, remain mysterious.
It is this difficulty that George Berkeley pointed to in criticising the methods of
calculus in his paper 'The Analyst' (1734). He wrote: "Now to conceive a quantity
infinitely small, that is, infinitely less than any sensible or imaginable quantity, or the
least finite magnitude, is, I confess, above my capacity" (Jesseph 1992, 167). But his
most powerful criticism of the methods of calculus concerns Newton's and Leibniz's
demonstration that for any function of the kind y = xn its derivative, i.e., dy/dx, is nx11"1.
The demonstration is briefly along the following lines: The derivative represents the ratio
of some increment of y to an increment of x, let the increment of x be o. The increment of
y, therefore, is (x + o)n - xn. This multiplies out to be xn + nox nl + (n2 - n)o 2 x n2 /2 + ... xn . The ratio is arrived at by dividing this expression by the increment o, which gives us
nx""1 + (n2 - n)ox n2 /2 + ... .At this point, however, it is reasoned that as o approaches
zero this expression approaches nx""1 at its limit. Berkeley complained that this result is
only arrived at if o is first assumed to be a quantity, i.e., as a divisor, and then afterwards
assumed to have no magnitude at all, i.e., to be zero. These assumptions, Berkeley noted,
are contradictory. And he warned that "no just conclusion can be directly drawn from two,
inconsistent suppositions" (ibid, 175). This criticism applies to all types of functions
given that the same method is used to derive the expression of the derivative for any
function.
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What Berkeley's criticisms highlight is the difficulty in conceiving of the
infinitesimal. As Carl Boyer notes, Leibniz conceded that "one could not prove or
disprove the existence of infinitely small quantities," but nonetheless he believed that his
calculus was justified on the basis of its usefulness (Boyer 1959, 217). Moreover, at one
point Leibniz described infinitesimals as useful fictions, but he insisted that the truths
concerning them hold in virtue of the fact that the notion of continuity requires them in
some sense, that is, insofar as we think of space and motion, say, as continuous we must
think of them as really being infinitely divisible (see ibid, 219). The problem of
infinitesimals, then, stymied the defenders of calculus. While calculus's overwhelming
usefulness made it an indispensable analytical tool of the physical sciences, the lack of
any rigorous demonstrations of its theorems meant that why these theorems are true was a
mystery.
Eventually the root of the problem was diagnosed as being our intuitive understanding
of continuity in spatiotemporal terms. To the extent that we think of continuity in such
terms we cannot fully make sense of the notion of the infinitesimal. If, like Zeno, we
think of an arrow's motion as continuous in this way, then we understand that no matter
how many times we divide up the period of its flight it is always possible to divide it
more. If we were to suppose, on the other hand, that such divisions really reach a limit, it
is hard to understand how each infinitesimal period, i.e., each instant, can have any
magnitude, since if it did we could imagine its being divisible still. The solution to the
problem, therefore, is to abandon thinking of continuity in spatiotemporal terms.
Mathematicians began to construe continuity in analytical terms, that is, strictly as a
relation between numbers. One might say that they define continuity operationally. Thus,

the infinitesimal is informally thought of as an arbitrarily small quantity, that is, as small
as one likes. In this way a function, /(x), represented by a curve is said to be continuous
at x = a if for any value of f(x) approaching this value as a limit, i.e.,/(a), there is some
positive number 8, i.e., e > 0, such that | /(x) -/(a) | < s , then there is always some
number 8, where similarly 8 > 0, such that | x - a | < 8. u This definition of continuity in
terms of limit does not invoke spatiotemporal concepts, it is purely analytical. Calculus
conceived in this thoroughly formalistic manner avoids the difficulties pointed out by
Berkeley; expunged of any empirical content in this way the infinitesimal, specifically, is
no longer thought of as a magnitude.
With the example of Descartes' anti-atomism we saw that appeal to an intuitive
understanding of space to justify such a theory is denied; this approach is backwards in
the sense that science aims to develop theories that agree with phenomena rather than
aiming to explain phenomena in terms of theories we find intuitively compelling.
Similarly, with the example of infintesimal calculus, we saw that mathematicians aim to
develop theories that are ultimately self-consistent, regardless of whether these theories
fit with our intuitive understanding of the concepts involved, e.g., continuity understood
as that which is unbroken, like a chalk line drawn on a board. Accordingly, undergirding
the sciences in general is a fundamental attitude that might be expressed by the following
precept: How the world is, as measured by our experiences, should govern how we think
of it. Thus, how we think of the world should not ultimately be determined by our
intuitive conceptions of it, however compelling these conceptions might be. That is not to
say that our intuitions play no role in constructing our theories, only that at bottom
11

This definition originates with Karl Weierstrass (1815-1897) in virtue of the earlier
insights provided by Augustin Louis Cauchy (1789-1857) in particular.
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whatever theory is constructed it must agree with experience, i.e., be empirically
confirmable either directly of indirectly. In terms of naturalism, an entity (object,
property, etc.) is understood to be natural according to how it is conceived by our best
scientific theories. So, for example, life as a natural property is understood strictly in
terms of what our biological theories - broadly defined - take it to be, e.g., in terms of
reproduction, metabolic processes, etc. Thus, to think of life as an irreducible force, such
as elan vital, instantiated by certain complex objects is not to understand life as natural.
These historical examples illustrate how metaphysical considerations based on
reasoning that appeals to our intuitions cannot overrule scientific claims. The practice of
science in this respect is not thwarted by philosophical concerns. Scientists, in other
words, do not have to change their practices in order to accommodate philosophical
doubts about them. The philosopher who takes this on board essentially adopts a
naturalistic attitude. Let us next consider how exactly this naturalistic perspective informs
our understanding of consciousness.

1.2 Consciousness as a Natural Property
I stated that naturalism is not a doctrine but rather it is an attitude. And this fact has the
important consequence that it cannot be said to be true, or indeed false. At most we can
say that naturalism is good, or conversely, that not to take a naturalistic approach to
philosophical inquiry is unpropitious. Denying naturalism in this sense is to assume that
our scientific theories must accommodate certain metaphysical assumptions that are
justified on an a priori basis, i.e., by appeal to intuitions alone. Adopting this attitude
leads the philosopher to suppose that there is some aspect of the world that is effectively
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closed to scientific inquiry, at least as it is presently conceived or practised. We saw by
way of the two historical examples that the problem with such a stance is that it is
antithetical to the basic project of science, namely, to build an understanding of the world
that best fits with our experience of it. The scientist is not interested in how we think the
world must be, rather she is concerned with how we should think of the world according
to the evidence available to us by our senses. Here it is not being suggested that the
scientific theories we propose are determined by our observations, such that scientists
should reject concluding, for example, that 'moderate-sized specimens of dry goods'12
such as tables and chairs are almost wholly composed of empty space, since this is
contrary to how such items appear to us. Rather, the point is that whatever theories and
claims we make about the world they must ultimately be accountable to our senses. That
medium-sized objects are composed of atoms and large amounts of empty space around
them is ultimately consistent with our observations in this sense. In the case of Descartes'
anti-atomism, he seemed to presume that we cannot doubt that vacua are impossible in
principle irrespective of the evidence to the contrary. Likewise, Berkeley supposed that
the very notion of continuity precludes us from being able to justify calculus, despite its
obvious fecundity as an analytical tool of the physical sciences. In this latter case we saw
that Berkeley did not appreciate the fact that how we think of continuity is not fixed.
What is fixed is the demand that mathematics be self-consistent.
Where this non-naturalistic streak is at its strongest in philosophy is with respect to
consciousness. This reflects the fact that it seems impossible for us not to think of
consciousness phenomenologically, that is, as we are acquainted with it from the firstperson point of view; and yet this conception strikes us as being beyond description in
This phrase is borrowed from J.L.Austin, (see 1962, 8).
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physical terms, a point, as we shall see in the next chapter, astutely made by Thomas
Nagel. But does this fact imply that consciousness, as a property, cannot be understood
other than phenomenologically? To assume this seems too strong, since we understand
other types of creatures to be conscious and attribute consciousness to them, even though
we have no access to their points of view. This suggests at least that we also understand
consciousness as a straightforwardly observable property.13 Consciousness in some sense
seems to be amenable to investigation from the third-person point of view. It seems more
than plausible to suppose that consciousness can be understood as a natural property as
defined above, at least to some degree. That is to say, in their investigations of conscious
experiences neuroscientists are not changing the subject. This is not to presume that
conscious states are identical with brain states such that the study of consciousness is
straightforwardly a matter of empirical investigation; rather, it is to suppose that
consciousness is understood in two ways, i.e., from the first- and third-person
perspectives, and these ways of understanding are mutually dependent on one another.
How they are mutually dependent is discussed in detail in chapter 4.

1.2.1 Chalmers' Naturalistic Dualism
It is the difference between a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic attitude that Valerie
Hardcastle recognises as the root of disagreement between physicalists and antiphysicalists, or 'sceptics' as she calls them. And because such disagreement is a matter of
attitude, she concludes that "this difference is not something that further discussion or
13

This claim is not wholly uncontentious. Peter Carruthers, for example, has argued
that insofar as we can distinguish between conscious (what-it-is-like) experiences and
non-conscious ones, it is unclear whether other creatures, or 'brutes' as he calls them,
have the former type of experiences (see Carruthers 1989).
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argumentation can overcome" (1996, 7). As a committed naturalist she protests that the
non-naturalistic approach of the sceptics has unfortunate consequences. She takes as her
example Chalmers' views. Specifically, Hardcastle considers Chalmers' claim that
consciousness is a fundamental property, a brute fact about the world. Its being a property
of things is analogous to gravitational attraction in the sense that we do not suppose its
existence can be explained in simpler terms. Hardcastle finds this way of thinking of
consciousness counterintuitive. She observes that if one claims that consciousness is
simply a brute fact in this sense "then one is prima facie operating with a perverse
metaphysics" (ibid, 9). Chalmers suggests that the phenomenological quality of
experience is an aspect of information. Hardcastle points out, however, that "not all
information has a phenomenal edge, insofar as we know quite a bit of our information
processing [i.e., in our brains] is carried out unconsciously" (ibid). And she notes that to
explain this fact Chalmers seems forced to suppose either that all our information
processing in the brain is conscious, but we do not realise it, or that no information
processing is occurring in those cases where the brain processing is unconscious. Neither
of these options is at all plausible.
Chalmers' position here seems relevantly analogous to Descartes' with respect to his
defence of the claim that vacua are impossible inspite of evidence to the contrary. Like
Descartes vis-a-vis his rejection of atomism Chalmers can offer a plausible defence of his
denial that consciousness is a biological property. Just as Descartes defended his position
from premisses that were not formed with any intention to fit with the empirical facts, so
Chalmers dismisses such considerations when forming his basic assumption, namely, that
consciousness is a fundamental property. Chalmers' theory is not formed with the

intention of explaining any empirical facts since he assumes, albeit quite reasonably, that
phenomenological facts are not empirical. Indeed, he acknowledges that "[b]ecause
consciousness is not directly observable in experimental contexts, we cannot simply run
experiments measuring the experiences that are associated with various physical
processes, thereby confirming or disconfirming various psychophysical hypotheses"
(1996, 215). And here he admits that his theory of consciousness is empirically
untestable. The problem is, however, that if no empirical evidence can ultimately count in
favour of or against his theory, then it is unfalsifiable. This makes the theory logically
independent of science - whether it is true or false makes no difference with respect to its
consistency with our scientific theories quite generally.
Chalmers is aware of this difficulty with his view. His response is to argue that his
theory is falsifiable by a process of inference to the best explanation (see Chalmers 1996,
215-218). He argues that while his theory is untestable, testing is not the only way to
evaluate a theory, i.e., to decide whether it is true or false. In addition, he supposes, we
can hold a theory true if it offers the most plausible explanation we can arrive at.
However, if, as he admits, his theory is untestable in principle, in what sense can we hold
it true? To suppose a theory can be thought of as true solely on the grounds that it is
plausible, despite being untestable, is untenable. Imagine the following relevantly
analogous scenario. Two centuries ago a man, Mr Smith, is reported missing after going
for a walk near his home. He was never seen again either dead or alive. There are, let us
suppose, several explanations about how and why Mr Smith disappeared, of varying
degrees of plausibility. However, we cannot hold what seems like the most plausible
explanation as true, given that none of the explanations are testable. That is not to deny
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that one of the explanations might be true. In general, we hold our theories to be true
insofar as they are at least testable in principle.14 Therefore, the most plausible
explanation of Mr Smith's disappearance is at best a conjecture. Here we are assuming,
for argument's sake, that his disappearance is so remote in time that no evidence could
have survived. Chalmers' theory cannot be held true, however plausible, for the same
kind of reasons.
One might object that inasmuch as truth is evidence transcendent one could assume
that one of the explanations of Mr Smith's disappearance is true, despite our being unable
to determine which. Therefore, the most plausible explanation could be held as true. But,
to hold an explanation or theory as true entails offering justification for its being so. An
explanation's plausibility does not on its own justify our believing it is true - it is not
sufficient for justification in this sense. No matter how convinced one might be of a
particular explanation, e.g., about Mr Smith's disappearance, this alone is never enough to
enable us to hold it true. The strength of one's conviction is irrelevant with respect to its
truth; that is to say, how strongly you believe something to be true obviously does not
make it so.15

This is not to affirm the verificationist principle of truth, namely, that something is
true if and only if it is empirically verifiable. Rather, the claim is that a theory (about
natural phenomena) can be held true if and only if it is testable; where to hold a theory
true entails acting as if the theory is true. So, while one could act as if one explanation of
Smith's disappearance is true, nothing about the facts in the world agree with, or best fit
with, acting in this way rather than in some other way, i.e., as if some other explanation
about Smith were true.
15
Contemporary physics provides us with a dramatic example illustrating this point,
namely, the case of superstring theory. Since the 1980's a great deal of research in
theoretical physics has focused on this theory. It promises to unify the theory of relativity
with quantum theory, that is, to incorporate under this one single theory the force of
gravity and the three forces found at the quantum level, i.e., electromagnetic force and the
weak and strong nuclear forces. However, the size of strings is so small (estimated
between 10"16 and 10 "33 cm) that they are unobservable - either directly or indirectly. But
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More generally, our scientific theories and explanations are not held true simply
because of how neatly we feel they fit with our present beliefs, and which are therefore
judged to be most plausible; rather, they are held true to the extent that they are
predictively successful, i.e., how well they tell us what will happen. Certainly one might
think that Einstein's general theory of relativity, for example, is held true because it offers
the most plausible explanation of, say, Mercury's shifting perihelion. However, this
theory is held true because of its predictive power rather than its offering the most
plausible explanation. Its competing theory, i.e., Newton's, fails to predict this
phenomenon. Einstein's theory, by contrast, predicts the curvature of space which can
explain the phenomenon. In this sense what interests us in a theory is that it resists being
falsified, and this is a measure of its predictive power. And here Chalmers' theory of
consciousness, however plausible it might be, predicts nothing - it is predictively inert
and hence unfalsifiable. Its logical independence implies that holding it true has no
consequences. I am not suggesting that inference to the best explanation is illegitimate. It
is a legitimate way of deciding which theory among a set is best to hold true. But we hold
the chosen theory true on condition that it is testable, i.e., to the extent that it has
predictive power.
It might be contended that if one countenances some sort of epistemic holism, e.g.,
Quine's, then one can suppose that so long as a theory is consistent with the rest of our

more importantly, string theorists have never been able to devise an experiment to test the
theory (or some version thereof). In other words, as it stands string theory is unfalsifiable.
Indeed, many physicists suspect that the only hope of testing it requires reproducing the
extreme conditions thought to exist very soon after the big bang, and this seems
impossible. All told the present status of string theory is precarious. The theory is
mathemetically sound and is consistent with physics; in this sense it is a very plausible
theory. The difficulty is that it predicts nothing about the observable physical world.
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scientific theories we can hold it true, despite its not being directly testable. So, the idea
is that while the hypotheses of some theory, call it T b are not testable, so long as T, can
be shown to be consistent with the rest of our theories, T2, T3,..., Tn, then we can hold Ti
as true, where these other theories are testable. Accordingly, one might suppose that
while the hypotheses of T] are not themselves directly testable they are indirectly so, in
virtue of T/s consistency with the other empirically confirmable theories. But this
defence of Chalmers' position will not work for the simple reason that the theory he .
postulates is logically independent of the rest of science. Even if we hold the hypotheses
of Chalmers' theory as false still the other theories can be assumed as true. Therefore, no
hypotheses of his theory can be justified by the rest of science in this way.
But again, Chalmers admits that his theory is not hard science in that it lacks the
"empirical credentials" of other sciences (ibid, 218). Moreover, the social sciences are
similarly vulnerable to the empirical untestability of their theories. Therefore, it might be
contended that Chalmers' theory is properly scientific despite its untestability. But given
that his theory concerns the relations between consciousness as a basic property and the
basic physical properties, such untestability does not sit well. The stated goal of his
theory is to naturalise consciousness, that is, to incorporate it into the natural sciences.
The theory lacks the autonomy afforded to social scientific theories in this regard. We do
not expect social phenomena to be naturalised in this way, i.e., explained in physical
terms. For example, Darwin provided us with a powerful theory , i.e., natural selection, to
explain how species originate. But the concepts involved in this theory, e.g., species,
reproduction, survival, and so on, are not reducible to basic physical properties. One can
Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not presently qualify as a theory of physics - it
remains a plausible conjecture (see Lee Smolin, pp. 177-199).
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fully grasp these concepts without deferring to such concepts as charge, electron, etc. The
theory of natural selection and physics are independent of each other in this respect. We
do not suppose there are any laws relating the phenomena of these two theories. By
contrast, Chalmers assumes there are laws relating consciousness to basic physical
properties.

1.3 Varieties of Naturalism
It might seem odd to characterise Chalmers' view as being antithetical to naturalism given
that he calls it 'naturalistic dualism'. Indeed, many of those sceptical about the prospect
for science, as it is practised, providing a theory of consciousness call their views
1 (\

naturalistic nonetheless. There is at work here an understanding of naturalism that is
quite different from that I have outlined. There are several varieties of naturalism.
Chalmers claims that his view is naturalistic because "it posits that everything is a
consequence of a network of basic properties and laws, and because it is compatible with
all the results of contemporary science" (1996, 128). However, as we have seen, this
compatibility is trivial since his theory is logically independent of science. As well
McGinn calls his view 'non-contructive naturalism'. It is naturalistic, he tells us, because
it denies that consciousness is supernatural, that is to say, "it must be in virtue of some
natural property of the brain that organisms are conscious" (McGinn 1991, 6). McGinn
and Chalmers think that consciousness is naturalisable, i.e., can be incorporated into the
sciences, and consequently that it is a natural property. However, for Chalmers
consciousness is naturalisable only if our natural sciences are radically reappraised, or
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reformed, by thinking of consciousness as a fundamental property. This is despite the fact
that his theory is logically independent of the rest of science. In other words, his reforms
are unjustified. These reforms assume there can be scientific hypotheses that are in
principle empirically untestable, either directly or indirectly. But any such hypotheses
cannot of course be scientific, since the natural sciences are predicated on their empirical
testability. And for McGinn, while consciousness is naturalisable we cannot formulate
the theories necessary to understand how it is natural, since, as we shall see, he contends
that our innate cognitive limitations preclude us from ever being able to do this.
Therefore, for both of them, consciousness cannot be understood as a natural property
according to science as it is (currently) practised by us.
These philosophers, then, suppose that metaphysical considerations concerning
consciousness can influence how we view science. That is, they assume that we can
appraise our sciences from an independent philosophical viewpoint. This is to adopt a
non-naturalistic attitude in terms of the naturalism I have outlined using the historical
examples concerning vacua and calculus. Unless stated otherwise, by 'naturalism' I refer
to the version I have countenanced. Again, this involves treating philosophy as
continuous with science, not independent of it. To adopt a naturalistic attitude, therefore,
requires a willingness to give up our intuitive understandings of phenomena. Science
only starts when we take this stance, which can be described by the precept I mentioned
earlier, namely, that how the world is, as measured by our experiences, should ultimately
govern how we think of it. That is because there is no higher tribunal by which we can
judge our claims about the world than our senses.
16

I have in mind here Strawson's naturalised Cartesianism as expounded in his
Mental Reality (1992), as well as Colin McGinn's so-called non-constructive naturalism
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The appeal of deferring to our intuitions can be very strong in philosophy, given its
centrality in philosophical reasoning quite generally. It is this reliance on intuitive
understandings of phenomena that Dennett also criticises. He cites a project by AI
researcher Patrick Hayes to formalise what Hayes calls our naive physics, i.e., our
everyday understanding of how the physical world operates, e.g., unsupported objects
invariably fall towards the ground etc. (Dennett 2005, 31-35). The expectations that
constitute our naive physics are internalised by us thoroughly; they play an indispensable
role in our everyday actions, such as quickly moving away from a glass full of water as it
tips over, expecting the water to spill out. Of course, the 'theories' of naive physics are
false. For example, according to its theories liquid in a drinking straw will fall out,
whereas in fact it remains inside. Dennett notes that a similar formalisation could be done
for folk psychology, and likewise its theories would be false. Folk psychology fails to
predict such anomalous phenomena as blindsight and prosopagnosia (inability to
recognise faces). Such naive theories are false because they are ultimately determined by
our intuitive understandings, i.e., how we think the world should operate, rather than how
it does. We can interpret certain philosophers of mind as attempting to formalise
rigorously our folk psychology, that is, to explain how our intuitive understandings of
such mental phenomena as consciousness are true. Some such philosophers at least have,
as Dennett describes it, "proceeded as if the deliverances of their brute intuitions were not
just axiomatic-for-the-sake-of-the-project but true, and moreover, somehow inviolable"
{ibid, 34). Dennett notes William Lycan's quote of Nagel's appeal to the primacy of
intuition in this regard in his book Mortal Questions where Nagel asserts that "I believe
one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over arguments"07n'd, 22, n. 18).
and Chalmers' naturalistic dualism.
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While scientists are often pleased that their results are counterintuitive, for some
philosophers of mind a claim's being counterintuitive is taken to show that it is false
(ibid, 34). Here it is important to add, I think, that what encourages this kind of deference
to intuition is that the resultant theories are often not shown to be false, as we have seen
with Chalmers.
The theory of consciousness that Chalmers advances is by his own admission
untestable. He claims that we can hold it true in virtue of its plausibility. I have argued,
however, that its untestability makes his theory unfalsifiable. Consequently, the theory is
not constrained by its empirical viability - it has none. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
hypotheses he postulates in relation to his theory are at best speculative and at worst
metaphysically extravagant. He is led to propose, for example, that consciousness is not a
chauvinistic biological property of certain complex organisms, but it is possibly a
ubiquitous feature of countless other objects, ranging from coffee makers to cars. All this
is a direct result of Chalmers' non-naturalistic approach. He assumes that how we think of
consciousness in phenomenological terms must be accommodated by our sciences, and
insofar as it cannot we must reform our scientific practices. Accordingly, he recommends
that consciousness ought to be thought of as a fundamental property of the world
alongside such physical properties as length and mass. As we shall see, this idea is very
problematic (see section 2.3). But the non-naturalistic approach of McGinn does not seem
to lead to the sort of extravagant metaphysics that Chalmers countenances. McGinn does
not prescribe any reforms of our scientific practices, and this would suggest a more
plausible version of naturalism. Let us look at McGinn's view in more detail.
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1.4 Consciousness and Cognitive Closure
The central premiss of McGinn's argument is that there must be some property, P, of the
brain that causes or generates consciousness given that consciousness is naturalisable in
principle. To suppose instead that our being conscious is just a brute fact, that is, to
suppose that consciousness arises from the brain causelessly, is to treat it as miraculous
(1991, 6). However, McGinn argues that P is not an ordinary physical property, that is, a
perceptible property, e.g., a neurological property of the brain, since, as he puts it, "[n]o
matter what recondite property we could see to be instantiated in the brain we should
always be baffled about how it could give rise to consciousness" (ibid, 11). And P is
precisely the property the knowledge of which would allow us to connect conscious
states to physical brain states. In other words, McGinn thinks of P as what might be
described as a 'psychophysical' property, that is, a property that we can understand as
relating to both consciousness and the brain. P is the 'missing link' that is needed for us to
be able to subsume consciousness under our scientific theories, i.e. to naturalise
consciousness.
In order to explain consciousness therefore, according to McGinn, we first have to
apprehend P. He recognises two cognitive faculties by which we might be able to do this,
namely, perception and introspection, but he argues that neither of these faculties allows
us to apprehend P. Introspection gives us each direct access to the properties of
consciousness, e.g., we can apprehend the experience of pain, say, but it does not let us
see how this experience is related to the neurological processes that are correlated with it
(ibid, 8). Thus, we cannot form a conception of P by introspection; P, after all, is a
psychophysical property and introspection only allows us to apprehend properties of
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consciousness simpliciter. Encouraged by neuroscience, however, we might suppose that
we can grasp P through our senses, i.e., perceptually. The problem with this route is that
nothing we perceive in the brain specifically has to be thought of as being related to
consciousness. McGinn argues that nothing we perceive "could ever convince us that we
have located the intelligible nexus we seek" {ibid, 11).
Ultimately McGinn argues that P and consciousness itself are essentially non-spatial
properties. Accordingly, they are best thought of as theoretical given that their nonspatiality makes them imperceptible in principle, or unobservable. This fact, he thinks,
does not rule them out from being natural since quantum theory posits theoretical entities
in this sense, entities that are clearly regarded as natural {ibid, 12). Assuming that P is
theoretical it seems plausible that we can at least deduce its existence by inference to the
best explanation. That is, so long as the theory that best fits the empirical data, and which
is thereby held as true, posits P, it seems possible to construct a suitable psychophysical
theory that can explain consciousness in terms of P, despite P's being imperceptible in
principle. McGinn, however, denies that this is a possibility. Our scientific theories,
McGinn suggests, employ models for those properties it aims to explain that are
essentially analogical extensions of perceptible macrophysical properties. He gives the
example of how our concept of molecule is based on its representation in terms of such
macrophysical objects {ibid, 13). That is, we think of the molecule as being analogous to
spheres representing atoms, rods connecting them, and so on. Such explanations,
therefore, require a homogeneity between such macrophysical objects and the objects or
properties concerning a theory. It is this homogeneity that a psychophysical theory lacks.
Properties of consciousness and the physical properties we want to relate them to,
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McGinn asserts, are heterogeneous in this respect. The models used for our physical
theories are useless with respect to constructing a suitable psychophysical theory that
concerns explaining non-spatial properties of consciousness, i.e., properties that are
disanalogous to our perceptually determined spatial models.
Consider an ordinary example of a physical explanation: We explain an object's being
black in terms of the microphysical properties of the object that cause it to absorb light.
We can understand these microphysical properties as being 'blackening', i.e., as fulfilling
the functional role of making the object appear black. This explanation works, i.e., is
satisfactory, to the extent that we grasp how these microphysical properties fulfil this
functional role. This we can do only if our models of these microphysical properties are
analogical extensions of perceptible entities. Such spatial models will be of no
explanatory efficacy vis-a-vis a psychophysical theory, that is, they could not help us to
understand non-spatial properties of consciousness. Thus, because P is imperceptible,
McGinn concludes that "it will be noumenal with respect to perception-based explanatory
inferences" {ibid, 13-14). The term 'noumenal' is here used by McGinn in the more or less
Kantian sense, namely, it alludes to the world beyond appearance, i.e., independent of our
'perception-based' apprehension of the world. McGinn concludes, therefore, that we are
constitutionally unequipped to apprehend P, and as a result we are precluded from even
constructing a psychophysical theory on the basis of inference to the best explanation.
Consequently any theory of consciousness that must involve P is beyond our
understanding. We are, as McGinn likes to put it, 'cognitively closed' to a theory of
consciousness.
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The conditions McGinn describes for the construction of a theory of consciousness
seem to be beyond the capacity of even the conceivably most intelligent creature. If
neither perception nor introspection can allow a creature to apprehend P, as required
according to McGinn, the task appears to be impossible in principle. That is to say, a
theory of consciousness is absolutely cognitively closed. Indeed, McGinn accepts that "if
we suppose that all concept formation is tied to perception and introspection, however
loosely, then no mind will be capable of understanding how it [consciousness] relates to
its own body - the insolubility will be absolute" (ibid, 16). This possibility, I think,
should trouble us. He claims that a naturalistic theory of consciousness is possible in
principle. But how can we make sense of this claim if no creature could construct such a
theory? We are left having to imagine a Fregean-type third realm where unthinkable
theories exist in their own right. This fact makes his conclusion very implausible.
That said, McGinn speculates that it is 'just about' possible to conceive of some
creature that is able to construct a naturalistic theory of consciousness independently of
the faculties of perception and introspection (ibid). How? The creature would employ a
highly developed faculty of a priori reasoning, the same faculty that we employ in a
limited way with respect to numbers and other mathematical concepts, according to
McGinn. Thus, he states that we can imagine this creature conceiving of consciousness,
brains, and all the properties thereof independently of experience (ibid). This strikes me
as a feat no less miraculous than the possibility of consciousness arising in brains
causelessly that McGinn dismisses. Indeed, he surmises that the employment of such
reasoning would likely be how God cognises (ibid). What this shows, more importantly,
is that McGinn assumes that our intuitions, i.e., the basis of a priori reasoning, can
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uncover how the natural world is. This assumption is representative of an attitude wholly
discordant with that of naturalism.

1.4.1 Consciousness as a Non-spatial Property
Why does McGinn think that P, as the property of the brain that realises consciousness, is
non-spatial? Many properties are non-spatial, e.g., the property of being worth ten
dollars. But relational properties like this are only trivially non-spatial - there is no sense
in which we think of them as spatial, i.e., they are not space-implicating - what precisely
is meant by this phrase will be explained shortly. On the other hand, P is an intrinsic
property of the brain, given that it is the property of the brain responsible for the brain's
being conscious. McGinn tells us that P has to be non-spatial because consciousness itself
is self-evidently non-spatial, and so as the property responsible for generating
consciousness P must share this characteristic with consciousness. What is special about
P, we must remember, is its epistemic role, namely, apprehending it allows us to link
consciousness to the brain. And no spatial property can fulfil this role. McGinn explains
that

the senses are geared to representing a spatial world; they essentially present things
in space with spatially defined properties. But it is precisely such properties that
seem inherently incapable of resolving the mind-body problem: we cannot link
consciousness to the brain in virtue of spatial properties of the brain (1991, 11).
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But, why must we suppose that there is a quixotic property like P? Why can we not
suppose instead that no such epistemologically handy property exists? Since the idea of
an intrinsic property of the brain that is non-spatial is difficult to understand it seems
plausible to deny that such a property exists. That would be unfortunate since it would
seem to preclude us from being able to grasp directly the link between consciousness and
the brain, but so be it.
McGinn's answer is that because consciousness is a natural, as opposed to
supernatural, property it must be naturalisable in principle. He insists that "[t]here just
has to be some explanation for how brains subserve minds... some theory must exist
which accounts for the psychophysical correlation we observe" (ibid, 6). In other words,
there must be some theory, appealing to laws of nature, by which how consciousness
arises from the brain can be fully explained. And according to McGinn this theory
concerns P. For this reason McGinn is confident that P exists, albeit beyond our ken.
However, it should be emphasised that P plays a very specific epistemic role. McGinn's
claim is that if we were able to grasp P (per impossible for McGinn) we would
immediately understand how consciousness is related to the brain. By this act we would
obtain complete epistemic satisfaction vis-a-vis an explanation of how consciousness
arises from the brain. That is, we would gain a feeling of complete epistemic achievement
in our understanding of consciousness as a natural property. But as Mark Rowlands
notes, explanations do not always entail such epistemic satisfaction. Rowlands suggests
that an explanation can be adequate without its necessarily being satisfying in this way,
i.e., without its leading us to say such things as 'Now I've got it' or even 'Eureka!'
(Rowlands 2001, 60). An explanation is said to be adequate, according to Rowlands' use
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of the term, when it is rationally accepted as an explanation by us, that is, when we feel
the explanation gives us a fuller understanding of the explanandum.
Essentially Rowlands argues that sometimes an explanation is adequate but not
completely epistemically satisfying; that is to say, full-blooded epistemic satisfaction in
the sense McGinn has in mind is not a necessary condition for an explanation to be
adequate. Rowlands urges us to think of explanatory adequacy as ranging over a
continuum, starting from full-blooded epistemic satisfaction passing to decreasingly
satisfying explanations, until at some point the explanation is regarded as providing only
a minimal understanding of the explanandum. He cites the example of explaining
solidity, e.g., of metals, in terms of the ionic and covalent bonds between molecules (ibid,
62). This explanation is not epistemically satisfying insofar as it may not allow us to
understand why, for example, ionic bonds are stronger than covalent ones. Moreover,
even when this is explained, perhaps ultimately appealing to physical laws, further
questions could still arise, that is, we might never attain epistemic satisfaction. He
generalises the point as follows:

The idea under consideration is that we can, in principle, render a particular
explanation more epistemically satisfying than it is, or seems to be, by appeal to the
various physical laws that underwrite the explanation. The problem is, however, that
there is no a priori reason why physical laws should be any more epistemically
satisfying than the explanations they underwrite (2001, 63).
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The upshot of Rowlands' argument is that if an explanation in science does not have to be
completely epistemically satisfying, then we do not have to suppose that an explanation
of how consciousness arises from the brain involves P, namely, that property which
would give us a completely epistemically satisfying explanation such that one could say
'Now I understand why the brain is conscious'. In other words, accepting that because
consciousness is a natural property it must ultimately be explainable in natural terms, it
does not follow that the theory used to explain consciousness must concern P as defined
by McGinn.

1.5 A Difficulty with McGinn's Naturalism
It has already been suggested that the version of naturalism that McGinn espouses is
incompatible with the one I have recommended. McGinn, like Chalmers, assumes that
science aims to reconcile our intuitive understanding of the world with how the world is
as we experience it. We intuitively understand consciousness as non-spatial and the brain
as spatial, and the fact that science seems incapable of reconciling this conflict is seen by
McGinn as a measure of the failure of science, that is, as testament to the limitations of
our science. This is to think of our understandings in this sense as data, i.e., as
independent facts in the world. Thus, McGinn thinks that the non-spatiality of
consciousness is a given, something that science must accommodate in its theories.
However, as I have argued, this approach is antithetical to that of science. Nothing of
how we understand the world is given in this way. The intuitive plausibility of our
understanding of a phenomenon, however strong, is simply irrelevant with respect to our
scientific theories. Our intuitive understandings have no determinative role in the

49

confirmation of our theories. Again, we saw this with the example of calculus: how we
intuitively understand the infinitesimal spatiotemporally cannot be reconciled with the
theorems of calculus, but this fact has not stopped mathematicians from holding these
theorems as true. Rather, they have worked to develop a conception of the infinitesimal
that fits with the truth of the theorems. But McGinn contends that consciousness is selfevidently non-spatial, such that science must accommodate this fact. It is very difficult,
however, to see how McGinn can hold both that consciousness is non-spatial and natural.
If one were to espouse some form of mind-body dualism one would have little
problem in supposing that consciousness is non-spatial, as a non-physical property, but
McGinn denies that he is a dualist. But it is not clear how intelligible this position is. The
non-dualist must hold that there cannot be disembodied consciousness. But if being
conscious depends on the physical brain in this way, then it is hard to understand how it
is not spatial. Obviously we must be clear on what is meant by a property being spatial
exactly. We do not ordinarily talk of properties as being spatial. But a plausible way of
understanding what is meant by saying a property is spatial is to assert that it can only be
attributed to an object said to be spatial. So, for example, blue is a spatial property
because it cannot be attributed to a non-spatial object, e.g., the number two. Or
conversely, we noted that the property of being worth ten dollars is non-spatial; and this
fits with this criterion since, for example, something non-spatial like one hour of
someone's labour can be said to be worth ten dollars. Anthony Brueckner and E. Alex
Beroukhim offer a useful definition of a property's being spatial in this sense in terms of
its being space-implicating; where "a property F is space-implicating iff necessarily, if x
instantiates F, then x is spatial" (2003, 404). That is, a property is spatial only if it is
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necessarily realised by a spatial object. But while McGinn holds that consciousness is
realised, i.e., instantiated, by the brain, is it the case that he must suppose that it is
necessarily realised by such a physical object? If he does not have to suppose this, then it
seems plausible for him to assert that consciousness is indeed not space-implicating and a
fortiori non-spatial. Clearly, to say that consciousness is not a space-implicating property
in this sense is to assert that there are possible worlds in which consciousness is not
realised by a physical object. Unfortunately, this suggests that disembodied
consciousness is possible. Again, as Brueckner and Beroukhim point out, this is not a
conclusion McGinn countenances (ibid, 398-99). McGinn recognises that the possibility
of disembodied consciousness makes it difficult to understand how consciousness is
related to the rest of nature, i.e., to other natural properties; thinking of consciousness as
natural would be made impossible. It seems, therefore, that by asserting that
consciousness is non-spatial McGinn's position collapses into the dualism he denies. But
if he were to give up this claim, then his entire argument for his non-constructive
naturalism fails.
Perhaps, in reply, one could argue that consciousness itself is not realised by the
physical properties of the brain but rather by P. Hence consciousness does not have to be
construed as a space-implicating property. But, of course, by holding that P is non-spatial
the difficulty is merely transferred to P; that is, if one holds that P is not spaceimplicating then it could be instantiated non-physically, which implies in turn that
consciousness can also be. Therefore, the possibility of disembodied consciousness is not
averted.
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But, perhaps McGinn only needs to assert that consciousness is non-spatial to the
extent that it is imperceptible in principle. Thus, he might be willing to suppose that
consciousness is space-implicating, but to note that just as we cannot perceive something
as being worth ten dollars, so we cannot perceive something as being conscious.
However, this comparison seems spurious. As noted earlier, the property of being worth
ten dollars is trivially imperceptible, i.e., non-spatial, given that it is relational, whereas
consciousness is non-trivially so because it is thought of as an intrinsic property of a
physical object. Consciousness is realised in virtue of the physical constitution of the
object in some crucial sense. Still, as McGinn points out, we cannot perceive the brain as
conscious, rather than as soggy and grey, for example. But what is interesting about this
observation is that the term 'consciousness' is not ordinarily applied to the brain; rather,
we ordinarily think of people, and perhaps some other creatures, as being conscious.
Indeed, we usually judge that S's brain is conscious only if S, its owner, is conscious.
And to the extent that we judge people to be conscious we do so on the basis of
observations about them. Therefore, consciousness, thought of as a property of people
and other creatures, is observable. In this regard Nagel, for example, famously asserts
that bats are conscious and that consequently there is something that it is like to be a
bat.17 If, however, consciousness is understood purely phenomenologically, that is, if we
each only understood being conscious from the first-person viewpoint, then we could not
assent to Nagel's claim. But we can assent to it, as Nagel does. The very question 'what is
it like to be a bat?' would make no sense if consciousness were understood purely
phenomenologically. A great deal more will be said on this issue in chapter 4.

17

See Nagel 1974. Nagel's views are discussed in some detail in the chapter 2.
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1.6 Summary
In this chapter I have outlined naturalism characterised by the treatment of philosophy as
being continuous with science. This continuity follows from the fact that philosophical
hypotheses, ultimately justified by our intuitions, cannot overrule our scientific
hpotheses. In section 1.11 illustrated this proscription using two historical examples of
failed attempts by philosophers to undermine scientific or mathematical theories by
appeal to our intuitive understandings of certain phenomena. Specifically, we looked at
Descartes' denial of atomism based on his intuitive understanding of space and at
Berkeley's attack on calculus based on its incompatibility with our intuitive
understanding of continuity in spatiotemporal terms. Consequently, I argued, it behoves
us to follow the precept: How we think of the world to be should ultimately be measured
according to our experiences. And so how we think of the world should not be governed
by our intuitions, however compelling these might be.
In section 1.21 pointed out that this rule is often not followed with respect to one
particular phenomenon in the world, namely, consciousness. Because our intuitive firstperson understanding of consciousn6ss is so compelling - it is how we are immediately
acquainted with consciousness - there is the temptation to insist that our scientific
theories must accommodate it. And given that consciousness understood in such
phenomenological terms seems patently to resist naturalisation in this way, a scepticism
prevails. This scepticism is usually expressed in terms of consciousness being
unexplainable in physical terms. In this section we looked at one of the most notable
sceptics in this regard, namely, Chalmers. In the case of Chalmers I showed how his nonnaturalistic attitude leads him to make extravagant metaphysical claims that are
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unfalsifiable. Indeed, I argued that his proposed theory of consciousness, based on this
scepticism, is antithetical to science in the same way that Descartes' anti-atomism was.
In section 1.3 I pointed out that matters are confused by the fact that these sceptics
call themselves naturalists. Both Chalmers and McGinn call themselves naturalists
because they hold that everything is in principle naturalisable. However, they claim that
science, at least as it is practised, cannot explain consciousness. According to Chalmers
consciousness can be naturalised only if how we practise science is suitably reformed;
and this requires our conceiving of consciousness as a fundamental property. This reform,
I argued, requires us absurdly to hold as true theories that are empirically untestable.
According to McGinn, while consciousness is in principle naturalisable our innate
cognitive limitations rule out our ever being able to construct a theory of consciousness.
Underpinning the claims of both these philosophers is the assumption that science must
accommodate our intuitive understandings of consciousness as determined from the firstperson viewpoint. And in this sense their views are not naturalistic, i.e., they do not adopt
a naturalistic attitude.
In section 1.4 I looked at the plausibility of McGinn's view. I noted his claim that
consciousness is likely naturalisable only for a creature that can construct a theory of
consciousness a priori. This claim, I pointed out, betrays a staunchly non-naturalistic
attitude. Further, we saw the consequences of this attitude in terms of his central claim
that consciousness is self-evidently non-spatial - here he appeals to our intuitions. If
consciousness is indeed taken to be non-spatial we concluded that we cannot rule out the
possibility of disembodied consciousness. This possibility, however, is incompatible with
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a naturalistic worldview, since consciousness would have to be in some sense
independent of other natural phenomena.
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Chapter 2
The Problem of

Consciousness

In the last chapter we looked at subsuming a phenomenon under our scientific theories,
that is, naturalising a phenomenon. There I argued that our intuitions cannot determine
our naturalistic conceptions of phenomena. If our conception of a natural phenomenon
according to a scientific theory is contrary to our intuitive understanding of it, so much
the worse for our intuitive understanding. With respect to consciousness I noted that our
intuitive understanding of it derives from our immediate acquaintance with it from the
first-person viewpoint. This phenomenological understanding of consciousness does not
seem to square with how we think of the world in physical terms. This essentially
describes the problem of consciousness - there seems to be no way of understanding
consciousness as a physical property, and hence we cannot rule out the possibility that it
is not physical.
Now, given the remarks above the obvious reply is that ultimately our intuitive
understanding of consciousness is irrelevant and so there is no problem. What
complicates matters, however, is that, as noted in the last chapter, our intuitive firstperson understanding of consciousness seems ineliminable. While, as we saw vis-a-vis
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calculus, we can think of continuity in analytical terms rather than spatiotemporally, the
same approach to consciousness appears impossible. We seem forced to accommodate
our intuitive phenomenological understanding of consciousness in our naturalisation of it.
My aim in this chapter is to face up to the strength of this intuitive understanding of
consciousness. It is this understanding that underpins the problem of consciousness.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to evaluate the problem of consciousness as a
barrier to the possibility of naturalising consciousness. The problem, as was noted in the
introduction, is usually delineated in terms of being a problem for physicalism. As such it
has been used by some to argue that physicalism is either false or open to serious doubt.
Below I shall look at the most notable anti-physicalist arguments in turn, namely, those
offered by Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. I argue that all three
arguments fail to refute physicalism, which at least suggests that there are no a priori
reasons for denying that consciousness is physical.
Here, I assume that the physicality of consciousness is a sufficient condition for its
being naturalisable.18 Naturalising a phenomenon is best understood as explaining it in
terms of, or specifying its relations to, other natural properties. William Seager offers a
useful definition. He states that a phenomenon, X, is naturalised if and only if (1) X has
been explained in terms of something else, (2) the something else does not logically
involve X, and (3) the something else is properly natural (Seager 1999, 249). Moreover,
to naturalise a phenomenon is thought of as explaining it in physical terms. The
underlying physicalist assumption here is eloquently expressed by Quine: "Nothing
happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without
18

I borrow this phrasing from Uriah Kriegel (see Kriegel 2005, 23, n. 1).
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some redistribution of microphysical states" (1978, 98). A microphysical state is any state
that can be described in terms of the fundamental entities posited by physics. This is to
embrace physicalism roughly characterised by the claim that all the facts are detemined
by the physical facts. What this amounts to exactly is a matter of dispute. However,
perhaps the least contentious construal of physicalism vis-a-vis the mental is to assume
the mental supervenes on the physical, as intimated by Quine's quote above. Here it is
supposed that mental properties depend in some minimal sense on physical properties.
This dependence is often understood in terms of covariation, namely, that any change in
mental properties of some creature, say, necessarily implies a change in some of its
physical properties.19
I shall look at the anti-physicalism of Nagel, Jackson and Chalmers in turn. Nagel,
one of the first people to enunciate the problem of consciousness, is beholden to a fullblooded realism about the phenomenological features of experience. Consequently, he
thinks that only by explaining how these features are physical properties can we assume
physicalism is true. Below, I argue that his realism is too strong. It is based on the
assumption that it makes sense to talk about understanding what it is like to be, i.e., to
have the phenomenology of, some other kind of creature - his example is being a bat. I
argue that we cannot in fact make sense of this idea, thus undermining the intuition he
appeals to vis-a-vis the problem of consciousness.
Jackson likewise subscribes to a full-blooded realism about the phenomenological
features of experience. He argues that our having conscious experiences furnishes us with
direct knowledge of the phenomenological features of these experiences, but that this
knowledge cannot be captured in physical terms. No amount of physical information
19

See Kim 1994, 575-583.
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about the world will tell us anything about the phenomenological features of experience.
Therefore, he concludes, these features cannot be physical. In reply, following similar
objections raised by Paul Churchland, I argue that the kind of direct knowledge or
acquaintance we have of these features does not concern the kind of factual knowledge
we have of the physical world. Consequently, he does not succeed in showing that the
phenomenological features of experience, i.e., qualia, are non-physical properties.
Finally, Chalmers appeals to our intuitive understanding of consciousness to argue
that we can always conceive of consciousness independently of the physical facts.
Essentially, he presents an augmented version of the classic conceivability argument to
the effect that because consciousness can always be thought of as independent of any
physical properties it cannot be identical to any such properties. In other words, Chalmers
argues that consciousness does not supervene on physical properties in the sense needed
to supposrt physicalism. Instead, he argues that consciousness is only contingently
dependent on the physical; that is to say, while in the actual world conscious states
depend on physical states (in terms of what he calls 'informational invariance') it does not
follow that in some world physically identical with this one consciousness even exists.
This conclusion leads Chalmers to suggest that we can construct a theory of
consciousness by thinking of conscious properties as fundamental in the sense of their
existence being taken as a brute fact about the actual world. Such a theory of
consciousness requires a revision of our sciences as mentioned in the last chapter. My
response to Chalmers' view is two-fold. First, I rehearse some of the arguments against
his conceivability argument, focusing on one given by Peter Carruthers. I support the
conclusion that Chalmers' conceivability argument fails. Second, I point out that the idea
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of thinking of conscious properties as basic is incoherent. Therefore, his proposed theory
of consciousness, I argue, cannot work. Together the refutation of these three antiphysicalist arguments shows that despite appeal to our intuitive understanding of
consciousness it has not been demonstrated that physicalism is false. In this respect, the
possibility of naturalising consciousness is not ruled out.

2.1 Nagelian Anti-Physicalism
It is Thomas Nagel who first formulated the problem of consciousness in his classic
article 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' (1974). He claims that, at the time of his writing this
article, identity theorists had failed to consider seriously the subjective character of
conscious experiences. For a creature to have conscious experiences, Nagel points out,
there must be something that it is like to be that creature. This is the felt quality of
experience. But to say that each conscious experience is identical with some physical,
e.g., neural, state tells us nothing about its felt quality. This in itself is perhaps a trivial
observation. But Nagel proceeds to offer reasons why we should think that, quite
generally, physical descriptions of experience cannot tell us anything about their
subjective character. Consequently we might at least suspect that the subjective character
of experience is not physical.
He begins by characterising the subjective as that pertaining to a particular point of
view, i.e., a first-person point of view. According to Nagel the subjective aspect, or
character, of experience is only apprehensible from the first-person point of view. By
contrast, Nagel notes, most properties can be apprehended from the third-person point of
view; that is to say, grasping them is not dependent on any particular point of view. For
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example, while a creature with a different perceptual apparatus may be unable to see that
a table, say, is a certain height, it can nonetheless apprehend this feature of the table in
other ways. Hence, the height of a table, as a physical property, is independent of any
particular way of apprehending it; and as such this feature is independent of any
particular point of view inasmuch as one's point of view is determined by how one
perceives things in the world, as Nagel suggests. Accordingly, insofar as pain is identical
with certain physical features, e.g., certain neurological properties, it is understood as
being independent of any particular point of view. But, viewed phenomenologically a
pain is defined in terms of its felt quality, and this feature seems to be essentially
connected to the single point of view of the person having the sensation (1974, 437). Yet,
so described the subjective character of experience seems to be essentially private, such
that it must be seen as a property of experience that could never be known by another
person. Hence, we slide into solipsism where I, at least, enjoy such felt qualities of
experience, but there is no way for me to know if others do. Nagel resists such solipsism
by insisting that there is a matter of fact about what it is like for either you or me to have
conscious experiences. He states:

I am not adverting.. .to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point
of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a
type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the
comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in
which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say
of another what the quality of the other's experience is (ibid, 442).
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Nagel's claim is that the subjective characters of our individual experiences are alike. So,
for example, the felt quality of person A's toothache is like that of person B's toothache.
Why should we think this when such felt qualities are not apprehensible by others?
Nagel assumes their felt qualities are alike because A and B are of the same species,
based on their being physiologically alike in relevant ways. Therefore, as members of the
same species we can know what each other's experiences are like, since we share the
same type of first-person point of view.
But what of a different type of creature? Nagel assumes that mammals and perhaps
other higher animals are conscious, and therefore there must be something that it is like to
be each of these creatures. Can we know the subjective characters of their experiences?
He considers the case of a bat. As a mammal it is plausible to assume that there is
something that it is like to be a bat, that is, to have bat experiences. However, certain of
their experiences are quite alien to our own. Specifically, he is thinking of bat sonar.
Since we do not have anything like this kind of perception it is difficult for us to imagine
what it is like to echolocate. Imagining what it is like to be a bat, as Nagel describes it,
involves extrapolating "to the inner life of the bat from our own case" (1974, 438). Thus,
to the extent that our experiences are different from those of bats, we cannot extrapolate
from our own case. We cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat, in this sense, by
imagining ourselves as bats, e.g., our hanging upside down, our flying about. What is
demanded is our being able to conceive what it is like from the bat's point of view to do
these sorts of things, specifically to echolocate.
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This difficulty can be generalised. Given that phenomenological facts are only
apprehensible from a particular point of view, they are constitutively dependent on, i.e.,
essentially connected to, the type of point of view from which they are apprehended.
They are, after all, facts about having a specific type of point of view. Again, in contrast,
physical facts are conceived objectively, that is, independently of any particular point of
view. Clearly, therefore, if phenomenological facts can only be thought of as concerning
a particular point of view, there is little hope of conceiving them objectively. This simply
seems to be ruled out. Indeed, with respect to subjective phenomena in general, Nagel
observes that "any shift to greater objectivity - that is, less attachment to a specific
viewpoint - does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us
farther away from it" (ibid, 445).
We have already noted the contrasting nature between phenomenological and
physical concepts in this regard. Nagel gives the example of lightning. While the
apprehension of lightning requires a first-person point of view, it is not understood
according to how it is perceived. So if we were to imagine a Martian that has different
perceptual capacities from us, e.g., perhaps it perceives only ultraviolet light, it is still
possible to assume that it could understand the concept of lightning. Lightning is not
essentially understood as a bluish flash in the sky, rather this is merely one of its modes
of presentation (ibid, 443). It is in this sense that a physical concept like lightning is
independent of any particular point of view. Thus, as Nagel explains, "it seems inevitable
that an objective, physical theory will abandon that [first-person] point of view" (ibid,
437). That said, the identity theorist maintains that conscious experiences are physical
states. If this is so, Nagel argues, then their subjective characters should be reducible to
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physical properties, i.e., we should be able to explain them objectively in physical terms.
But, as we have seen, there seems to be no possibility of doing this.
According to Nagel this contrast between phenomenological and physical concepts
presents a difficulty for physicalism. If we wish to hold physicalism true, then we need to
explain how the subjective characters of experiences quite generally are related to
physical properties. Accordingly, we need to explain the subjective characters of a bat's
echolocatory perceptions, for example, in physical terms; that is to say, we should
provide a physical, i.e., objective account of what it is like to have such bat experiences
for a bat. However, a physical account of the subjective characters of such experiences
requires abandoning the particular point of view of the creature in question; and since
these characters are dependent on this point of view it does not seem possible to provide
such an account. Therefore, inasmuch as this is not possible, there is no reason to hold
that physicalism is true. Nagel concludes that the onus is on the physicalist, e.g., the
identity theorist, to demonstrate how a physical account of the subjective character of
experience is possible, that is, "[i]f physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological
features must themselves be given a physical account" (ibid). He therefore expresses the
kind of mysterianism to which Joseph Levine later subscribes, namely, that as it stands
we are not in a position to know how physicalism might be true. Nagel, in his later
writing, tends to the conclusion that physicalism is a misguided doctrine, for example,
when he states:

It is the phenomena of consciousness themselves that pose the clearest challenge to
the idea that physical objectivity gives the general form of reality. In response I want
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not to abandon the idea of objectivity entirely but rather to suggest that the physical
is not its only possible interpretation (1986,16-17).

But in the earlier article under discussion he tempers his anti-physicalism by suggesting
that our inability to explain consciousness in physical terms might result from conceptual
limitations. He considers the claim that matter is energy. Unlike current physicists, rather
than the lay person, the pre-Socratic philosopher did not have the concepts to enable him
to understand this claim. Nagel suggests that with respect to the claim that consciousness
is physical we might be in the same position as the pre-Socratic philosopher with respect
to the claim that matter is energy. But perhaps in the distant future people will have
developed the concepts that will allow them to see how consciousness is physical. For
now we remain in the dark.
Nagel speculates on how one might provide such a physicalist account. What is
demanded, he suggests, is a way of conceiving of such phenomenological features
objectively, i.e., independently of any particular point of view, without at the same time
abandoning the particular point of view that constitutes it. This appears to be plainly
contradictory. It describes a necessarily impossible task. However, rather than reaching
this conclusion Nagel argues that it could be that this task merely seems impossible to us
because of our current conceptual framework. We cannot rule out the possibility that
there is a way of understanding the subjective character of any creature's experience
objectively, but that either we presently lack the concepts needed to gain such an
understanding, or we are perhaps cognitively closed to these concepts (ibid, 440). In this
respect Nagel embraces an agnostic mysterianism.

SeeLevine 1983.
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Despite the explicit denial that his argument shows that physicalism is false it is
often interpreted as effectively showing this. As noted, the paradoxical nature of
providing an objective account of the subjective character of experience seems to make
defending physicalism impossible, rather than difficult. To the extent that we must think
of consciousness as being dependent on a particular point of view we cannot suppose
physicalism is true if physicalism demands giving up that point of view. Indeed, in later
writings Nagel takes this view. He diagnoses physicalism as suffering from what he calls
"objective blindness", that is, it presupposes that all facts can be understood
independently of a particular point of view (1986, 7).
Should we conclude, therefore, that physicalism is false? Again, the provision of a
physicalist account of these phenomenological features seems plainly paradoxical, in the
sense of being self-contradictory. The development of concepts that bridge the first- and
third-person viewpoints seems hopeless in a way that our speculations concerning other
conceptual advances do not. For example, we presently do not have the conceptual
wherewithal to explain how gravity relates to electromagnetism and the weak and strong
nuclear forces, nonetheless there is nothing paradoxical about the development of such
concepts.
Crucially, the paradoxically of understanding the subjective character of experience
in physical terms points to another possibility, namely, that the very idea of
understanding what it is like to be another creature is incoherent. Indeed, below I argue
that it is incoherent. Moreover, its incoherence suggests that Nagel's doubts about
physicalism are unfounded. The worry is that the subjective character of experience
depends on a particular point of view implying that it is impossible to understand, and a
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fortiori to know, facts concerning such phenomenological features except from the firstperson point of view. But this is impossible, I contend, because there is no sense in which
we can know these facts. That is to say, rather than our being unable to gain such
knowledge there is nothing for us to know or understand vis-a-vis facts concerning what
91

it is like to be some creature.
Nagel thinks that it is possible in principle to know what it. is like to be an alien
creature given that some being unlike ourselves could imagine it. He writes:

From the perspective of one type of being, the subjective features of the mental
states of a very different type of being are not accessible either through subjective
imagination or through the kind of objective representation that captures the physical
world... A being of total imaginative flexibility could project himself directly into
every possible subjective point of view, and would not need such an objective
method to think about the full range of possible inner lives (1986, 17).

But what grounds does Nagel have for assuming that such a being could exist? He
plausibly defines imagining in this sense as extrapolating to the inner life of another type
of creature from one's own case. If this is impossible for us to do in the case of bats
because we are so different from them, how are we to suppose that this being - itself
necessarily different from some other creatures - is able to do this instead? What faculty

" A similar line of argument is taken by Yujin Nagasawa. Nagasawa points out that if it
is impossible in principle to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, then physicalism is
not threatened. Here it is assumed that physicalism might be false because there are facts
about bats that the physicalist cannot know, i.e., facts concerning the phenomenological
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does this being possess that we do not? Nagel has nothing to say about this. This being's
imagining what it is like to be another creature rests on extrapolating from its own point
of view, and this is a limitation - relative to its own point of view some creatures are
always going to be sufficiently unlike it to make such extrapolations less successful.
Having a point of view puts limits on one's imaginative ability no matter what kind of
being you are. Likely, by the phrase 'total imaginative flexibility' Nagel is attempting to
describe a capacity to imagine beyond the limitations of a particular point of view. But
this capacity amounts to the ability to apprehend another point of view directly, that is,
without having to extrapolate from one's own. Such a capacity can only be thought of as
divine since it entails powers unavailable to finite beings.
Let us suppose that the being Nagel presumes is ideal, and as such it is in essence
divine. It seems possible by this measure to think that there may be facts such as what it
is like to be another kind of creature that are knowable by such a being, granting these
facts are unknowable by us. In similar vein we might suppose that any infinite decimal
expansion of a transcendental number, such as it, is determinate such that it is at least
graspable by God or some infinite being. This is indeed what Nagel supposes while of
course, as finite beings, we cannot grasp such an infinite expansion.22 By this measure for
example, whether or not the sequence 7777' occurs in the infinite decimal expansion of TT
is in principle determinable. However, we cannot determine this not because of the
limited calculating ability of our brains, but rather because we cannot make sense of the
idea of this sequence occurring inside an infinite decimal expansion - an expansion
features of their experiences. However, these facts cannot be known whether physicalism
is true or not, since it is impossible to know them in principle (see Nagasawa 2004).
22
This example, as presented by Wittgenstein, is discussed by Nagel. See Nagel
1986, 107.
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which we must think of as limitless. As Wittgenstein points out, there is no inside an
entity without limits. Perhaps God has the imaginative ability to think of this sequence
occurring inside the infinite decimal expansion, but we can never conceive of this; and
because we cannot do so, the question 'Does "7777" occur inside the infinite decimal
expansion of n? is nonsensical and hence unanswerable.
Likewise, because we cannot even conceive of imagining what it is like for a bat to
be a bat, for example, the question 'What is it like for a bat to be a bat?' is nonsensical.
Our inability in this respect does not concern our limited cognitive capacity, rather it
concerns the conceptual impossibility of any non-bat creature imagining what it is like
for a bat to be a bat in the way Nagel assumes to be possible. The impossibility of this
task is illustrated by an example originally given by Bernard Williams. First, Williams
thinks of his imagining himself as Napoleon; so like an actor on stage he plays the role of
Napoleon, imagining himself as a French general, perhaps surveying the destruction at
Austerlitz or spending his days in exile on the island of St Helena. Imagining such things
seems possible. Then, however, he tries to think of himself being Napoleon, that is, his
having the same physiology, history, character, etc. of the actual Napoleon. Williams
puzzles: "What could be the difference between the actual Napoleon and the imagined
me?" (1973, 42). His point is that insofar as there is no discernible difference we must
doubt that he can imagine himself being Napoleon. We cannot make sense of this idea, it
is incoherent.
There is no sense in which we can come to know facts about the subjective character
of the experiences of other creatures, e.g., a bat. Our not being able to make sense of
knowing such facts must be distinguished from our being unable to know them. Its
23

See Ambrose, 195-199.

nonsensicality in this sense points to there being nothing to know or understand. Now,
one might object that intuitively we think of such facts as knowable. We feel there is a
matter of fact about what it is like to be a bat. But, again, there is no sense in which we
can understand these facts as such, just as we cannot understand there being a fact about
whether 7777' occurs in the infinite decimal expansion of n or not. What is it like for a
bat to be a bat? Again, the question is unanswerable. Is this to deny that there is
something that it is like to be a bat? To paraphrase Wittgenstein, there is not something
that it is like to be such a thing, but that is not to say there is nothing that it is like to be
one.24 What it is like to be a bat is not something in the sense of being identifiable by
others. There is, nevertheless, something that it is like to be a bat in the most general
sense that there is a world for a bat, rather than nothing at all.
To sum up, Nagel points to a crucial characteristic of conscious experience that his
predecessors and peers seemed to overlook, namely, that the phenomenological features
of experiences are dependent on a particular point of view. Nagel worries that this
characteristic of experience makes it difficult for us to understand and therefore come to
know facts concerning these features. I have argued above that the paradoxical nature of
understanding from a third-person point of view these phenomenological features that
depend on a particular point of view should be taken seriously. It suggests that asking
what it is like to be such-and-such a creature is nonsensical - such questions are
unanswerable. Seeing this endeavour as nonsensical rather than difficult to answer
undermines the threat to physicalism that Nagel worries about. Physicalism cannot be
false insofar as it cannot explain facts concerning the phenomenological features of

See Wittgenstein 1958, 304.
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experience, as Nagel reasons, because there is no sense in which these facts can be
explained.

2.2 Jackson's Knowledge Argument
We have seen that Nagel presents an epistemological problem for physicalism that he
believes threatens it. By contrast Frank Jackson argues outright that physicalism is false.
Although Jackson is concerned with the difficulty addressed by Nagel, he sees the focus
of his argument to be quite different. He takes Nagel to be concerned with the problem of
describing what it is like to be a particular type of creature in physical terms (see Jackson
1982, 131-32). Jackson, on the other hand, points to the problem of explaining the
subjective character of any particular experience in physical terms, something that he
thinks must be possible if this feature is physical. His argument can be summed up as
follows: No amount of physical information can capture what it is like for a person to
have a certain type of experience, e.g., the experience of redness looking at a ripe tomato.
So facts about our experiences concerning these kinds of phenomenological features
cannot be known in physical terms. Therefore, these features are not physical in nature.
Hence, physicalism is false. Below I argue that Jackson's argument fails because it rests
on an invalid inference he makes concerning acquaintance with the phenomenological
qualities of our own experiences and knowledge of the phenomenological qualities of
other people's experiences. This problem is made clear when we consider Paul
Churchland's closely related objections to Jackson's argument.
Jackson asks us to imagine an individual he calls 'Fred', who reports being able to
distinguish two colours with respect to the wavelengths of light we describe as the red
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spectrum. His claim is supported by evidence, namely, he is able repeatedly to separate a
pile of ripe tomatoes into two consistent groups; where these tomatoes appear to
everyone else as being a single colour. As well, careful study of his physiology
concerning vision reveals he is abnormal in relevant ways. We might assume, therefore,
that Fred realises at least one distinctive colour quale with respect to what he calls 'redi'
and 'red2', that is, the distinct colours that we only see as red. Jackson notes that no
amount of physical information about the differences between Fred and the rest of us
describes how redi and red2 feel to him (ibid, 129). Physical information is any
information used to describe functional roles of, in this case, Fred's visual processes in
relation to physical objects in the world. This is information about the world we gain
from the core natural sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology. There is something
about Fred, i.e., a property of some of his colour experiences, that no amount of physical
information can describe.
One might perhaps doubt that this putative property of some of Fred's colour
experiences really exists, since it cannot be described in functional or physical terms. But,
in reply, Jackson imagines someone else acquiring the capacity to see the new colour, or
colours, by surgical means; so that after the operation she declares "So that is what it is
like to see the colours that Fred saw." This suggests that she learns something genuinely
new about Fred. In the same vein Jackson offers another example concerning a
neuroscientist called 'Mary', who is raised from birth in a black-and-white environment.
Mary has learned everything there is to know about the physical processes concerning
vision; that is to say, she knows all the physical information there is about vision. Yet, if
she is suddenly presented with a colour, there is no doubt, according to Jackson, that she
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would learn something new, namely, what it is like to see this colour, i.e., some colour
quale. And given that she knows everything physical about vision, this new thing that she
would learn cannot be a physical property. Hence, physicalism is false.
Most of the objections to Jackson's argument centre on the example of Mary. So this
is where I shall also concentrate my efforts. Consider one of the objections leveled by
Paul Churchland. Churchland offers the following construal of Jackson's argument (1985,
23):

(1) Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their properties.
(2) It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about sensations
and their properties.
Therefore, by Leibniz's law,
(3) Sensations and their properties ^ brain states and their properties.

Churchland points out that (3) only follows from (1) and (2) so long as the phrase "Mary
knows" is employed univocally in these two premisses. But this is not the case. Premiss
(1) concerns prepositional knowledge while (2) concerns knowledge by acquaintance.
Given this fact it is entirely possible that the properties of Mary's brain and those
pertaining to her colour experiences are one and the same. Churchland determines that at
most we can say that Mary, before seeing the colour red for the first time, "does not have
a representation of redness in her prelinguistic medium of representation for sensory
variables" (1985, 24). In other words, she is not acquainted with the sensation of redness
for herself. And when premiss (2) is expressed in this way, without using the term 'know
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about', we can see that (3) does not follow from it in conjunction with (1). Therefore,
Jackson's argument plausibly interpreted in this way is invalid.
In response to Churchland's objection above (Jackson 1986) Jackson says that
Churchland's construal of his knowledge argument is not accurate. Jackson agrees that
Mary learns a new fact about herself when seeing something red in the trivial sense that
she has never had this kind of experience before. He observes that before being released
from her black and white environment Mary "could not have known facts about her
experience of red, for there were no such facts to know" (1986, 130). What is crucial,
however, is that upon seeing the colour red for the first time Mary gains knowledge about
the property of her own experience, which is likewise a property of other people's
experiences according to Jackson. Since the physicalist assumes that Mary already knew
about all the physical properties of people's experiences, it should not be possible for
Mary to learn anything new in this respect. The fact that Mary would do so indicates that
this property that Mary learns about cannot be physical.25 What matters, Jackson thinks,
is that after seeing the colour red for the first time Mary realises that she did not know
(howsoever) about certain properties of other people's visual experiences, i.e., red qualia.
Accordingly, he offers a more accurate formulation of the knowledge argument (1986,
293):

(a) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about
other people.
25

This assumption is challenged by Daniel Dennett, who argues that if indeed Mary
knows everything about hers and other people's visual experiences in physical terms,
then she would not learn anything new when seeing the colour red for the first time.
Jackson assumes that she could not know about what he calls red qualia, but he provides
no independent argument for this claim. He simply appeals to our intuitions in this
respect (see Dennett 1991, 398-406).
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(b) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about
other people (because she learns something about them on her release).
Therefore,
(c) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist
story.

The suggestion is that by construing the argument in this way the charge of equivocation
is deflected since we can see, as Jackson explains, that "the point is not the kind, manner,
or type of knowledge Mary has but what she knows" {ibid).
But, as Churchland notes in reply to Jackson's defence of his argument, this more
accurate formulation of it still does not escape the charge of equivocation (see
Churchland 1998, 143-45). He notes that (a) is an implicit conditional that says that 'if
there is any property of people and this property is physical, then Mary knows about this
property'. In (b) we are told that there is one thing that is a property of people that Mary
does not know about. That is to say, the consequent of the conditional implied by (a) is
false. Accordingly, we infer that its antecedent is false, that is, it is not the case that all of
the properties of people are physical, hence (c). Churchland points out, however, that
inferring (c) from (a) and (b) is only legitimate when the phrase 'know about' is used
univocally in (a) and (b). And, once again, this is not the case. Therefore, Jackson's
formulation of the knowledge argument is invalid .

'" Churchland insists that the burden is on Jackson to provide a version of his argument
that avoids this equivocation. Churchland himself suggests one way of trying to do this,
namely, by quantifying over all the possible ways of knowing about properties. The
suggestion involves claiming that if there is any property and it is physical, then Mary
knows about it in each and every way possible. While equivocation is thereby avoided
the universally quantified conditional expressed by this claim is too strong. Mary, after
all, lacks one way of knowing about the properties of people because of her upbringing
(see Churchland 1998,149-51 and 153-57).
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The equivocation that Churchland points out in Jackson's improved formulation of
the knowledge argument is clear enough. Indeed, Churchland is prompted to remark:
"Here I am surprised that Jackson sees any progress at all with the... formulation, since I
continue to see the same equivocation found in my earlier casting of his argument" (1998,
144). Why would Jackson not have anticipated this difficulty given that this formulation
is meant to defend against the charge? I think the answer lies with premiss (b). There he
stresses that after her release Mary learns something new about other people. Crucially,
he not only assumes that Mary comes to know by acquaintance what it is like for her to
see the colour red, he also explicitly claims that she gains factual knowledge about other
people's visual experiences. And this factual knowledge is propositional in kind. He
supposes that once Mary has a sensation of redness she is justified in asserting that
thereby she knows that other people's experience of seeing the colour red has 'this
property', i.e., the red quale she is said to realise at the moment in question. Before she
lacked this propositional knowledge, that is, she did not know that other people's red
experiences have this property. Thus, since the knowledge she lacked before her release
is propositional, the phrase 'know about' in (a) and (b) is used univocally.
But how exactly is Mary justified in believing that other people's colour experiences
have this property, i.e., as she is acquainted with it, given that her evidence is limited to
her own case? Jackson equates doubting that this property is realised by others to
scepticism about other minds. Accordingly, it is as much a mistake for Mary to doubt that
by experiencing redness she learns something new about other people's colour experience
as it is for her to doubt that other people have minds (1986, 294). But here we need to
distinguish between her knowing that other people's experiences of red have this i.e., a
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phenomenological quality understood indexically, and her knowing that they have some
phenomenological quality. Scepticism about other minds concerns this latter kind of
knowledge, i.e., doubting that other people's experiences of red have any
phenomenological quality at all. If, on the other hand, we grant that other people's
experiences of red have some phenomenological quality it does not follow that this, i.e.,
the quale with which Mary is newly acquainted, is the same type that others enjoy.
Appeal to the implausibility of scepticism about other minds, therefore, does not permit
Mary to assume that she knows that other people's experience of red have the same
phenomenological quality as her own.
More generally, we noted that Jackson assumes that this knowledge that Mary gains
is propositional in kind. He supposes that Mary comes to know that other people's
experiences of red are like this. However, knowledge about/? is propositional to the
extent that it is justifiable, that is, to the extent that it is possible in principle to provide
reasons for believing that/?. Mary cannot provide any such reasons with respect to her
supposedly new knowledge about other people's experiences. That is because her
knowledge of the phenomenological quality of her own experience of red is
noninferential in nature, that is, she comes to have it directly. Therefore, she has no
means by which to justify her knowing about other people's experiences. At best, as
Jackson suggests, she might appeal to our not doubting seriously that other people have
minds. But as we have seen, such an appeal is not justification for the knowledge claim
Mary is imagined to make.
To sum up, despite her rejection of scepticism about other minds Mary can still
plausibly doubt that the red quale she realises is the same as that of other normally
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sighted people. This fact tells us that Mary is not justified in assuming that she knows
that others realise the same kind of red quale as she does. In other words, by her new
colour experience she does not gain new propositional knowledge about other people, as
Jackson claims. Therefore, his claim that what Mary learns on seeing colour for the first
time is a fact about other people is spurious. More generally, the charge of equivocation
still holds, so that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to refute physicalism.

2.3 Chalmers' Panpsychism
We have seen that neither Nagel's scepticism about physicalism nor Jackson's antiphysicalist argument are successful. But, more recently David Chalmers has offered some
interesting arguments against physicalism which have become influential. It therefore
behoves us to consider Chalmers' views in some detail.
How we think of consciousness seems utterly distinct from how we think of the
physical world. Nothing about how we understand consciousness, it seems, falls under a
strictly physical description. While, in response to this fact, it may be plausible to think of
consciousness as supernatural, that is, as something that transcends the physical world,
such thinking is wholly counter to our scientific worldview. The success of the sciences
quite generally suggests overwhelmingly that we have no need to appeal to supernatural
forces to explain phenomena. Perhaps the death knell for supernaturalism in this regard
was Charles Darwin's explanation of the origin of species in wholly naturalistic terms.
Thus, despite its seeming incommensurability with physical phenomena we endeavour to
naturalise consciousness, that is, to bring it under our sciences.
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But this incommensurability points to an underlying difficulty for the project of
naturalising consciousness. As David Chalmers notes: "All sorts of mental phenomena
have yielded to scientific investigation, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many
have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target"
(1995, 200). This constitutes what Chalmers dubs the 'hard problem' of consciousness. He
diagnoses the problem in very broad terms as follows:

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of [conscious] experience. But the
question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing.
Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory
information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep
blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is
like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed
that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of
why or how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life
at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does (ibid, 201).

The problem, as Chalmers sees it, originates from the nature of explanations used in the
natural sciences. The natural sciences standardly employ reductive explanations which
involve defining phenomena functionally. More precisely, the scientist explains some
phenomenon, X, by specifying the mechanism that realises X's functional role. For
example, reproduction can be analysed in terms of its functional role, i.e., roughly to the
ability of an organism to produce another organism (see Chalmers 1996,43-44).

Accordingly, a fleshed out analysis of this sort constitutes an explanation of the
phenomenon. However, such reductive explanations fail with respect to conscious
experience. Chalmers contends that any detailed descriptions of the mechanisms in the
brain involved in cognitive processes will not explain why these mechanisms give rise to
conscious experience. Thus it makes sense to ask: "Why doesn't this informationprocessing go on 'in the dark', free of any inner feel?" (ibid, 203). Nothing in descriptions
of such mechanisms seems to rule out this possibility.
Chalmers talks of conscious experience as an additional phenomenon, as something
that arises from physical processes but which does not reduce to them. He thinks of
conscious experiences as over and above the brain states said to realise them; as when he
describes them as accompanying the performance of certain cognitive functions (ibid).
But given that the rest of nature falls under physical descriptions, the obvious way to
naturalise consciousness is to assume it too is a physical phenomenon. This requires us to
suppose that consciousness is identical with certain brain states, or perhaps identical with
the functional roles realised by such brain states. Accordingly when Chalmers notes that
there is wide agreement that experience arises from a physical basis, but that we cannot
explain how this is so, we might reply that the reason every experience 'arises' from some
physical state is that it is. identical with that physical state, or with the functional role this
physical state occupies.
Chalmers' main reply to this physicalist identity thesis is to argue that any identity
between conscious states and brain states is always conceivably false, and therefore their
distinctness is always a logical possibility; or as he would prefer to say conscious states
do not supervene logically on physical states (see Chalmers 1996, 93-122). Briefly, to say
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that fi-properties supervene logically on A-properties is to assert that given an account of
the facts concerning A-properties we can know a priori all the facts concerning Bproperties (ibid, 35-36). Moreover, following Saul Kripke, Chalmers notes that identity is
a necessary relation, i.e., something has to be identical with itself in all possible worlds
(see Kripke 1980). By this measure, it must be logically impossible for a phenomenal
property, i.e., a quale, to be non-physical. However, according to Chalmers, it is plain
that we can conceive of possible worlds in which everything is physically identical with
the actual world, but where nothing is conscious, i.e., a zombie world. Therefore, such
psychophysical identities cannot hold, hence physicalism is false. Thus, he claims that
consciousness is ontologically distinct from the physical; in other words, he countenances
dualism. However, as a natural phenomenon consciousness is an integral part of the
causal order, and by assuming consciousness to be ontologically distinct from the
physical world substance and property dualism effectively rule out such causal
integration27. But he thinks that consciousness is naturalisable despite its being
ontologically distinct from the physical. His assertion is that conscious experience can be
explained non-reductively, in contradistinction to standard scientific explanations which,
as noted above, are reductive. However, as Chalmers points out, non-reductive
explanations do occur in physics. These are explanations involving properties thought of
as basic, or fundamental, such that they are not themselves reducible to simpler entities -

Of course, property dualists suppose that phenomenal properties, i.e., qualia, are
natural given that they are assumed to be in some sense caused by the physical processes
in the brain even though they are causally inert. However, as I shall argue later, it is
difficult to understand this epiphenomenalism to the extent that it is supposed that these
phenomenal properties that arise from physical properties are causally inert in toto.
Certainly a shadow, say, is largely epiphenomenal, but not entirely so - it has some
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they are thus regarded as simple. Chalmers cites the example of James Clerk Maxwell's
theory of electromagnetism (1995, 209). Before, scientists had tried, without success, to
explain electricity and magnetism in terms of Newtonian mechanics. Instead, Maxwell
introduced the concepts of electromagnetic charge and force, and postulated laws relating
these properties to the other basic physical properties, these laws being expressed by four
fundamental equations. This revised physics, with its expanded ontology, has
successfully explained higher level phenomena. Chalmers summarises the general idea:

Physical theories do not derive the existence of these features from anything more
basic, but they still give substantial, detailed accounts of these features and how they
interrelate, with the result that we have satisfying explanations of many specific
phenomena involving mass, space, and time (1996, 213).

From this description of non-reductive theories we can discern two levels of explanation.
First, at the more basic level, a "substantial, detailed account" of the basic properties
themselves is provided by relating at large these properties, i.e., detailing how they
interrelate. At the second level our understanding of these basic properties and the basic
laws relating them is then used to provide explanations of particular higher-level
phenomena.
Chalmers suggests that by thinking of consciousness as a basic property in the same
sense as we think of the basic properties of physics we can, in similar fashion, construct a
fundamental theory of consciousness. This proposed theory would "specify basic
causal efficacy however minimally. Qualia, on the other hand, are supposed to be entirely
causally inert. This is very implausible. Moreover, because no other phenomenon is
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principles telling us how [conscious] experience depends on physical features in the
world" (1995, 210). Of course, by assuming consciousness to be a basic property, why it
exists in the first place is left unexplained. Nonetheless, such a fundamental, i.e., nonreductive theory of consciousness at least promises to explain particular instances of
conscious experience according to Chalmers. That is, it would enable us to explain what
Chalmers calls "familiar phenomena involving experience" using principles concerning
experience (ibid).
So according to Chalmers consciousness is naturalisable in that we can potentially
explain particular conscious experiences in terms of this expanded ontology, i.e., in terms
of all the basic properties postulated by physics and conscious properties also thought of
as basic. A conscious property is a property of experience; qualia are taken to be
paradigmatic conscious properties. Chalmers refers to such properties as 'phenomenal'.
Thus we think of conscious properties in the same way as we think of gravitational or
electromagnetic force, making no attempt to explain them in simpler terms, but rather to
view them as irreducible in this sense. This is prima facie a promising idea since it
appears to allow us to avoid any kind of supernaturalism vis-a-vis consciousness; that is
to say, it entitles us to think of consciousness as a fully natural phenomenon, i.e., as
nothing that requires postulating any supernatural causes. Let us look at this idea more
closely.
Chalmers approvingly cites Saul Kripke's creation story (1996, 38;124;148). In his
lectures Naming and Necessity Kripke likens consciousness to an afterthought of God. He
imagines God creating the physical world, laying down, so to speak, all the laws relating
the basic physical properties. In this world consciousness is absent. However, once this
strictly epiphenomenal in this sense we should wonder how qualia can be the exception.
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purely physical world is established God adds consciousness to it, that is, God has more
work to do in order to create consciousness in this physical world (Kripke 1972,150-53).
Consequently, the presence of consciousness makes no difference to the physical world
in the sense that the laws of physics remain unchanged. Conscious properties,
accordingly, can always be thought of independently of any physical properties. This
construal of the relation between the physical and consciousness is endorsed by
Chalmers. So although conscious properties are basic they are conceptually independent
of the other basic physical properties. At most their relations to these basic physical
properties are contingent, i.e., hold in the actual world but not in all possible worlds.
But, what is a basic property in this sense? It is essential to understanding the idea of
a basic property that we define it in some way. Chalmers defines a basic property as one
that is explanatorily simple, i.e., it cannot be reductively explained. But how do we
determine if a property is explanatorily simple? If we do not know how to do this then we
can only presume that some property is basic. Thus any property that seems simple in this
sense is taken to be basic. This is not terribly helpful. In the case of basic physical
properties we judge them to be basic because we can only understand them in terms of
other basic properties. For example, in terms of traditional Newtonian physics at least,
gravity is understood as the force related to mass, time, and distance expressed by the
equation F = GminVr2. In this sense a basic property is one that is essentially understood
in terms of its relations to other basic properties. One cannot understand gravity or
electromagnetic force without invoking other basic properties. This relates to Chalmers'
remark, noted above, that physical theories "give substantial, detailed accounts of these
[basic] features and how they interrelate" (1996, 213). One might argue that gravity, for
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example, can be otherwise understood, e.g., as the force that makes things fall to the
ground. But this is not to understand gravity as basic. By this measure it might turn out
that this force can be explained in terms of simpler properties. Therefore, we know that a
property is basic when it is understood strictly in terms of its relations to other basic
properties, that together form a set of basic properties. Thus, gravity, electromagnetic
force, mass, length, distance etc. together constitute a set of basic properties, where
membership in this set is predicated on the property essentially being understood in terms
of its relations with the other members of the set.
Conscious properties, however, are not members of this set of basic properties. They
are not understood essentially in terms of their relations to these other basic physical
properties. We do not think of conscious properties as basic in virtue of being an integral
member of this set. But this is what defines these properties as basic. Its members are
integral in that if one of the properties were removed from the set our understanding of
the remaining members would be diminished. By this definition of a basic property,
therefore, conscious properties are not basic. Certainly they are basic when defined
purely in terms of being explanatorily simple. But again, this definition is too weak to be
informative. So defined, conscious properties are basic insofar as they seem to be simple
in this sense. Accordingly, we are only justified in supposing that consciousness itself is
basic to the extent that it seems to be.
There are other reasons for rejecting the claim that consciousness is basic. In
particular, as Chalmers admits, it would imply that experience is ubiquitous. That is to
say, things can have conscious properties unconditionally, just as, for example, objects
can have such basic properties as length or mass or gravitational pull for no underlying

reason - the object is not assumed to have these properties in virtue of realising even
more fundamental properties. Thinking of conscious properties in this way clearly goes
against our ordinary understanding of them. We assume, at least, such properties are
chauvinistic biological properties, that is, we attribute them only to certain very complex
systems such as higher animals. The idea that there is no reason to deny that a chair
realises conscious properties strikes us as almost absurd. The construal of conscious
properties as fundamental at least suggests that chairs can have experiences.
However, Chalmers bites the bullet and offers a spirited defence of the idea that
experience is ubiquitous. This leads him to entertain some sort of panpsychism. In
essence his response to obvious doubts about the possibility is twofold: First, he points
out that we cannot rule out the possibility, i.e., it is not disconfirmable. No amount of
observation of chairs, for example, can show that they do not realise conscious properties.
Second, he tries to show that the idea is not absurd, i.e., it is plausible. He suggests that
perhaps experience itself as such is not strictly ubiquitous, rather there might be even
more basic conscious properties that in conjunction realise the kind of experience we
have. So, for example, qualia are themselves constituted by even simpler or more basic
phenomenal properties. In this respect chairs may lack the right combination of such
properties that would enable them to have experiences as rich and complex as our own.
He writes:

...perhaps there is some other class of novel fundamental properties from which
phenomenal [conscious] properties are derived...Such properties would be related to
experience in the same way that basic physical properties are related to non-basic
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properties such as temperature. We call these properties protophenomenal
properties, as they are not themselves phenomenal but together they can yield the
phenomenal...it is very hard to imagine what a protophenomenal property would be
like, but we cannot rule out the possibility that they exist (1996, 126-27).

The first part of his defence does not of course demonstrate the truth of the idea. To
attempt to do this would be to reason fallaciously, namely, to appeal to ignorance. The
fact that there is no evidence to show that the idea is false does not demonstrate that it is
true. Chalmers, no doubt, would accept this. Therefore it is the second part of his defence
that must do the work, that is, show that the idea is plausible.
What is problematic about the hypothesis is not its plausibility, but the fact that it is
untestable. This relates to Chalmers' claim that the hypothesis cannot be disconfirmed by
observation (see ibid, 215). Above we noted that Chalmers remarks that it is very hard to
imagine what a protophenomenal property would be like, but things are worse than this these putative properties would be unobservable in principle. One might argue, in reply,
that properties of subatomic particles like spin and charm are also unobservable, therefore
protophenomenal properties are at least as respectable as these physical properties.
However, these physical properties are observable in principle. Their existence is
confirmable by observation, even if they cannot be directly detected. So long as thinking
of subatomic particles as having these properties agrees with observation, i.e., fits with
empirical evidence quite generally, we can suppose that they really exist. On the other
hand, there is no method of confirming the existence of protophenomenal properties in
the same manner. They are simply not thought of as empirical entities. Consequently,
Chalmers' hypothesis can amount to no more than metaphysical conjecture.

87

That said, Chalmers tries to explain how conscious properties might be understood in
terms of their relationship to the physical. Following Bertrand Russell he worries that
basic physical properties are only understood relationally, especially in terms of their
causal relations. This suggests the world is constituted by such relations. He remarks
disapprovingly that "[t]he picture of the physical world that this yields is that of a giant
causal flux, but the picture tells us nothing about what this causation relates" {ibid, 153).
The proton, for example, is understood in physical terms simply as "that which causes
interactions of a certain kind" (ibid). However, according to Chalmers, this understanding
of the proton says nothing about 'what does the causing' as he puts it. I am not quite sure
what more one could understand a proton to be exactly other than as that with such-andsuch relations to other basic entities. It is not clear what is missing when we think of a
proton in such relational terms. But Chalmers argues that such a purely relational
understanding of basic entities leads to an insubstantial view of the physical world. It
would not enable us to think of a proton, say, as having properties of its own. He holds
that "it is more reasonable to suppose that the basic entities that all this causation relates
have some internal nature of their own, some intrinsic properties, so that the world has
some substance to it" (ibid).
So, very roughly, his thought is that our understanding of the world in terms of its
basic physical entities and their relations leaves out a crucial aspect of reality - it presents
us with a picture of the world as nothing but entities as nodes in a causal flux. Chalmers
seems to think that the basic entities we name are substantive, that is, they are things in
their own right and are not merely nodes, or 'placeholders' as he puts it. But any
properties that basic physical entities have in this regard are by definition not relationally
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determined. For that reason Chalmers chooses to call them intrinsic properties.
Consequently, however, we have no idea about the nature of the intrinsic properties of the
physical. Indeed, there would seem to be no way even to know about any such intrinsic
properties. However, Chalmers suggests that phenomenal properties might plausibly
count as such properties. Why should we think that this might be so? There is no reason,
Chalmers tells us, except for the fact that the nature of these intrinsic properties "is up for
grabs, and phenomenal properties seem as likely candidates as any other" {ibid, 154).
There is to my mind at least something troublingly profligate about Chalmers'
speculations above. He essentially posits an entire parallel set of properties which are
independent of our physical understanding of the world. Again, this suggests that nothing
we observe in the physical world could confirm or disconfirm the existence of these
posited properties. The issue of metaphysical speculation was addressed in chapter 1. For
now it is enough to note that while Chalmers' hypothesis that conscious properties are
basic might be minimally plausible, the fact that there is no way of testing it makes it
sterile.
Underlying Chalmers' suggestion that consciousness is best thought of as basic in
some way is his claim that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to the physical. If he
is right about this, then this suggestion makes sense at least to the extent that it allows us
to find a place for consciousness in nature, i.e., to naturalise conscious experience in
some way. He offers several arguments for this central claim, but the most important of
them is his version of the conceivability argument. The form of this type of argument is
that we can always think of consciousness as non-physical and therefore it follows that it
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is non-physical. Next I shall consider his argument in detail, concluding that it is not
persuasive.

2.4 The Conceivability Argument
Earlier I remarked that consciousness seems incommensurable with natural, or physical,
phenomena. At least, how we think of consciousness appears to be wholly distinct from
how we think of physical phenomena. Some, such as Chalmers, take this
incommensurability to show that consciousness cannot be a physical property. The basic
argument is that if it is always possible to conceive of consciousness as distinct from the
physical, then it cannot in fact be reduced to the physical. Therefore, consciousness is a
non-physical property. A version of this argument was advanced by Descartes, for
example, and as we shall see it has since been elaborated to strengthen its plausibility.
Below is a formal presentation of the basic argument28:

(1) Conceivability is an adequate test for possibility. If we can clearly conceive of
its being the case that/?, then it is possible for it to be the case that/?
(2) Where x is any conscious experience and y is any physical process, it is possible
to conceive clearly of a situation when x is not identical with y.
(3) If it is possible for x not to be identical with y, then it is false that x is identical
with y.
(4) Therefore, conscious experiences are not identical with physical processes.
Let us start with premiss (2). Few doubt that it is true. It seems that we can think of a
person who, despite realising all the usual physiological states correlated with being in
28

This is a paraphrase of Christopher S. Hill's presentation of the argument from
conceivability, or what he calls the 'Cartesian argument' (see Hill 1991, 90).
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pain say, nonetheless feels nothing. Nothing about realising such physiological states
seems to force us to think that this person must feel pain. Turning to premiss (3): If, for
example, it were possible to conceive of Cicero as distinct from Tully, then according to
(3) Cicero cannot be identical with Tully. That said, even though it is in fact true that
Cicero is Tully, it seems a possibility that Cicero is not the same person as Tully,
suggesting that (3) is false. However, Cicero's being identical with Tully is necessarily
true. This is because 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are coreferential terms. Consequently there is no
possible world in which we can mean by 'Cicero' and 'Tully' different things. For, as
Kripke points out, proper names refer rigidly. In other words, the meanings of proper
names are fixed by their references. Moreover, their meanings must remain constant
across all possible worlds - that is the only way we can meaningfully talk about the same
object across possible worlds. It seems prima facie conceivable that Cicero is distinct
from Tully, but only insofar as it is not known that the names are coreferential. Once the
meanings of these names are known, it is impossible to hold that Cicero is distinct from
Tully. Similarly, it seems possible, for example, to think of water as distinct from H 2 0
despite the fact that they are identical. But given that in fact these terms refer to the same
substance, the only way to imagine them being distinct is to misdescribe water as being
identical with some other substance, call it XYZ. So it appears that (3) is also true.
We are left with premiss (1). There is good reason, however, for thinking that (1) is
false. We observed that it is not possible that Cicero is distinct from Tully because of the
fact that we use these names to refer to the same person. But while this is how we
actually use the names, there is nothing to stop us from imagining our using the names
differently. Thus, there is a sense in which I could imagine that the Roman orator Tully
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was never referred to as 'Cicero'. Therefore, I can conceive of Tully as distinct from
Cicero. This is because, as Christopher Hill points out by way of another example, the
concept Cicero is not logically identical with the concept Tully (Hill 1991, 92). That is to
say, how we use the name 'Cicero' is not conceptually tied to how we use the name 'Tully'
and vice versa. The same reasoning applies to the identity 'water is H2O'. These concepts
are likewise conceptually independent of each other. That is why we had to discover that
they refer to the same substance, and as such the identity is an a posteriori truth. Given
their conceptual independence we can imagine the world having turned out differently,
such that the substance we call 'water' in virtue of its macrophysical, i.e., watery,
properties was found not to be composed of H2O, but of something else, call it XYZ.
Clearly then not everything that we can conceive is possible, hence (1) must be denied.
The conceivability argument fails, therefore, because the falsehood of (1) stops the
inference from (2) to (3). That is, while it is conceivable that x is not identical with y it
does not follow that it is possible that x is distinct from y.
That said, there is a sense in which what is conceivable is possible. We just noted that
while in the actual world 'water' refers to H2O, things could have turned out differently.
This fact also expresses a possibility. However, if we think of possibility in this broader
sense and the inference from (2) to (3) goes through, then we would have to conclude that
because we can conceive of water as distinct from H2O they are in fact distinct. This
conclusion seems absurd. However, Chalmers offers a way of both holding (1) as true
and rescuing the conclusion from absurdity, thereby defending the conceivability
argument.

This defence centres on the distinction between two types of meaning, on what is
called a "two-dimensional semantics" (see Chalmers 1996, 56-65). Chalmers follows
Gottlob Frege who held that every concept has a sense [Sinn] which is said to determine
the concept's reference [Bedeutung] (see Frege 1892/1997). Chalmers calls this sense the
intension of a concept, which essentially is described by the function that relates the
concept to its extensions. So, for example, the intension of gold is the function that relates
the concept to its referent, namely, all the individual chunks of the substance. There are
two ways in which intension can be thought to operate. We observed that in the actual
world 'water' refers to the substance H2O, and that things could have turned out
differently. Another way of putting this is that in another possible world the concept
could refer not to H2O but to XYZ instead. The intension of the concept water in this
sense describes a relation between the concept and its referent relative to the possible
world in question. The idea is that the substance that has all the macrophysical, i.e.,
superficial, properties we associate with what we actually refer to as 'water' is not H2O in
some other possible world. This substance must be minimally thought of as 'watery stuff,
namely, that substance that has the superficial properties we associate with actual water.
If we imagine water distinct from watery stuff in this sense we have effectively stopped
thinking about water simpliciter. This way of construing a concept's intension Chalmers
calls its primary intension.
According to Chalmers premiss (1) of the conceivability argument is true when a
concept is understood in terms of its primary intension. He asks us to consider the
assertion 'water is watery stuff, stating that "we can know this statement to be true a
priori, as long as we possess the concepts" (ibid, 64). By this he means that once we have

grasped the concept of water, i.e., understand what the term refers to, we immediatedly
know that it is watery stuff, that is, no further observations are needed to know this. How
is this so exactly? It is best to understand 'watery stuff as an indexical term. In other
words, however the actual world might have turned out, the term 'water' would refer to
that stuff around us that has those manifest or superficial properties we actually attribute
to water, i.e., its watery properties. Thus, in some other possible world 'water' may refer
to XYZ and not H 2 0, but insofar as we think of this substance as water it is because we
assume that it is watery in this sense. This concerns the primary intension of the concept
of water. Again, intension is thought of as that which maps the extension of the concept.
And the primary intension maps the concept from any possible world to its extension,
i.e., the class of things that the term refers to in that possible world. In terms of this
primary intension we cannot conceive of water as not referring to watery stuff. And that
is why when we grasp its primary intension we cannot fail to know that it is watery; that
is to say, once in possession of the concept of water, and a fortiori its primary intension,
we know a priori that it is watery stuff. This way of thinking of necessity must be
distinguished from another concerning the concept's secondary intension. This intension
maps the concept as it is determined in the the actual world to its extension across
possible worlds. In the actual world water, understood as watery stuff, is in fact H2O and this is something which we have discovered about watery stuff, i.e., this is an a
posteriori truth. Once what we mean by 'water' is fixed in this sense the term refers to
H2O in all possible worlds. This is to hold 'water is H 2 0' as necessarily true.
The thrust of Chalmers' argument, as it relates to the conceivability argument
more generally, is that in terms of a concept's primary intension conceivability is an

adequate measure of possibility, in accordance with premiss (1) in the conceivability
argument above. We cannot conceive of water as not being watery stuff, i.e., thought of
in terms of its primary intension, and this is evidence for its metaphysical impossibility.
To use Chalmers1 own terminology, watery stuff supervenes logically on water. Again,
this is to say that if something is water then we also know a priori that it is watery stuff.
The important question is whether premiss (2) holds with respect to this revised
conceivability argument. Still, is it possible to conceive clearly of a situation in which a
conscious experience is not identical with some physical process? It is such
conceivability that Chalmers considers to be the test of logical supervenience (1996, 93122). If some pain quale supervenes logically on certain physical properties of the brain,
i.e., neural properties, then when such neural properties are realised we should be able to
know a priori that this pain quale is realised. But our understanding of conscious
properties is such that we do not know a priori that a person realising such neural
properties realises a pain quale. Indeed, as Chalmers argues, we can imagine a physical
replica of a person, say of yourself, that lacks consciousness quite generally, i.e., your
zombie twin. Knowing all the physical facts about a person does not entail knowing that
she is conscious. Even with respect to particular types of conscious experience such
knowledge is not entailed. Chalmers considers the intersubjective inverted spectrum
scenario, where two people relevantly alike physiologically can still be imagined to have
opposite colour experiences, e.g., I have a sensation of red looking at a ripe tomato while
another person has a sensation of cyan, i.e., blue (1996, 99-101). It seems, therefore, (2)
is true and conscious properties are not logically supervenient on the physical. By this
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measure, the revised conceivability argument appears to succeed, and we should
conclude that consciousness cannot be a physical property.

2.4.1 Reply to the Conceivability Argument
The objection to Chalmers' version of the conceivability argument that I shall look at, by
Peter Carruthers, focuses on challenging his defence of premiss (1). Carruthers argues
that because water and consciousness are natural phenomena it makes no sense to think
of their concepts as mapping one-to-one onto their extensions as Chalmers assumes.
Rather, the relation is many-to-one since a single natural phenomenon can always be
conceived of in many ways. Therefore, our inability to conceive of a phenomenon in
terms of particular properties does not entail its being metaphysically impossible that it
reduces to these properties, which is what is assumed in premiss (1).
Carruthers argues that conceivability is not a measure of possibility, but for
different reasons. Specifically, he argues that inasmuch as consciousness does not
supervene logically on physical properties, contrary to Chalmers' claim, this has no
metaphysical implications; that is to say, it does not show that consciousness is
ontologically irreducible to physical properties. He notes that Chalmers countenances the
belief that life is logically supervenient on the physical. Once all the physical facts about
an organism are known, then we know a priori that it is living. There was a time,
however, when it was commonly thought that life is an irreducible property, which some
called 'elan vital'. But as Carruthers remarks: "They may have been mistaken, but they
were surely not guilty of conceptual confusion, nor of mere failure to envisage the microphysical realm in enough clarity and detail" (2000, 50). That is because the concept of
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life was independent of the concepts concerning microphysical properties. And no
amount of a priori analysis could have shown that life in fact reduces to such properties.
Rather, people came to conceptualise life in terms of microphysical properties after a
long process of scientific investigation. Thus, despite having originally thought of being
alive as independent of any physical processes, this conception was not evidence of its
being a non-physical property. Instead we take life to be real, i.e., a mind-independent
property in the world - what Carruthers calls a 'worldly' property. Thus the term 'worldly'
is used to connote a property's being 'out there' rather than being constitutively
determined by how we think of it. How we think of a natural property makes no
difference to the property as such in agreement with my precept. We understand that
there are many modes of presentation of this property, and therefore many ways of
conceiving of it. Properties are therefore individuated "thickly", as Carruthers puts it, that
is, they can each be picked out by various conceptually independent descriptions. We
have gradually come to understand how the descriptions of life in terms of its superficial
properties and descriptions of the various processes, e.g., metabolism, in terms of
microphysical properties are each descriptions of one and the same thing. It is by thinking
of life as a worldly property in this sense that we are able to naturalise it, that is, to
explain it in terms of other lower-level properties and the causal laws governing them.
Carruthers complains that it is because Chalmers does not think of consciousness as
worldly that he concludes that it must be irreducible to physical properties. Moreover,
this fact is indicative of Chalmers' construal of properties. According to Chalmers
property terms are defined intensionally. Carruthers points out that Chalmers thinks of
properties as mappings from worlds to extensions (2001, 54). Indeed, Chalmers states:
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"We can see the intension of a property as a function of a world to a class of individuals
(the individuals that instantiate the property), or from a world to properties themselves"
(1996, 62). Consequently, he thinks that every discernible concept corresponds with a
singular property; as indicated, for example, when elsewhere he writes that "such
[primary] intensions will provide different functions from worlds to extensions
(remember, there is just one space of worlds), and therefore distinct properties" (1999,
479). But, this is not to think of properties as real. It is instead to individuate them 'thinly',
such that each property is said to be able to be picked out by descriptions involving a
single concept alone. So, for example, suppose we conceive of two diseases R and S and
we can coherently think of them as separate. By Chalmers' reckoning R and S are distinct
properties. But if R and S are construed as worldly properties, the fact that they are
thought of as distinct does not show them to be so. For as worldly properties it is seen as
quite possible that some of their modes of presentation might be incompatible, such that
they might in fact be the same property thought of in distinct ways. The only way to
judge whether R and S are distinct or identical properties is again by empirical
investigation, as in the case of the property of being alive. Yet Chalmers determines that
consciousness is distinct from physical properties by appealing to the fact that we can
coherently think of them as separate, i.e., that consciousness does not supervene logically
on physical properties. That is fine, Carruthers notes, if consciousness is viewed
according to Chalmers' construal of properties. But if we view consciousness as a worldly
property then such thought experiments are of no use.
Carruthers acknowledges that many share Chalmers' intensional construal of
properties. But he argues that to construe properties in this way is to abandon naturalism,
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which holds that all properties are an integral part of the natural world governed by
causal laws. More generally, he argues that thinly individuated properties are clearly
distinguishable from real, i.e., worldly, properties. For example, he asserts that change
strictly concerns real properties. He offers the following example: According to Chalmers
the concepts of grue and bleen pick out distinct properties since they can coherently be
thought of as distinct.29 An object is said to be grue when it is green before the year
3000, say, and blue thereafter. Similarly, an object is said to be bleen if it is originally
blue and turns green at the beginning of the year 3000. However, it is plausible to think
of an object changing from grue to bleen at this precise time. There would, of course, be
no discernible change in the colour of the object in question. From this Carruthers
concludes that "grue and bleen, although perfectly legitimate as concepts, do not pick out
real properties of objects" (2000, 36).
We are tempted to think that because consciousness does not supervene logically on
physical properties, this is reason to suspect that it is a non-physical property. Carruthers
argues in reply that this fact about consciousness does not show that it is non-physical,
i.e., that it is not ontologically reducible to physical properties. Rather, this fact is simply
a consequence of consciousness being a recognitional concept. He gives the example of
chicken sexers to illustrate his point. There are apparently people who can sex chickens
reliably without being able to explain how they do it. They sort the chicks into two
groups, call them A and B, and these groups correlate strongly with male and female
chicks respectively. This amounts to a recognitional capacity. It is relevantly analogous to
how we grasp phenomenal concepts. We likewise grasp redness or pain, for example,
29

This example is based on Nelson Goodman's grue paradox concerning the problem of
induction (see Goodman 1965)
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directly such that we do not understand them in functional or causal role terms, as we do
with nearly every other type of concept. If the chicken sexer is asked can she imagine a
world physically identical with ours but where A-type chicks are B-type chicks and vice
versa, she is likely to answer that this is indeed conceivable, given that these types are not
thought of in physical terms. However, Carruthers insists that this chicken sexer would be
mistaken to conclude from this fact that these types are not reducible to physical
properties. The same holds true with respect to consciousness. To the extent that
consciousness does not supervene logically on physical properties it is because
phenomenal concepts quite generally are recognitional. And this fact does not show that
they do not reduce to physical properties.
Carruthers, then, rejects the claim that conceivability is a measure of possibility,
namely, premiss (1) of the conceivability argument. He thinks that (1) is false because
properties are real, i.e., worldly, and as such, how we conceive of them is independent of
how they are in reality. That is, a property can be individuated by distinct concepts, hence
what we may conceive of as distinct facts concerning a property may in reality be the
same fact. In other words, what is conceivable may not be genuinely, or metaphysically,
possible. It is worth noting that Carruthers presumes consciousness to be a natural, i.e.,
worldly, property. And in this respect his view differs importantly from that of Joseph
Levine, another influential philosopher on this topic. Carruthers thinks that as a thickly
individuated natural property, there is every reason to assume that consciousness is
naturalisable in principle. It is no strike against the prospect of naturalising consciousness
that it may not be directly reducible to the physical, that is, it may not supervene logically
on physical properties. Indeed, he attempts to explain consciousness in terms of
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intentional properties, which he holds, can in turn be explained naturalistically. Thus,
given that reduction is transitive he thinks there is every possibility of at least indirectly
explaining consciousness naturalistically.
Levine also argues against Chalmers' revised conceivability argument.30 But Levine
worries that Carruthers is simply dismissing the problem of the explanatory gap with
respect to the possibility, that Carruthers envisages, of explaining consciousness
naturalistically . Carruthers essentially takes the explanatory gap to be the harmless .
result of consciousness's being a recognitional concept. For example, he states: "While
the 'explanatory gap' is of some cognitive significance, revealing something about the
manner in which we conceptualize our experiences [i.e., in purely recogitional terms], it
shows nothing about the nature of those experiences themselves" (1999, 67). It is this fact
which explains why we cannot explain consciousness in physical terms. But since
consciousness is nonetheless a natural property, it is still a candidate for reduction at least
in principle. Levine also notes that, as it stands, consciousness can only be conceived

Essentially Levine argues that we can understand concepts like water without
concomitant knowledge of their manifest, i.e., superficial properties, pace Chalmers.
Using the example of the concept of cat he states: "Of course it may be metaphysically
necessary that cats are animals, but the crucial point is that it is not a priori. Mere
competence with the term "cat" does not yield such knowledge." (2001a, 53) He does not
deny that our understanding of concepts is often accompanied by knowledge of the
salient properties concomitant with them, he only denies that it must include such
knowledge. He calls this position "non-ascriptivism" given that it is to deny that we must
ascribe a priori knowledge of a concept's concomitant properties with the grasp of its
primary intension.
The 'explanatory gap' is the term used to describe a major epistemological difference
between identity statements concerning physical entities, e.g., 'water is H 2 0', and
psychophysical identity statements, e.g., 'pain is C-fibre stimulation'. Physical identity
statements often help explain what something is, e.g., understanding that water is H2O
helps us understand why water has the properties it does. On the other hand,
understanding pain as C-fibre stimulation in no way helps us to understand what pain is,
i.e, to grasp the qualitative character of a pain experience. This particular concern is
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recognitionally. However, he worries that there is no way of showing how consciousness
is the natural, or real, property that Carruthers takes it to be. Levine, therefore, views the
explanatory gap as a genuine epistemological difficulty for naturalistic theories of
consciousness.

2.5 Summary
Each of the three arguments we have looked at are epistemological in tone, that is, at
bottom their authors contend that consciousness does not ontologically reduce to the
physical because of the seeming impossibility of understanding consciousness in physical
terms. As we have seen there are many objections to this conclusion. And the success of
these objections shows that the problem of consciousness is not sufficient evidence for
the falsity of physicalism; at most our inability to understand consciousness in physical
terms demonstrates that we can think of consciousness independently of the physical. But
again, as we have seen, conceivability is not sufficient for metaphysical possibility, to
paraphrase Levine. Insofar as it seems possible to think of pain separately from C-fibre
stimulation it does not follow that they cannot really be identical.
But, I remarked in the introduction that I do not want to focus on the problem of
consciousness as a problem for physicalism. Rather, my concern has been to evaluate the
possibility of naturalising consciousness, that is, explaining it in terms of other natural
properties. We have seen that the anti-physicalist arguments we have looked at are
unsuccessful. They do not show that physicalism is false. From this fact we can infer that
consciousness is at least in principle naturalisable. That is to say, there are no a priori

expressed by Levine in a forum discussion between himself and Carruthers (see
Carruthers 2001 and Levine 2001b).
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reasons for concluding that consciousness is not a fully natural phenomenon, i.e., a
natural phenomenon among others, despite its peculiar epistemological status. And that is
the conclusion I want to take away from this discussion. Importantly, however, I am not
interested in defending a physicalist theory of consciousness to the extent that for any
such theory it is assumed that qualia, as the properties of consciousness understood
phenomenologically, are identifiable as particulars, i.e., they are individuable.

That is

because I deny that they are individuable; and why this is so is the topic of the next
chapter.

'" This is not to imply that each of these theories are mutually exclusive.

Chapter 3
The Unindividuability ofQuaUa

In the last chapter we looked at the most influential arguments that repute to show either
that physicalism is open to serious doubt or that it is outright false. In reply, I argued that
none of these arguments succeed. Therefore, I concluded that there are no a priori
reasons for supposing that consciousness is not physical, and consequently we can
suppose that it is naturalisable, at least in principle. And it is the question of the
naturalisability of consciousness to which I now want to return.
Earlier I acknowledged that our intuitive understanding of consciousness, i.e., our
understanding determined by the first-person viewpoint, is ineliminable in that we cannot
think of consciousness as such without understanding it in this way. In this respect we
think of experiences in terms of their phenomenological qualities or qualia. For example,
an experience of seeing something as green differs from seeing something as red because
they have distinct phenomenological qualites, i.e., they realise different qualia. But it is
one thing to postulate such properties of experience, it is another to make sense of them,
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that is, to use the concept successfully to communicate facts about experiences. This way
of thinking of experiences suggests that we can individuate qualia. The individuation of
properties in general requires having a criterion by which we can judge when two
instances of one of them are the same or distinct. In terms of qualia, there should be some
way of deciding when one red quale, for example, is identical with or distinct from some
other instance of a red quale. However, below I argue that no such criterion can exist.
That is to say, qualia are unindividuable. As we shall see, the unindividuability of qualia
implies that they are unnaturalisable, a fact that seems to contradict the conclusion above
that consciousness is naturalisable. Later, in chapter 4,1 shall argue that this contradiction
is only apparent.
Below, in section 3.1,1 begin by spelling out as precisely as possible the concept of
qualia. There I suggest that, in agreement with Nagel's central assumption, qualia are
perspectival in nature and that this fact is best understood if we think of qualia as
constitutive of the phenomenal subject, i.e., the subject understood as that which has
experiences. Then, in section 3.2,1 argue that qualia thought of as constitutive of the
subject are inapprehensible, that is, the subject cannot grasp them. Moreover, their
inapprehensibility entails that they are unindividuable.
Next, in section 3.3,1 consider Dennett's sceptical arguments against qualia. He
contends that there are no such properties as qualia since the concept is incoherent. In
arguing this Dennett likewise thinks that qualia are unindividuable, which he expresses in
distinctive terms. I apply Dennett's insights in support of my claim that qualia are
unindividuable. Here, like Dennett, I appeal to Wittgenstein's private language argument
concerning why sensation terms cannot refer to features of experience that only the

subject is thought to have direct knowledge of. Crucially, I do not accept Dennett's
conclusion that there are no such properties as qualia.
In section 3.41 address some criticisms of Dennett's arguments that challenge his
assumption that qualia are unindividuable. Initially I consider criticisms by Owen
Flanagan, who argues that assuming our experiences are identical with certain brain
states qualia, as properties of experiences, are straightforwardly individuable. Discussion
of these criticisms is broadened to include arguments by David Papineau and Clyde
Hardin, who similarly contend that qualia can be thought of as physical properties and
consequently they are individuable. However, for similar reasons to Dennett I argue that
the basic argument of all three of these philosophers is question-begging. Their reasoning
is roughly as follows: they each present evidence for thinking that experiences are
identical with brain states. And as properties of experiences qualia would thereby be
physical. Moreover, if qualia are physical then they are individuable. Therefore, qualia
are individuable. However, it cannot be assumed experiences are identical with brain
states unless it is already assumed qualia, as the essential properties of experiences, are
individuable to begin with, hence their argument is circular.

3.1 What Qualia Are Thought to Be
When someone reports that her tooth aches, for example, she aims for sympathy from her
listener. Aches and pains, we all agree, are unpleasant feelings that we each want to
avoid. Many of us have experienced a toothache and know first-hand how unpleasant it
is. But, it does not seem to be necessary that her listener is able to identify with how she
feels. Her intention in reporting a toothache is not to make him understand how her
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toothache seems to her. In general, we assume there is a way sensations seem to others,
as there is for ourselves. Further, we also presume that in some sense how a particular
type of sensation seems to each of us is how it seems to others. But none of our everyday
talk about sensations depends on this being the case; notwithstanding the fact that
similarities in our behaviour in this respect suggest to us that toothaches probably feel the
same way to each of us. But, again, our everyday sensation reports do not function as
reports about what it is like to have such-and-such a sensation.
Many assume there is a fact of the matter about how a sensation seems to each of us.
And if that is the case, then it makes sense to ask if a sensation seems to someone the
same as or different from an earlier sensation, or even to ask if a particular type of
sensation, e.g., a toothache, seems the same to two or more persons said to have it. That
is, we can talk intelligibly about such seemings being alike or different from each other,
both intrasubjectively and intersubjectively. The term of art for seemings is 'qualia'.
Insofar as conscious experiences are thought of as a type of mental state, as distinct from
propositional attitudes for example, we attribute to them certain identifying properties.
These properties are their qualia.
Nonetheless, there is not complete agreement about the concept of qualia. Thus far we
have defined them as the phenomenological qualities or features of conscious
experiences, or what we have referred to as the "what it is like" of such experiences.
When we perceive the sky as blue, for example, we do not simply recognise it as so,
rather we feel it to be so. Paraphrasing Manuel Garcia Carpintero, qualia might be
minimally characterised as follows (2003, 357-58):
(1) Qualia, as properties, are essentially types.

(2) The realisation of qualia distinguishes the conscious mental sates of a subject
from those mental states subjects have even when they are not conscious.
(3) Qualia are paradigmatically realised in mental states involving sensations,
emotions, and imaginings.
(4) Qualia characterise what it is like for subjects realising them to be in those
conscious mental states, the way things seem to them.
(5) Qualia are known by the subject realising them in a privileged way, in that
subjects are said to know them non-inferentially, and consequently judgments about
them are largely infallible.

Clearly (1) follows from thinking of qualia as properties of experiences, i.e., as types. (2)
simply states that qualia are what make some mental states conscious, so to speak, as
opposed to those mental states a subject might have while in a coma for example. There
is perhaps room for disagreement about (3). Some hold that prepositional attitudes such
as beliefs or fears have qualitative aspects to them, e.g., Flanagan. That is, there is
something that it is like to believe that Napoleon was French, for example. Others, e.g.,
argue that prepositional attitudes feel no particular way to their holder. With respect to
(4), we have already discussed at length the characterisation of a quale as the "what it is
like" of an experience when we considered Nagel's views in chapter 2.
Our focus will be on (5). Knowledge of qualia would seem to be privileged in that
qualia are only apprehensible from a particular point of view. If I judge the pain I now

Disagreement exists about this. In particular, while David Rosenthal (1986) agrees
that qualia, or phenomenal properties, distinguish one sensory mental state from another,
he argues that it does not follow that we are conscious of such a state and its phenomenal
properties. In other words, he denies that qualia are properties that we are essentially
aware of- we may not be conscious of their presence. What makes any such sensory
mental state a conscious state, according to Rossenthal, is our thinking about it, i.e.,
attending to it. This view of qualia is not standard and the higher-order-thought (HOT)
theory of consciouness on which this conception of consciouness is based is notoriously
problematic (see e.g., Seager 1999, 60-84).

experience is like the one I experienced yesterday, it seems absurd to suppose someone
else can dispute this claim. My judgment seems infallible in this sense. However, this
infallibility might be spurious. We could imagine, say, a neurophysiologist identifying
certain pain qualia with a specific type of neural activity. So, if you report having the
same pain as you had yesterday but the neurophysiologist points out that according to his
observations these pain experiences are qualitatively different, then he seems to show that
you are mistaken, inasmuch as the identifications between pain qualia and types of neural
activity are true. But it is not clear how this neurophysiological evidence can defeat your
claim given that only you have access to the qualitative content of your pain experiences.
In this sense your report is incorrigible, since others cannot apprehend your qualia
directly. Another way of putting this is to say that if you cede authority to the
neurophysiologist you might reasonably doubt your report, but if you do not doubt it then
the neurophysiological evidence cannot convince you that you are mistaken. This issue is
discussed in more detail later.
But, imagine the following experiment: A person is told that a hot object will be
briefly placed on her skin - let us assume she is blindfolded - and when an ice cube is put
there instead she reports a burning sensation. The experimenter immediately removes the
blindfold showing her that the sensation she is having is not one of heat but of cold. This
suggests that our first-person judgments about qualia are sometimes mistaken. However,
this kind of misidentification of qualia is possible only to the extent that the sensations in
question are alike. In this case the person is effectively reporting that she is having a
burning-//^ sensation, and in this respect she is not mistaken. When a sensation of
burning or cold are alike in their qualitative character what causes them is irrelevant. The
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qualitative character of an experience, i.e., its quale, is not necessarily correlated with a
particular type of property of an external object, just as, for example, we are supposed to
be able to imagine two persons staring at a ripe tomato but realising distinct colour qualia
according to the inverted spectrum hypothesis.34 This fact about the way we think of
qualia relates to the infallibility of our judgments about them. There is no way we can
disabuse this person of her believing that she is having a burning-like sensation. In this
sense her judgments are incorrigible. Likewise, if someone were to insist that how a ripe
tomato seems to her is how grass seems to you, nothing we can do or say can convince
her otherwise. To do that would require being able to compare these qualia publicly, and
insofar as we must understand qualia as the ways things seem to each of us that is
impossible.

3.1.1 The Peculiarity of Qualia
The characterisation of qualia in terms of judgments about them being infallible,
stemming from our being acquainted with them in a privileged way, could perhaps be
explained by their being intrinsic properties. While the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction is
notoriously difficult to define, an intrinsic property is understood roughly to be a property
an object possesses that does not depend on the object's relations to any other distinct
object. But the very notion of intrinsicness, Dennett suspects, is spurious. He gives an
example of a property we might think of as being intrinsic, namely, laughter. Dennett
notes that we might explain laughter as an appropriate reaction to something funny, or
more succinctly, to hilarity. However, this is not an explanation of laughter at all since
hilarity in turn is defined as the cause of laughter. He likens such a pseudo-explanation to
34

For a detailed discussion of the inverted spectrum hypothesis see Shoemaker 1996.
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that given by Argan in Moliere's play La Malade Imaginaire, who, when asked why
opium puts people to sleep, responds: 'because of its virtus dormitiva', i.e., its dormative
power (see Dennett 1991, 63). The best we can do to define laughter is by such circular
means because it is an intrinsic property. As evidence of the spuriousness of the concept
of intrinsicness he points out that not even a brilliant theorist like David Lewis has
succeeded in explaining the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction (see Dennett 1986, 67). Calling
some property intrinsic, Dennett contends, follows from the desire to think of it as being
essentially so. In the case of laughter, for example, we think of it as 'just so' in that if we
were to explain it in terms of relations to other objects and their properties, we are
strongly inclined to believe that what we essentially mean by the term 'laughter' would
necessarily be omitted. But in general he thinks claiming that certain properties are
intrinsic on these grounds is simply question-begging (ibid, 68).
But, the idea that qualia are intrinsic points to something very important, namely, that
qualia are thought of as being essentially perspectival or subjective. What is peculiar
about the concept, i.e., how we think of qualia, is that they are inapprehensible to others.
As Nagel noted, we think of them as being dependent on a particular perspective.
However, we think of properties as universals or as types, and as Carpintero's list
indicates, we think of qualia in this way as well. But, if a red quale for example is a type
of phenomenological quality that can be tokened by other people, then what does it mean
to assume that qualia are subjective, i.e., dependent on a particular viewpoint? The only
way to make sense of qualia as types, it would seem, is to think of them as independent of
the viewpoint of the subject they concern. After all, we do not want to assert that a quale
is the phenomenological quality of experience as realised by a particular subject only. If
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we were to hold this then we could no longer coherently think of qualia as properties. In
order to think of qualia as properties, i.e., as types, while maintaining that they are
perspectival by nature a la Nagel, I suggest that we think of them as epistemically private.
That is, they are in some crucial sense constitutive of us as phenomenal subjects. Indeed,
it is the attribution of these properties to experiences which enables us to think of
experiences as distinctive phenomena in some sense. What distinguishes pain from mere
neurological activity and certain behaviour? It is its phenomenological quality, i.e., its
subjective aspect. We might express this thought by the following principle:

(S) No two subjects can know that they are realising the same type of quale.

By this measure, it would be impossible for distinct subjects to know that they are
realising the same quale-type. Here we think of the subject, minimally, as that which has
experiences.
The obvious worry about this claim is that, as noted in our discussion of Jackson, it
leads to a radical scepticism about other minds (see section 2.2). If I can never know that
you or anyone else is having the same type of qualitative experience as me when, say,
experiencing a toothache, then I cannot rule out the possibility that everyone else is in
fact a phenomenal zombie. However, (S) does not necessarily entail that there is nothing
that it is like to be another subject, rather it states that no subject can ever know if
someone else is having the same type of qualitative experience. Accordingly, (S) is
consistent with assuming that there is something that it is like to be another subject.

Moreover, as I argue later, there are no grounds for assuming that other normal human
beings lack phenomenal consciousness.
More generally, I think it is helpful to distinguish between direct acquaintance with
qualia and knowledge o/them. Assuming that acquaintance is a species of knowledge
very broadly construed, it is nonetheless important that we understand the differences
between these kinds of knowing. Earlier, in my discussion of Jackson's views, I said that
something is knowable if and only if it is knowable by others. Here we are talking about
propositional knowledge, as opposed to mere acquaintance. Indeed, I argued that it is the
equivocation of these distinct ways of knowing that led Jackson mistakenly to conclude
that qualia fall outside of our physical knowledge about the world. And we have this kind
of propositional knowledge so long as it is justifiable, and as such it is inferential in
nature. But acquaintance with our own qualia is non-inferential. Indeed, we cannot
justify to others how we know, for example, that we are realising a red quale. Moreover,
given that knowledge is usually defined as justified true belief we might conclude that
talk of knowing that we realise such-and-such qualia is not possible, i.e., it makes no
sense. I shall say more about this later.

3.2 Why Qualia Cannot Be Individuated
The epistemic privacy of qualia implies that they are not apprehensible by others. In fact,
I contend, they are not apprehensible at all since we cannot apprehend our own qualia
either. Qualia are constitutive of us as phenomenal subjects; that is to say, it is in virtue
of realising qualia that we are subjects. One might say that the phenomenal subject
realises itself as qualia. Another way of understanding the perspectival nature of qualia in
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this sense is to think of them as properties by which we apprehend things in the world.
This fact explains the transparency of qualia and conscious experiences more generally.
We cannot apprehend qualia by some sort of introspection of our perceptual experiences,
rather we see right through them so to speak to the external properties of the things the
experience is of. Michael Tye offers this helpful appraisal of our situation:

Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience [looking at a
blue painted square] that distinguishes it from other experiences, something other
than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one's awareness seems
always to slip through the experience to the blueness and squareness, as instantiated
together in the external object (1995, 30).

The inapprehensibility of qualia is thus manifested in their transparency.
Crucially, the inapprehensibility of qualia implies that there is no distinction to be
made between an experience having a particular quale and an experience seeming to have
this quale, since seeming to have a quale would entail apprehending it. This is
impossible because a quale, as an integral part of the subject, cannot itself be

This basic point is made by Saul Kripke in his Naming and Neccesity, where he
states that "in the case of mental phenomena there is no 'appearance' beyond the mental
phenomenon itself (1980, 154). It is this characteristic of mental phenomena, e.g.,
qualia, that Kripke thinks precludes experiences being identified as physical states.
According to Kripke this is because there could be no way of reconceiving qualia so that
the ostensible distinctness of the experience identified by some quale from a certain type
of brain state is ruled out. If we can conceive of an experience as distinct from a certain
type of brain state we cannot be mistaken about this since there is nothing about its quale
beyond this appearance. The ways things appear to us cannot themselves be only
apparent, i.e., possibly otherwise.
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apprehended by the subject it is part of, just as the eye cannot gaze upon itself. This fact
precludes the possibility of individuating qualia.
To individuate a property is to determine if some instance of it is distinct from or
identical with some other instance. Individuation requires possession of a criterion, a
standard by which to make such a determination or judgment. It involves using a criterion
to determine whether a thing that seems to have some property does have that property
rather than some other. We need such a criterion to decide, for example, whether a sofa is
maroon in colour. Unless a criterion exists we would effectively be unable to predicate
maroon of anything. So, for example, in the case of the property of being a certain height,
e.g., one metre, we determine this by devising a standard scale to make a direct
comparison between the apparent height of an object and some mark on this scale. Thus,
having a scale enables us to judge if the object is one metre high, i.e., has this property.
Here we distinguish between seeming to be one metre high and being one metre high. If
there were no such distinction so that we took the height of an object to be whatever it
seems to be, then different instances of being one metre high would be incomparable. We
could not determine if two objects have the same property or distinct properties, i.e.,
distinct heights.
But this is the situation with respect to qualia. There is no gap between a quale and
how a quale seems to be. So, we cannot determine if the quale of my toothache is distinct
from or identical with the quale of your toothache, for example, because there is no
possibility of comparing them. In general, therefore, qualia are unindividuable, that is,
there cannot be any criterion by which we can judge when one quale is either distinct
from or identical with some other quale. An important upshot of the fact that qualia are

unindividuable is that qualia terms cannot refer, since by any such term we do not
identify a particular property.
But while perhaps we cannot compare qualia intersubjectively in the way suggested
by the example of different people's toothaches, still we might think that qualia can be
individuated from a first-person viewpoint. The idea would be that intrasubjectively we
are able to judge whether one instance of a quale is the same or different from another
across time. We each feel confident, after all, that we know that how the colour of a lawn
seems to us one day is the same as it seems to us the next day, for example. There is,
however, a fatal difficulty with this idea. It is impossible that such an intrasubjective
exercise could amount to a judgment; there can be no private judgments in this sense. To
make a judgment requires the possibility of distinguishing how something seems to
someone and how it actually is, and this distinction is impossible from a single point of
view - there is no sense in which the subject making the so-called judgment could make
such a distinction.
This point is famously made by Wittgenstein vis-a-vis rule-following. To follow a
rule is to obey it. But, Wittgenstein observes that "to think one is obeying a rule is not to
obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking that one
was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." This is because obeying a
rule is a practice, i.e., something we do that is necessarily 'done in the open'. To make a
judgment is a practice in the same sense. My judgment that it is raining, for example, is
only so to the extent that there is a distinction between its seeming to me that it is raining
and there being a fact or not as to whether it is raining. Accordingly, for someone to
judge that she is realising a red quale, say, could be a judgment only if she can make the
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distinction between how it seems to her that she is realising a red quale and whether or
not she is actually realising a red quale. However, qualia are defined as how things seem
to the subject. Therefore, the utterance 'I am realising a red quale' is empty since there is
no distinction between how red seems to someone and how red 'really' seems to her.
Accordingly, for someone to claim that she is realising the same colour quale as she did
yesterday cannot amount to a judgment.

3.3 Dennett's Qualia Scepticism
In supposing that qualia are unindividuable I take it that it is this fact about them that
marks them out from ordinary properties. But how can we think of qualia as properties at
all if we cannot in principle distinguish one instance of such a property from another?
This question brings us to Dennett's views. While Dennett does not use the term
'individuability' he essentially argues that qualia are unindividuable from the third-person
viewpoint, and that consequently the concept is incoherent. He likens the concept of
qualia to such bogus scientific concepts as elan vital and caloric. These properties were
originally posited by theories used to explain certain phenomena, namely, life and heat
respectively, but were eventually dropped when the theories they concerned were
replaced by predictively more successful ones that did not posit them. The theories
employing the concepts of elan vital and caloric came to be seen as false and so the
concepts were judged to have no extensions; we came to realise that there were no such
properties. Dennett argues that psychological explanations of our behaviour that invoke
qualia are empty in the sense that they are empirically untestable. Our judgments

Wittgenstein 1958, #202.
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concerning qualia are unconfirmable because of how we think of qualia, i.e., as intrinsic
properties that are unobservable from the third-person viewpoint. This fact suggests that
like caloric the concept of qualia is useless. For example, positing them does not help us
to explain the behaviour in the way that it is sometimes appealed to. Overall, there is no
reason to think qualia exist according to Dennett.
I disagree with Dennett's conclusion that qualia do not exist. My reasons for
disagreeing will be given later, but for now it should be noted that there is the
straightforward objection to it that qualia self-evidently exist. Given that we have
phenomenal experiences it seems absurd to suppose that they do not have this peculiarly
perspectival aspect to them. Denying the existence of qualia seems to amount to denying
this fact about experience. This concerns what I previously referred to as the
ineliminability of our phenomenonological understanding of consciousness. But what is
useful about Dennett's arguments, notwithstanding the seeming absurdity of his
conclusion, is his showing how it is that qualia are unindividuable. And it is this aspect of
his arguments that I want to focus on.
His arguments start off from Wittgenstein's observations about the nature of sensation
talk. Following Dennett it is worth considering some aspects of Wittgenstein's renowned
private language argument since the argument is directly relevant to the impossibility of
individuating qualia. In his article 'Quining Qualia' Dennett compares his position to that
of Wittgenstein (Dennett 1988). He suggests that Wittgenstein effectively denies that
there are such things as qualia, citing the following well-known passage from his
Philosophical Investigations in which Wittgenstein argues that a sensation term cannot
refer to some private, i.e., inner feature, namely, what we are here calling the qualitative
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character of an experience. He compares such inner features to the privately accessible
content of a box. He writes: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at
all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. - No, one can divide
through by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is" (Wittgenstein 1958, 293). It
is important to be clear what Wittgenstein's claim is here.
According to his early philosophical views, as expounded in Tractatus, the essential
purpose of language is to describe the world, i.e., the facts. As such language, he thought,
mirrors the logical structure of the world. Later, however, he came to view language in a
different way. He began to see it in terms of an activity, as a practice; or more precisely,
as a myriad of practices, reflecting the enormous variety of uses to which we put
language. Thus, language is a complex of particular practices each of which can be
described as a "language-game". Here the term "game" is used to capture the sense in
which the practice is characterised by following rules. By this measure our concepts, as
determined by such rule following activities, are constituted by the language-games in
which they are employed. A concept is best understood in terms of how it is used in
specific language-games.
In the passage cited above Wittgenstein focuses on the language-games concerned
with how we report to others about states internal to us, that is, states that others cannot
directly observe, e.g., a decaying tooth or a sprained wrist. These are states that, of
course, we each come to know about through particular sensations. Often in such reports
we relate to others what kind of sensation it is that we are having, e.g., "I have a
headache." Thus, we might be tempted to suppose that by such reports we are not only
expressing to others our discomfort, pleasure etc., but also we are telling them something
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about the sensation as identified by its qualitative character, i.e., its quale. Wittgenstein,
however, denies that our reports can ever be about such qualia. To explain his position he
likens the qualitative character of sensations like toothaches to the content of a box,
content that only the owner of the box can see or apprehend. He imagines a whole
community of such box owners, all of whom call the content of their box a "beetle." He
observes that since no one can apprehend the content of anyone else's box, the term
"beetle" cannot be used to refer to it, i.e., the thing inside each box. The term "beetle" can
only be used by the members of this community to talk about the content simpliciter, i.e.,
that which is inside the box, whatever that happens to be. Consequently, what happens to
be inside any one of the boxes does not affect how the term "beetle" is used; indeed, as
Wittgenstein remarks, the box could even be empty. Hence his insistence that the thing
inside the box can play no role in this language-game. Our language-games concerning
reports about our internal states are analogous to that of the imagined box owners, our
sensation words cannot be used to refer to the qualitative character of the sensations.
Qualia are relevantly analogous given that no one else can apprehend the one we each
realise.
However, Wittgenstein is not claiming that sensation words like 'pain' are about
nothing, and to stress this point he adds that while the thing in the box "is not a
something, it is not a nothing either!" (ibid, 304). Thus, strictly speaking Wittgenstein
does not deny the existence of qualia outright, as Dennett initially suggests. At most he is
suggesting that our sensation words do not refer to any such inner features.
But regardless of the conclusion Dennett aims to defend, his arguments are based on
denying the possibility of individuating qualia from the third-person viewpoint. And with
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this aim in mind he presents what he calls intuition pumps, i.e., thought experiments
"designed to flush out - and then flush away - the offending intuitions" (1988, 44). These
offending intuitions are those that lead us to think of qualia as ordinary properties in the
sense that we can treat them as identifiable particulars. Dennett insists that this is not
possible. One of the characteristics he identifies qualia as having is immediate
accessibility to each of us. That is, we are only acquainted with qualia from our own case.
For example, I am acquainted with what it is like to be in pain, i.e, to realise a pain quale,
through my experiencing pain. I could not have gained this knowledge through anyone
else's experience of pain. In other words, we know qualia non-inferentially such that our
knowledge of qualia is secure.
Dennett sets about showing how thinking of qualia in this way is incoherent. By
describing qualia as an incoherent concept I interpret him as claiming that, unlike in the
case of concepts concerning ordinary properties, judgments involving qualia are
unconfirmable, making it impossible to employ the concept in the same manner as we
standardly employ other concepts. He considers the example of intersubjective spectrum
inversion, asking you to imagine waking up one morning to discover that colours seem
inverted to you, so now the sky looks yellow, the grass has a distinctively magenta hue,
and so on. You have reason to suspect that some unethical neurosurgeon has tampered
with your brain to effect the inversion of your colour qualia. Dennett notes that the
neurosurgeon could have done one of two things to you (ibid, 50-51):

(1) Your optic nerves have been altered so that "all relevant neural events 'downstream'
are the opposite of their original and normal values."
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(2) Your memory-access links have been inverted, causing you to remember everything
as having the opposite colour to that which it presently seems to have.

Both of these procedures will lead you to think that your colour qualia have been
inverted. However, only (1) is supposed to cause such inversion. In the case of (2) your
colour qualia are assumed not to have changed - it is your memory of how colours seem
to you that has been altered. Dennett observes that there is no way for the victim of this
surgery to know whether her colour qualia have been inverted for herself. In order for her
to know this she would have to seek outside evidence. Certainly a neurophysiologist
might be able to confirm whether she has undergone procedure (1) or (2), but from the
victim's perspective there is no way of determining which procedure she has undergone
despite its being supposed that only (1) leads to the inversion of her colour qualia.
However, it might be objected that the neurophysiologist only confirms whether her
memory has changed. As Seager puts it: "The question should be: after the apparent
inversion, do I have any reason to doubt my memory?" (1999, 99). Thus, after waking up
you are equally concerned to know whether your memory has changed or not. And it is
this concern that the neurophysiologist can answer. But it is not clear that this is a
successful reply to Dennett's attack on qualia. Let us suppose that the neurophysiologist
confirms that it is your memory that has been tampered with. What conclusion can you
draw from this? You might conclude that the cloudless midday sky, for example, seems
to you the opposite colour that you remember it seeming, but in reality your colour qualia
are not inverted, so the sky still seems blue to you - you just falsely remember it seeming
to be a different colour. However, this is plainly contradictory. The sky does not seem to
you to be the same colour, for if it did you would have noticed nothing after waking up.

This objection presupposes that how colours seem to us is independent of how we
remember them seeming. The sky still seems blue to you, it is just that you misremember
it as once seeming yellow. But, what colour would the sky seem to you after the
procedure described in (2), blue or yellow? The difficulty is that it is impossible to
imagine this. We cannot think of how colours seem to us as independent of how we
remember them seeming; and this relates back to the fact that qualia are unindividuable.

3.3.1 Qualia Debunked
Another of Dennett's thought experiments concerns a story about two professional coffee
tasters, Chase and Sanborn. Each gives a different explanation for why, after many years
with the company, he no longer enjoys the taste of Maxwell House coffee:
Chase: While the coffee has the same flavour I have become a more sophisticated
coffee drinker and no longer like it.
Sanborn: My tastes have not changed, but my taste buds have and as a result I no
longer like the coffee either.

Note that neither man claims that the coffee's flavour has changed. Chase, then, contends
that his taste qualia with respect to the coffee have remained the same, whereas the effect
these qualia have on him has changed. Sanborn, on the other hand, thinks that it is his
taste qualia that have changed, and if they had not he would still enjoy the coffee's
flavour. The important thing to note is that both men's accounts of why they no longer
enjoy the company's coffee appeal to qualia, and as such they assume qualia to be entities
in their own right; that is, their existence is what makes the difference. But the problem
with these accounts, Dennett suggests, is that they are ultimately unconfirmable.

Accordingly, appeal to qualia serves no purpose; thereby indicating that the notion of
qualia is empty.
Why should Dennett think that these accounts are unconfirmable? Because, he argues,
there is no fact of the matter as to which is true. But how does this follow? It seems
plausible to suppose that there is a fact of the matter even if we cannot confirm which is
true. Indeed, Dennett himself notes,:"[i]t seems easy enough... to dream up empirical
tests that would tend to confirm Chase and Sanborn's different tales" (1988, 55). For
example, Chase may fail to re-identify coffee and other drinks when blind-folded, with
only minutes between sips. His failure would of course strongly undermine his claim to
know that the taste of the comapany's coffee has remained constant over the years.
However, Dennett chose the example of two tasters to characterise two polar opposite
accounts of the same phenomenon, namely the gradual loss of enjoyment of the coffee's
flavour. In such cases these kinds of empirical tests might indeed seem persuasively to
confirm Chase's or Sanborn's stories. But here we overlook another explanation of this
change. It is equally plausible to suppose that their loss of enjoyment might be explained
in terms of a combination of the two factors each cites as a singular cause. That is to say,
both Chase's and Sanborn's loss of enjoyment could be explained as being the result of an
imperceptible shift in their taste qualia and a shift in their reactions to these qualia. This
account, however, cannot be confirmed conclusively by any such empirical tests. In other
words, empirical tests could only confirm the kind of extreme accounts represented by
the examples of Chase and Sanborn.
Nonetheless, there seems to be another way of confirming such accounts empirically,
and that is to appeal to changes in neurophysiology. Dennett imagines, for instance,

Sanborn appealing to a change in his taste organs to explain the change in his taste qualia.
Similarly changes in Chase's neurophysiology might confirm his account. This kind of
empirical confirmation at least seems possible in principle. But, Dennett contends that
there is a limit to the evidential power of neurophysiology as well. To make this point
clear, in another thought experiment, he presents the following scenario: We are asked to
imagine that Chase undergoes a surgical procedure that results in the reversal of his taste
qualia; so, for example, things that once tasted sour to him now taste sweet. But over time
Chase compensates for this reversal so that eventually there is no discernible difference
in his behaviour, including his linguistic behaviour, i.e., he learns once more to call icecream sweet etc. His readjustment is so complete that he cannot remember how things
tasted any differently before the operation from how they do now. If the
neurophysiological changes correlated with this readjustment occur early in the process,
then we might plausibly suppose that Chase's qualia have been restored to how they were
before the operation. If, on the other hand, the correlated neurophysiological changes
occur later on in the process, then we might suppose that Chase's qualia remain as they
were immediately after the operation but he mistakenly remembers them as being the
same as they were before the operation. Here we suppose that the changes have occurred
in the part of the process concerned with memory, where in effect the qualia, as putative
properties, act as inputs in the memory process. The trouble is, Dennett points out, we
have no way of determining which of these two possibilities is actually the case. Chase
cannot know what is really the case by appealing to how things seem to him, since as
Dennett observes:

Chase may think that he thinks his experiences are the same as before [the operation]
because they really are (and he remembers accurately how they used to be), but he
must admit that he has no introspective resources for distinguishing that possibility
from [the] alternative... on which he thinks things are as they used to be because his
memory of how they used to be has been distorted by his new compensatory habits
(ibid, 5$).
Now, we might appeal to neurophysiological evidence to decide which is the case.
However, Dennett asserts that no neurophysiological facts can ever tell us where in the
process the qualia effectively are formed such that they become a factor in this sense. In
other words, there can never be any neurophysiological evidence that allows us to decide
the case. The concept of qualia he is attacking, recall, is of properties that are
apprehended immediately and only by the subject. Imagine in Wittgenstein's beetle-in-abox scenario that whatever is in each box is always correlated with certain phenomena,
for example, every box rings simultaneously. This seems like good evidence for
supposing that each box contains the same type of object, even if we cannot directly
confirm this assumption given that we cannot view the things in other people's boxes. But
it is crucial to note that the content of each box is essentially private; that is to say, there
is in principle no possibility of anyone other than the owner being able to view its
content. Therefore, it simply makes no sense to talk of the things in the boxes as being
the same thing, ditto for qualia. As Dennett remarks: "The idea that one should consult an
outside expert, and perform elaborate behavioural tests on oneself to confirm what qualia
one had, surely takes us too far away from our original idea of qualia as properties with
which we have a particularly intimate acquaintance" (ibid, 60). While this follows if

qualia are thought of as essentially private, as we shall see, some contend that qualia do
not have to be thought of in this way.

3.4 A Physicalist Criterion of Individuation
A common response to Dennett's position is to argue that qualia are identical with certain
brain states, a view which of course goes back at least to U.T. Place's and J.J.C. Smart's
defences of the mind-brain identity thesis. Accordingly, the concept of qualia is
straightforwardly coherent and their existence is not in doubt. A detailed version of this
line of argument is presented by Owen Flanagan in his book Consciousness Reconsidered
(1992). Flanagan endorses Dennett's description of qualia as the ways things seem to us.
However, he adds that this "characterization is useful so long as we do not join it to some
contentious theory of qualia according to which first-person seemings exhaust the nature
of states with a seeming aspect" (1992, 62). And this is precisely what he accuses Dennett
of doing. He argues that Dennett's construal of qualia is too narrow in this sense.
Flanagan's claim is curious given that qualia are defined, at least, as those properties of
experiences apprehended from the first-person point of view. How, therefore, does he
suppose them to be more than first-person seemings? For one thing he thinks of qualia as
more in terms of mental states than as properties. Rather, he asserts that a quale "is a
mental event or state that has, among its properties, the property that there is something it
is like to be in it" (ibid, 64). However, the description of this property of a quale, that it
has among others, itself fits exactly with the general description of qualia. In this respect,
what Flanagan takes qualia to be is difficult to discern. But, in general, he holds that
qualia in a wider sense, as he puts it, represent a typology of mental states, that is, the

term describes the kind of mental states that have a qualitative aspect to them, i.e., they
seem some way or other to us. These can include propositional attitudes according to
Flanagan.
Flanagan is sympathetic toward some sort of identity theory; he thinks that it is at
least a plausible empirical hypothesis (see ibid, 56-60). Thus, he suggests that
"[s]ubjective experiences have particular spatial locations in the form of distributed
neural activity. The neural properties of qualitative experiences are not revealed in the
first-person point of view" (ibid, 64). In agreement with Paul Churchland, he is inclined
to type-identify colour qualia with "a specific triplet of spiking frequencies in some triune
brain system" (P.M. Churchland 1989, 104). Flanagan, therefore, holds that qualia can be
more broadly conceived as mental states with a qualitative aspect, but which also have
physical features to them.
To make clear the contrast between his view and that of Dennett Flanagan cites an
analogy employed by Dennett. Dennett compares our supposed conceptual muddle with
regards to qualia to the snarled string of a kite, where in the case of such a kite there
comes a point when it is simply easier just to get some new string. He writes: "That's how
it is, in my opinion, with the philosophical topic of qualia, a tormented snarl of
increasingly convoluted .and bizarre thought experiments," (Dennett 1991, 369).
Flanagan, on the other hand, contends that the problem is better likened to the strings of
two kites getting entangled. The one kite represents an uncontentious conception of
qualia - what he calls the box kite - and the other represents the problematic conception
based solely on the subjective aspects of qualia. He declares that the solution is to
disentangle these kites and to discard the problematic one, leaving the box kite to "fly

freely" (1992, 63). This uncontentious conception of qualia is to think of them simply as
the "ways things seem to us" which, as noted earlier, is a characterisation offered by
Dennett himself.
Addressing Dennett's thought experiments discussed in his 1988 article "Quining
Qualia," Flanagan specifically considers the example of Chase's surgical inversion of his
taste qualia. Dennett lists two hypotheses that could explain how, after six months, Chase
reports that his taste qualia have returned to how they were before surgery, namely, (i)
that his taste qualia are still abnormal, but changes in memory-access processes in his
brain during the six months has altered his memory, and (ii) that somehow the changes in
his brain are such that his memories are compared to relevant neural activity prior to, or
upstream from, the qualia phase of his brain processes, so he remembers his old taste
qualia again. As noted, Dennett claims that we cannot decide between the two
hypotheses, no matter how much empirical evidence there might be in favour of one over
the other. That is because, according to Dennett, the reasons a neurophysiologist might
have to prefer one hypothesis over the other follow only from her appropriating the term
"qualia" to her own theoretical ends. Flanagan confesses that he is confused by Dennett's
claim (1991, 77). He interprets Dennett as assuming that the reason why no empirical
evidence can decide in favour of one hypothesis over the other is that he simply denies
that the term "qualia" refers to anything at all, given his narrow conception of qualia. In
reply to Dennett's story Flanagan imagines that upon watching a video of himself just
after his operation Chase remarks to his doctor that he has now come to realise that, six
months later, his taste qualia are back to normal. The doctor agrees with his judgment and
offers him two plausible hypotheses for explaining in neurological terms how this
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readjustment has come about. The doctor explains how his team settled on one rather
than the other. Flanagan remarks:

The case at hand is one in which Chase knows that something is happening - he can
describe it up to a point - but he doesn't understand what is happening in any depth,
so he rightly cedes authority to the experts. It violates the logic of the concept of
qualia as Dennett construes it for first-person authority to be ceded in this way. To
think this, Dennett must think that the identification of qualia with the "ways things
seem to us" must be interpreted as meaning that a quale is a state such that,
necessarily, being in it seems a certain way and, necesssarily, there is nothing else to
it. But.. .1 claim that the concept simply doesn't need to be understood in that way
(1992,79).

However, a crucial part of Dennett's complaint about the notion of qualia is that how we
think of them, i.e., as intrinsic properties, makes them conceptually independent of
physical properties. In essence Flanagan denies that qualia are intrinsic, that is, he
supposes that we can understand them to some degree in terms of their relations to other
properties. Nonetheless, he admits that he does not know how we can understand qualia,
as subjective phenomena, in physical terms. With respect to the question of how
subjectivity is part of the material world, he admits to being unable to offer any answer.
Rather, he argues that given the immense complexity of the brain it is not implausible to
expect that subjectivity can arise from it (ibid, 60).
If Flanagan is right and qualia are identical with brain states, then we cannot assume
that qualia are unindividuable after all. So we are presented with a theory of

consciousness that seems to undermine principle (S), namely, the assumption that only
the subject can be acquainted with the qualia it realises. Flanagan's overall position is that
while we do not know how qualia, as subjective phenomena, are natural, there is no
reason to suppose that they are not so. Intuitively we think of qualia and brain states as
distinct since the former, but not the latter, is subjective in nature. David Papineau
acknowledges this widespread intuition. Nonetheless, he argues that we have good
reasons to reject it. However much we might feel that they are distinct, to believe that
they are is too problematic. Moreover, he recognises that how we think of experiences
from the first- and third-person points of view is distinct. But, the fact that we think of
them in distinctive ways does not imply that we are thinking about distinct phenomena.
To reach this conclusion is to commit a fallacy, what Papineau calls the "antipathetic
fallacy"37 (1993,114-18). So, even though we cannot explain how the subjective aspect
of qualia relates to physical properties, it does not follow that qualia are not identical with
brain states. Of course, here Papineau is essentially making the same point as those who
oppose the conceivability argument, such as Levine and Carruthers. That is, he is
pointing out that how we conceive of properties must be distinguished from the
properties themselves, i.e., from what Carruthers calls "worldly" properties. What is
more, Papineau contends that once we have determined that conscious experiences are
identical with particular brain states there is no obligation for us to explain why they are
identical. To make this point he imagines the Mark Twain and and the Samuel Clemens
historical appreciation societies who coincidentally hold their conventions at the same
37

He derives the phrase 'antipathetic fallacy' from John Ruskin's pathetic fallacy,
which concerns the erroneous attribution of human feelings to objects in nature in virtue
of the figurative language of poetry, e.g., 'the deep and gloomy wood' (see Papineau
1993,116).
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venue. When their members meet they come to realise that their societies are dedicated to
the same man. If they discovered that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens in this way we
would not be inclined to ask why they are the same person. As Papineau explains: "If
they were [the same person], they were, and there's an end on it" (ibid, 121). Likewise, he
argues, if consciousness turns out to be identical with some complex physical property A
it makes no sense to ask "why consciousness is always present when physical property A
is" (ibid).
However, these cases are importantly disanalogous. In the case of the appreciation
societies, 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' unequivocally refer to individuals; we have
clear criteria of individuation with respect to them. Thus we are able to pick out
satisfactorily the person, or at least some historical facts about him, to which the names
refer. But in the case of identifying a type of quale with some physical property there is
no criterion of individuation for qualia prior to the determination of the identity. That is,
until we assume that qualia are brain states we cannot identify particular qualia. What is
needed in order to discover that qualia are in fact identical with brain states, in the same
sense as the societies' members discover that Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens were the
same person, is an independent means of identifying particular qualia. Without such an
independent criterion of individuation it is question-begging to assert that we can
discover that qualia are identical with brain states. So, to reiterate, a criterion of
individuation for qualia in terms of physical properties presupposes their identity with
physical properties. To assert that person S realises a red quale, for example, if and only
if S's brain has properties Pi,..., Pn, is to identify the red quale with the brain state that
has these properties. In other words, we cannot determine that a red quale is identical
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with some brain state without first presupposing this by a physical criterion of
individuation for qualia. No such question-begging occurs when the members of the
appreciation societies conclude that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.
It might be replied, however, that while we may not be able to show directly how
particular qualia are identical with some brain state there is plenty of evidence to support
the empirical hypothesis that qualia are identical with brain states quite generally. To this
extent Flanagan points to the ways in which qualia can plausibly be individuated by
physiological criteria. He cites Clyde Hardin's research in this regard which concerns
colour perception and the possibility of spectrum inversion. It is widely assumed that we
cannot rule out spectrum inversion by appealing to our physiologies and other physical
facts about us. Hardin, however, argues that we can pin down relations between colour
qualia and the neurophysiological states said to realise them, and therefore resist
concluding that spectrum inversion is possible. To do this requires being able to identify
a particular colour quale. Let us look at Hardin's argument.

3.4.1 Evidence for the Identity Theory?
Hardin identifies a commonly held view, namely, that qualia bear no relations to physical
properties. A classic expression of this view that Hardin quotes is by Leibniz in his
Monadology (see Leibniz 1998, 270). There Leibniz imagines scaling up the brain so that
we could walk into it as we can into a mill. Assuming that the physical processes of the
brain are inherently no different to the workings of a mill, Leibniz notes that observing in
this way the workings of the brain would obviously not lead us to an understanding of
how it is that the brain perceives anything. Nothing about the neurophysiology, therefore,

can tell us anything about perception, or more precisely, why it is that each thing seems
to us a particular way rather than some other way. This view, Hardin thinks, is evidenced
in Joseph Levine's well-known discussion of the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine
1983). There Levine denies that we can individuate colour qualia in terms of physical
properties. Call the physiological account of a person's seeing red "R" and her seeing
green "G". Levine contends that "it seems just as easy to imagine G as to imagine R
underlying the qualitative experience that is in fact associated with R. The reverse, of
course, also seems imaginable" (1983, 357-58). Thus, according to Levine, there are no
necessary connections between colour qualia and the physiological processes said to
underlie them. Whatever physical account R of a person's experience of seeing red it is
always possible to suppose that this person is in fact experiencing green, i.e., realising a
green quale.
In reply Hardin argues that given a detailed enough version of R this possibility can
be ruled out. Nonetheless, he admits to offering no proof against the possibility. That is
because of our lack of detailed knowledge about brain processes involved in colour
experience. In this sense his reply is speculative. But, he thinks that it is very likely that
when we do gain such knowledge we shall be able to rule out the possibility. Hardin
suggests that input from our different sensory modes are to some degree compared. As he
notes, "there is a considerable body of reliable cross-modal psychological connections
documented in the experimental literature" (1987, 290). Assuming this is so R must
include a description of how the perception of red is related to other sensory modes. We
already have evidence of such relations. For example, colours are given somatic
descriptions in terms of their advancing or receding, or in terms of being warm or cold.
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Hardin contends that this evidence strongly suggests that there is some part of the visual
cortex which acts as a central processing unit that compares inputs from the sensory
modes with our colour perceptions. Accordingly, the accounts R and G will inevitably
differ in detail. And for this reason we can ultimately rule out the possibility that a
person in physical states underlying the experiencing of red could, instead, be
39

expenencing green.
Like Flanagan Hardin thinks that we can understand qualia relationally. As we have
seen, he argues that our colour experiences are complexly structured such that it is very
difficult to imagine that when a person is perceiving red, say, her experience could be
38

In general, therefore, Hardin claims that which colours we have the capacity to
perceive is determined by the physical structure of our perceptual apparatus. Our colour
perceptions, he explains, are coded on two chromatic channels. Each of these channels
has a neutral, or base, level of excitation. In this neutral state no colour is perceived. But
if these channels realise levels of excitation above their base rates, then we perceive
either yellow or red, depending on which channel it is. And when they are excited below
the base rates we perceive blue or green respectively. Thus, the two chromatic channels
have either yellow-blue or red-green opponent colours. This fact tells us we should not be
able to perceive a combination of these opponent colours since, of course, a channel
cannot be both excited above and below its base rate simultaneously. Since this is indeed
the case it is reasonable to conclude that how we perceive colours is determined by the
underlying physiological processes. This again seems to suggest that we can individuate
the qualia a person realises in terms of her physiological states, or properties more
generally.
39
Hardin considers two replies to his denial of colour qualia inversion. First, a
person's colour qualia might be epiphenomenal; so she realises a green quale looking at a
red object, for example, but her behaviour is independent of this fact - she behaves as if
the colour of a ripe tomato elicits warm feelings, so to speak, despite its eliciting cool
feelings. Second, it might be possible that the inversion includes comparisons with other
sensory modes, so that the person not only realises a green quale looking at a red object,
it also seems to her to be a warm, advancing colour. The first possibility Hardin finds
outlandish (1988, 138). It requires us to suppose either that a person can believe that red
seems cool to her but is unable to express this belief, or that she expresses a belief that
red seems warm to her but experiences it as cool. With respect to the second possibility,
Hardin points out that it is difficult to imagine how a person could realise a green quale
and yet the colour seems warm to her. Such a quale would effectively be a residue of
green, as he puts it, that "would seem to correspond to nothing in experience or
imagination" (1987, 292).

thought of as being of the colour green instead. Consequently, he rejects Levine's claim
that whatever physiological account of seeing a particular colour, C, we offer, it is always
possible to imagine that the person has this experience while realising a different colour
quale to C, e.g., the quale of its complementary colour in the case of spectrum inversion.
However, Hardin's denial of Levine's claim presupposes that such a physiological
account of C identifies C's quale. More precisely, in his discussion of Levine's position
Hardin conflates experiencing a colour and realising a particular colour quale. He treats
these as the same thing. He states that "Levine asks us to decide whether one could be in
physical state R and yet have an experience of green, without letting us know anything
about the particulars of R" (1987, 286). But in fact Levine asks us to decide whether one
could be in physical state R and yet realise a green quale, i.e., that the qualitative
character of the experience be green rather than red. Levine is not suggesting that in
physical state R a person might be having a green experience as such. This is a subtle
difference but an extremely important one. Levine assumes that experiencing a colour C
as describable in physical terms and realising a C-quale are distinct. Hardin, on the other
hand, takes these to be the same thing. So, like Papineau, Hardin takes qualia to be
individuable on the assumption that to have an experience of C is identical with realising
a C-quale. Again this is circular; it is simply to presuppose that qualia are identical with
brain states.
It is this sort of question-begging that Dennett points to when he insists that the
reasons a neurophysiologist might give for preferring one hypothesis concerning qualia
over others only follow from her appropriating the term "qualia" to her own theoretical
ends. Here, I think that Dennett is pointing out that in order to endorse the one hypothesis

the neurophysiologist must assume a physical criterion of individuation for qualia. And
that is to think of qualia as relational properties which again, as Dennett notes, "takes us
too far away from our original idea of qualia as properties with which we have a
particularly intimate acquaintance" (1988, 60). If we think of qualia as relational
properties in this way, it is very difficult to understand how they can have a subjective
aspect. Flanagan's reply to this difficulty is to suggest that qualia are subjective in the
sense that they can be characterised as the ways things seem to us. Characterising qualia
in this way, according to Flanagan, allows us to pin down "the phenomenological features
of mind so that we can check for relations among the phenomenological, psychological,
and neurological levels" (1992, 61). However, 'the ways things seem to us' describes an
essentially subjective aspect of experience, my pain quale with respect to a toothache, for
example, is that property of my pain experience intrinsic to me, i.e, the way the toothache
seems to me. Understood in this way qualia are not relational properties. Flanagan claims
that we can conceive of qualia more broadly to include their relations to natural
properties. But, how is this possible unless we have some way of understanding qualia as
subjective phenomena relationally? If there is a conceptual link between qualia so
understood and physiological properties, that is, a way of understanding the subjective
aspect of qualia in physiological terms, then qualia could straightforwardly be thought of
as relational properties. But no such link exists.

3.5 Summary
I started, in section 1, by laying out a conception of qualia, an account of how we think of
them, that is as uncontroversial as possible. Crucial to our understanding of qualia, I

argued, is that they are perspectival in nature. This is the essential insight about qualia
that originally led Nagel to anticipate the problem of consciousness, which he expressed
in terms of their dependence on a particular point of view. The peculiarity of qualia in
this respect is that we are each directly acquainted with them, and as such we do not have
to posit them in our scientific and common-sense theories about the world as we posit
ordinary properties such as blueness, being a whale, being one metre high, and so on. The
difference is that we apprehend these ordinary properties, either directly or indirectly by
our senses, whereas qualia are those properties in virtue of which we apprehend these
ordinary properties. That is what is peculiar about qualia. In understanding qualia thus, I
then argued, it is best to think of them as constitutive of the subject of experience, i.e., the
phenomenal subject. The idea is that the term 'qualia' describes the manifestation of the
phenomenal subject. Qualia exist as the phenomenal subject.
Qualia thought of this way must be, however, inapprehensible even by the subject.
This follows from the fact that as constitutive of the subject it is impossible that the
subject can apprehend them. The inapprehensibility of qualia, I argued, implies that they
are unindividuable. That is, there can be no criterion by which we can judge if one quale
is distinct from or identical with some other quale. In section 3 I considered Dennett's
arguments aimed at eliminating qualia. What is interesting about his arguments is that he
likewise claims that qualia are unindividuable, albeit towards a different end since I
accept the existence of qualia pace Dennnett. And following Dennett I discussed aspects
of Wittgenstein's private language argument relevant to the unindividuability of qualia.
Wittgenstein's views on the issue will become central to discussions in chapter 4
especially. In his arguments Dennett points out that insofar as we can think of qualia they
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cannot be relational properties in any sense, and so there is no hope of understanding
them in behavioural or physiological terms.
The conclusion that qualia are unindividuable is compatible with how we find qualia
to be, that is, it agrees with our inability to apprehend other people's qualia or to
understand even what this could amount to. However, their unindividuability does make
it impossible to identify them as brain states, or as anything else for that matter. This
would preclude identifying qualia as physical properties, and a fortiori it would preclude
identifying experiences as brain states to the extent that our experiences are identified by
their qualia - a person's experience is thought to be one of pain, for example, only if the
experience has a pain-quale, i.e., the right kind of phenomenological quality.
Accordingly, identity theorists must assume qualia are individuable. As I indeed point out
in section 4, the identity theorist argues that qualia are straightforwardly individuable
because they are identical with certain types of physical properties. In this section I
considered Flanagan's objections to Dennett's claim that qualia are unindividuable, and
then I broadened the discussion to include arguments against the general claim made by
Papineau and Hardin. With respect to all three philosophers - Flanagan, Papineau and
Hardin - 1 argued that their reasoning is question-begging. For example, Papineau
contends that there is overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting that qualia are
identical with properties of the brain, or at least to deny that they are identical is too
problematic. But even to assume that qualia can be identical with certain physical
properties entails already assuming that they are individuable. None of these
philosophers, I argue, succeeds in showing that qualia are individuable.

But, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter, if qualia are unindividuable then
they are not naturalisable. Qualia cannot be subsumed under our scientific theories if we
are unable to determine when two or more instances of a quale fall under the same type
or under distinct quale-types. This conclusion seems to contradict my conclusion in
chapter 2 that there are no a priori reasons to suppose that consciousness is not
naturalisable. Again, I shall argue in the next chapter that this contradiction is only
apparent.
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Chapter 4
Saving the Phenomenological

I have argued that qualia are unindividuable and hence cannot be naturalised, but that
consciousness is nonetheless naturalisable. Thus consciousness, as a natural phenomenon,
can be understood in terms of behaviour and physiology, and qualia play no direct role in
this understanding. This conclusion concurs with Dennett's view that consciousness is
analysable in heterophenomenological terms, which suggests that the concept of qualia is
mistaken or empty so that talk of qualia is about nothing. Indeed, Dennett argues that
there are no such properties as qualia. I agree that consciousness can be naturalised in
heterophenomenological terms, but I resist the conclusion that qualia do not exist. Here
we struggle with words, but denying the existence of qualia makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to understand ourselves as experiencing anything, in contrast to being
something like a chair, namely, something that there is nothing it is like to be. Thinking
of qualia concerns the attempt to account for the subjective aspect of consciousness that
distinguishes it from other phenomena. Thus, to the extent that Dennett eliminates the
subjective aspect of experience he is often accused of changing the subject. That is to say,
for many what is essential to consciousness is its phenomenology, i.e., those features that

seem apprehensible only from the first-person viewpoint, features that a
heterophenomenological analysis misses out. Therefore, the phenomenon Dennett takes
to be naturalisable is not consciousness as such. Below, I aim to reconcile the tension
between maintaining that the concept of qualia plays no role in naturalising
consciousness and that qualia are real properties.
After taking stock, in section 4.1, of the main conclusions reached so far, I point to
the principal aim of the chapter, namely, to reconcile the two following apparently
conflicting claims: (1) Qualia exist and (2) Qualia are unnaturalisable. In section 4.21
again look at how Dennett argues for the unindividuabilty of qualia, and explain why we
do not have to accept his conclusion that their unindividuability requires us to deny their
existence. In section 4.2.11 argue that prima facie we seem able to think of someone
being conscious, as measured by behaviour and physiology, independently of being
conscious phenomenologically understood in terms of realising qualia, but these two
apparently distinctive ways of thinking of consciousness are mutually dependent; that is
to say, they are two aspects of a single concept in the sense that the one way of
understanding consciousness presupposes the other. This mutual dependence derives
from the fact that we cannot acquire the idea of being conscious in the one sense without
the idea of being conscious in the other. Consequently, although consciousness is only
naturalisable in terms of a naturalistic understanding of consciousness, i.e., in terms of
behaviour and physiology, this fact does not make our phenomenological understanding
of consciousness irrelevant. The very fact that we have a naturalistic understanding of
consciousness requires this other kind. Then in section 4.2.2 I argue the concept of
consciousness understood in terms of this mutual dependence shows how the zombie

hypothesis is only superficially plausible. And in section 4.2.3 I consider an objection to
this understanding of the concept of consciousness in terms of the problem of the
explanatory gap, showing how this objection can be met. Finally in section 4.3 I briefly
consider how the unindividuability of qualia might threaten to make talk about qualia
meaningless, a worry which again is deflected.

4.1 Making Sense of Consciousness
In the first chapter I argued that it is a good policy to adopt naturalism, that is, an
approach or attitude based on treating philosophy as continuous with science, justified
principally by the fact that there is no higher authority by which to determine how the
world is than our senses. Any hypothesis that is putatively about the world that
contradicts or is in conflict with what our senses tell us, roughly speaking, must either be
rejected or adjusted to explain away this conflict. By this measure, no metaphysical claim
based on intuition can falsify any scientific hypothesis held true in virtue of its
consistency with the rest of our best scientific theories and its agreement with our
experience. The necessity of empirical falsifiability in this sense means that metaphysical
claims cannot stand above scientific scrutiny. That is to say, our scientific theories, and
practices more generally, cannot be undermined by metaphysical considerations because
such considerations cannot appeal to a higher authority.
Nothing stops us from assuming philosophical hypotheses can be held true
independently of any ultimate empirical confirmation. But I have argued that a nonnaturalistic attitude, based on assuming that such philosophical hypotheses can
undermine our scientific theories, tends to lead to extravagant or perverse metaphysical
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claims. The example we looked at is Chalmers' suggestion that perhaps consciousness is
ubiquitous, rather than a chauvinistic biological property. Because this hypothesis is
logically independent of the rest of science and untestable it cannot be shown to be false.
Nor can it be shown to be true in any robust sense, specifically, in terms of being
compatible with how we find the world to be according to our senses. Chalmers argues
that this hypothesis can be held true to the extent that it is part of a plausible theory of
consciousness. The problem with trying to measure the truth of a theory by its plausibility
alone is that it is an intuitive measure rather than an objective one. Truth concerns how
the world is, not how we intuitively think it must be. Underlying this observation are the
facts about how we conceive of natural phenomena.
To understand a phenomenon as natural is to suppose that we think of it according to
how well it fits with our theories as confirmed by observation. To borrow Carruthers'
term mentioned earlier (see section 2.4.1), natural phenomena or properties are
understood as being thickly individuable. That is, a single natural property can be
individuated, or picked out, by various concepts. There is no one-to-one correspondence
between properties and our concepts of them such that concepts determine properties. To
assume otherwise, Carruthers notes, leads us to endorse a highly implausible platonism.40
However, it is important to note that Carruthers embraces a full-blooded realism about
natural properties. He tells us that
40

Briefly, the claim is that every valid concept must correspond with some mindindependent property, but concepts are mind-dependent. Accordingly, our minds would
have to be capable of grasping so-called mind-independent properties. The only way to
make sense of this possibility is to think of properties as inhabiting a sort of abstract
platonic realm accessible to our minds (Carruthers 2001, 35-36). The problems with such
platonism are well-known, and there is no need to cite them here; in particular, it is
antithetical to the idea of what natural properties are.
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we should believe, both that there are real properties belonging to the natural world,
and that which properties there are in the world is an open question, which cannot be
read directly off the set of concepts which we happen to employ (ibid, 37)

Here and elsewhere Carruthers suggests that what properties there are in the world is
independent of our concepts in some absolute sense, as when he describes this as an 'open
question'. Carruthers, therefore, thinks of properties as somehow fully entities in their
own right. I would qualify his assertion above by insisting that we cannot think of
properties as wholly or absolutely independent of our concepts. Picking out a property
requires possessing a corresponding concept. Fortunately, I think we can subscribe to a
more modest, less inflated, view of properties than the one embraced by Carruthers. We
can instead think of properties in terms of predicates, such that an object is said to have a
property if some predicate is true of that object; and in this sense properties can be said to
exist. So, for example, we say that there is a property of being furry if it is true, for
example, that some cat is furry.
Now, Carruthers is drawn to his property realism by the thought that how we think of
an object, i.e., in terms of what properties it has, cannot determine how it really is in this
sense. By this measure, we cannot ever assume a one-to-one correspondence between
properties and concepts - it is always possible that we have more than one way of
conceiving of some property. Hence, the relationship between properties and concepts is
one-to-many rather than one-to-one. However, we can understand talk of one-to-many
correspondence between properties and concepts other than in the way Carruthers
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understands it. Instead we can understand predicate terms as being semantically
equivalent. So, rather than talk of an object having the same property differently
conceived, we can talk of two or more predicate terms, e.g., F and G, having the same
meaning so that F and G attribute the same property to the object. Accordingly, there
would be a one-to-many relationship between properties, thought of as concept
predicates, and predicate terms. So, to use a previous example, rather than thinking of
there being two concepts, R and S, that seem to refer to distinct properties, i.e., diseases,
but which are later discovered to refer to a single property, we can think of there being
two predicate terms, R and S, that seem to pick out distinct concept-predicates, but which
are later judged to have the same meaning and hence can be said to pick out the same
property (see section 2.4.1).
The view of properties I have outlined above, this other way of thinking of properties,
might reasonably be called conceptualist. However, I am reluctant to describe it as such.
That is because conceptualism about properties is usually defined as the view that
properties are mind-dependent. Thus, it is understood to be the rejection of the idea that
properties exist in their own right. I do not think that this is a helpful way of viewing
things. Talk of properties in their own right is an attempt to elucidate the thought that
how the world is does not depend on how we think of it. But it is implausible to think that
we can understand this talk as implying that independently existing properties are
identifiable as such. This is what I reject in Carruthers' view. Carruthers holds that
science aims at, and could eventually succeed in, picking out properties in their own right
(ibid, 38). This is to presume a dichotomy between mind-dependence and mindindependence, so to speak. Thinking in terms of this dichotomy is unhelpful.

Science does not reveal properties in their own right. We are tempted to suppose that
science provides an ever fuller or more comprehensive picture of the world in terms of
properties. This picture of the world might be likened to a written portrait of a person,
describing in increasing detail her character, looks, etc. such that it corresponds ever
more closely to the real, i.e., mind-independent, person. However, with respect to science
there is nothing analogous to this corresponding 'given' person, nothing we can hold up
this so-called picture of the world against. We do not have to think of science as a
picturing of the world, rather we can think of it as an activity in the world. Does the truth
of our best physical theories, for example, imply that some things really are negatively
charged? Yes, but it is nonetheless a misleading question. What our best physical theories
show is that we must think of certain things as being negatively charged - it fits with our
observations in general, and it enables us do things in the world. Importantly, this is not
usefulness in the sense implied by pragmatism, that is, concerned simply with getting
things done; rather it concerns the hard and fast notion of usefulness for science, based on
the demand that our scientific theories are predictively successful, so that if a theory fails
to be it is our duty to alter it.41 Carruthers, on the other hand, seemingly bewitched by this
notion of science as the picturing of the world, betrays a non-naturalistic attitude by
presupposing that there is a God's-eye-view that science aims to reach, a viewpoint on the
world as it is 'independent of us' in some absolute sense. No such viewpoint exists. The
view I am urging is realist insofar as the properties posited by our best scientific theories
truly exist, i.e., are real, on the understanding that what we believe to be real is ultimately

41

Here, I have in mind William James's notion of truth, as expressed in various
passages in his Pragmatism, 1907, as it relates to his so-called pragmatic method.
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putative - we must always be prepared to give up our belief in the existence of properties
if adjustments in our theories demand that we do. This is not some second-rate realism,
for as Quine remarks: "Nor let us look down on the standpoint of the [scientific] theory as
make-believe; for we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or
other, the best we can muster at the time" (1960, 22).
With respect to consciousness we have seen that Dennett argues that 'qualia'
represents a 'confused intuitive concept'. In this regard he claims that the philosophical
concept of qualia is based on a loose way of talking in terms of 'how things seem' to each
of us. Indeed, it seems unexceptional to say, for example, that how green things seem to
me is how they seem to you. In the everyday context this way of talking leads to no
confusion inasmuch as little depends on its being true or false, since such assertions are
not expected to be tested in any rigorous manner. And that is a good thing given that
qualia, understood as the phenomenological qualities of our experiences,
are unindividuable. That is, there is no criterion by which we can ever determine whether
some quale is in fact identical with some reportedly distinct quale or not from the thirdperson viewpoint. It is not possible, for example, for me to know that how a toothache
feels to me is the same or distinct from how one feels to you. To the extent that
knowledge requires providing independent evidence, there seems to be no way of
knowing such things. We have no means of identifying, or picking out, individual qualia
from one another. However, unless an entity is individuable in this sense there is no way
to quantify over it since, to cite Quine's maxim, we can have 'no entity without identity'.
This implies that qualia cannot be naturalised, since to naturalise an entity, such as a
property, requires being able to quantify over it in order to bring it under a theory.

Very broadly there have been two responses to the unindividuability of qualia. One
response has been to conclude that because qualia are self-evidently real, i.e., exist, the
only way to explain their unindividuability is to suppose that they are not physical
properties, since they are accordingly not apprehensible from the third-person point of
view. This roughly characterises Jackson's original position (1982), for example. The
second response has been to assume, with the non-physicalists, that qualia are real, but to
conclude that they are unindividuable because we cannot properly conceive of
consciousness, and a fortiori of qualia - it is at least beyond our present conceptual
capacities, and maybe forever so. Accordingly, qualia are in principle individuable but
we could never grasp any criterion by which to do this. This describes the kind of
mysterian response offered by McGinn (1989/91), and with which Nagel is sympathetic.
By now it should be clear that these responses face serious difficulties, and
consequently neither of them is attractive. But as I argued earlier, to insist instead that we
can individuate qualia fails. As we have seen, this is the basic position of identity
theorists like Flanagan and Papineau, who argue that qualia are physical and hence
individuable, at least in principle. The problem is that they provide no independent
support for the claim that qualia are physical. Although Flanagan, for example, argues
that while we do not understand how qualia, thought of as physical properties, have a
phenomenological aspect to them, we can at least come to understand more clearly how
phenomenology arises in the brain as our neuroscience advances (Flanagan 1992, 35-60).
The trouble with this claim is that in essence we understand qualia phenomenologically,
and no amount of detail about the underlying mechanisms in the brain can explain qualia
so understood.
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The unindividuability of qualia, then, seems to entail an undesirable dichotomy since
neither response is acceptable. I think, nonetheless, that there is an element in the
responses that is right. And so what I want to explore is the possibility of conserving
what is right about each of them and weaving this into a coherent position. There are two
fundamental insights I think that we should accept:

(1) Qualia exist; there is a phenomenological aspect to experience.
(2) Qualia, as properties of experience, are not naturalisable, as they are
unindividuable and hence cannot fall under any naturalistic theory.

However, one might argue, as Dennett does, that qualia are not naturalisable because
the concept of qualia is incoherent. And this, Dennett contends, shows that there are no
such properties as qualia. But such eliminativism about qualia seems very difficult to
accept. As Levine, for example, explains somewhat rhetorically:

[W]hat could be more obvious than the fact that we have conscious sensory
experiences? How could you deny that there is something that it's like to see red,
smell a rose, or feel pain? What possible illusions could we be suffering from in
thinking that these are all genuine properties of experience? (2001, 131)

The idea that qualia do not exist does appear absurd. But does the unindividuability of
qualia, specifically, imply this? The assumption that qualia are unindividuable concerns
the concept of qualia. It is to assert that insofar as we think.of consciousness in terms of
the properties of experience, i.e., phenomenologically, these properties do not have

identifiable instances. But that is not to suppose that we cannot conceive of qualia
generally; that is, it can still be assumed that, for example, there is something that it is
like to see the colours yellow and blue for most of us. What is denied is that we can talk
about individual qualia. In other words, while we can say that there is something that it is
like to see yellow, blue, red etc. in general, talk of how it is to see red as opposed to
yellow, say, goes nowhere. Therefore, to assert that qualia are unindividuable does not
seem to force us to conclude that there is nothing that it is like to smell a rose and so on.
Here we are reminded of Wittgenstein's remark concerning his beetle-in-a-box scenario,
cited earlier in section 3.3, that while the content of the box "is not a something, it is not a
nothing either!" (1958, 304). In other words, while the concept of qualia does not concern
particular property instances it is not about nothing, i.e., qualia do exist.

4.2 Retaining Qualia
How exactly might one suppose that the unindividuability of qualia implies that they do
not exist? One might reason that if it is impossible to determine that one quale is in fact
distinct from another, then any statement about qualia, e.g., 'I am having a red quale
looking at this tomato', is unfalsifiable in principle. This fact suggests that it must be
denied, in the above example say, that I am really having a red quale since if I were so it

That said, this is not to deny that we can make sense of the notion of distinguishing
between qualia simplicter. Whatever it is like for someone to see red and to see yellow,
we can straightforwardly assume the person distinguishes between these qualia, as
evidenced behaviourally. Indeed, as Kim remarks, "the intrinsic qualities associated with
qualia are, or may be, undetectable, but differences and similarities between qualia,
within a single individual, are behaviorally detectable, and this opens a way for their
behavioral functionalization" (2005, 172).
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would be confirmable. It is this essential line of argument that Dennett uses to deny that
qualia exist.
Dennett is sometimes interpreted as appealing to verificationist principles in his
argument for the claim that qualia do not exist. This is how William Seager, for example,
interprets Dennett. Seager helpfully summarises verificationism in general as "the
doctrine affirming that where one can't tell the truth about something, there is no truth to
tell" (2001, 85). This describes the verificationist principle of truth, otherwise expressed
as 'a statement is true if and only if it is verifiable'. Dennett's argument also would seem
to appeal to the verificationist principle of meaning. This principle, most often referred to
as the principle of verifiability, states that a statement is meaningful if and only if there is
some method of verifying it. As Dennett makes clear at the beginning of his 'Quining
Qualia' (1986), his aim is to show that the concept of qualia is incoherent. In this sense
his general strategy is to point out that statements concerning qualia are unverifiable, and
this fact suggests that the statements are in an important sense meaningless, and hence
there is nothing that such statements are about.
Consider a statement that involves a pseudo-concept in this way: 'God is perfection'.
This statement could be said to be meaningless because we have no method by which to
verify it empirically. To verify this claim we need to identify God, and this we cannot do
since the concept of God bears no relations to anything observable. Thus, appealing to the
verificationist principle of truth, if this statement is unverifiable then it cannot be true.
Therefore, the term 'God' fails to refer, hence God does not exist. Dennett is taken to
argue that statements concerning qualia are meaningless for the same kind of reasons. But
insofar as Dennett can be interpreted as arguing that qualia are unindividuable - a
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position, I have argued, that can be very plausibly attributed to him - he does not need to
appeal directly to these verificationist principles.
Specifically Dennett argues that the concept of qualia is confused such that the term is
unusable - any statement employing the term 'quale' is unverifiable. He observes that the
concept originates from a pretheoretical notion (1986, 227). He describes 'qualia' as "an
unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
things seem to us" (ibid, 226). As he remarks, this original notion is "so thoroughly
confused that even if we undertook to salvage some "lowest common denominator" from
the theoretician's proposal...it would be tactically obtuse—not to say Pickwickian - to
cling to the term" (ibid, 227). He elucidates how this everyday notion relates to that of
qualia using examples such as the way milk tastes to someone is a gustatory quale (ibid).
Dennett points out that the trouble with the concept, to repeat what was written in an
earlier chapter, is that qualia are thought of as essentially private and intrinsic properties
so that reports concerning someone's qualia are empirically unverifiable. In other words,
qualia would have to be properties whose instances cannot be independently identified;
that is to say, qualia would have to be unindividuable. It is impossible to determine
whether a quale is distinct from or identical with another quale from a third-person, i.e.,
objective, viewpoint. By this measure, the extension of the concept of qualia is
indeterminable so that the set of actual instances of qualia cannot ever be determined.
Hence the concept is unusable in the sense outlined above, namely, any statement
employing the term is unverifiable.
In this way his argument does not appeal directly to verificationist principles. We do
not conclude that the concept is incoherent because judgments concerning it are

unverifiable and hence cannot be true; rather, we can take Dennett to be arguing that the
concept is incoherent and this is evidenced by the fact that judgments concerning them
are unverifiable. In essence his argument would therefore amount to the following. The
concept of qualia, based on our everyday notion of how things seem to us, is confused
and incoherent. How we think of qualia entails their being unindividuable. Their
unindividuability implies that the concept's extension is indeterminable. This is evidenced
by the unverifiability of judgments concerning them. Consequently, we are better off
giving up on the concept; or, as he puts it, it is "[f]ar better, tactically, to declare that
there simply are no qualia at all" (ibid).
However, I think Dennett is too pessimistic. I agree that ordinarily if we were to think
of some property as unindividuable, then the concept would be unusable, and hence we
would be best off passing it over. But, it is precisely the unindividuability of qualia that
defines the concept, and so rather than abandoning the concept we should aim to
understand why they are unindividuable. Consider the following hypothetical example.
Imagine someone observes an astronomical phenomenon that he calls a 'mysterion'. A
mysterion, he proposes, does not necessarily have a single location, so that if we
ostensibly observe two mysterions simultaneously at different points in the sky we are
unable to determine whether they are the same mysterion or distinct ones. Mysterions,
therefore, would qualify as unindividuable phenomena. Now, there seem to be two ways
in which mysterions could be thought of as unindividuable. First, we might assume that
there is a fact of the matter as to whether two such observations are of the same
mysterion or distinct ones, but we cannot know which is the case. This is to think of
mysterions as being epistemically unindividuable. Second, we might think that there is no
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fact of the matter vis-a-vis such observations. This is somewhat analogous to the
indeterminacy of the position or direction of a subatomic particle in accordance with
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. That is, the position of a subatomic particle is not
determinate until it is observed; except that in this case not even observing mysterions
would determine their identities. Let us call this ontological unindividuability.
The idea of ontological unindividuability is plainly incoherent. It amounts to
assuming that it is undetermined whether a so-called mysterion is identical with itself or
not, which is nonsense. But what can we make of the idea of the epistemic
unindividuability of mysterions? Let us call the observed mysterions at two points in the
sky 'A' and 'B'. The thought is that it is either the case that A = B or that A £ B but we can
never know, i.e., there is no criterion by which to determine which is the case. If this is
so, then clearly the concept of mysterions is unusable logically, that is, no judgment
concerning them would ever be verifiable and hence statements concerning them are not
truth-evaluable. Accordingly, we are best off to give up on the concept of mysterions
altogether. But as an epistemic limitation it might turn out that there are reasons why
mysterions are unindividuable. This is at least a hypothetical possibility. We could still
maintain that they exist so long as we could offer a satisfying account of why we cannot
know when two observed mysterions are the same individual or distinct individuals. And
the same holds for qualia, that is, if we can explain why qualia are epistemically
unindividuable, then we do not have to conclude that the concept is incoherent and
should consequently be given up, as Dennett recommends. Indeed, later I shall offer the
outline of such an account.

4.2.1 Two Ways of Understanding Consciousness
Earlier I argued that insofar as we attribute consciousness to others we do so strictly in
terms of another person's or creature's behaviour and physiology. Whether others have
an inner life, i.e., whether they are phenomenologically conscious, plays no direct role in
judging them to be conscious as such. When we say, therefore, that someone is conscious
we are attributing to them such-and-such behaviour and physiological characteristics.
Only by thinking of consciousness from this third-person viewpoint can we get the
concept of consciousness off the ground at all. If, on the other hand, we thought of
consciousness strictly from the first-person viewpoint, then my judgment that I am
conscious would be distinct from my judgment that you are conscious, i.e, they would be
justified in wholly different ways. Let us call this third-personal understanding of
consciousness 'consciousnessN'. And let us call our phenomenological first-personal
understanding of consciousness 'consciousnessp'.
Now, consciousness as we understand it phenomenologically, i.e., from a first-person
viewpoint, appears to be a property distinct from the one we conceive of naturalistically,
i.e., from the third-person viewpoint. Here it is not being suggested that because we can
think of consciousnessp and consciousnessN separately they must be distinct properties. I
am not reviving the conceivability argument discussed in chapter 1. Rather, it is being
pointed out that to the extent that these ways of thinking of consciousness are
independent of each other we seem unable to rule out the possibility that they concern
distinct properties. This possibility is starkly illustrated by the zombie hypothesis. A
zombie is essentially thought of as a being that is consciousN, that is, it exhibits all the
right kinds of behaviour and possesses the relevant physiological characteristics so that

we can judge it to be consciousN, but it is not consciousP, that is, it has no
phenomenology. Such a being is logically possible, however odd it strikes us, if nothing
about how we think of consciousnessp implies consciousnessN.
So, unless it can be shown how these two seemingly distinct ways of thinking of
consciousness are dependent on one another, i.e., they are effectively aspects of the same
concept, we cannot rule out the possibility that these 'concepts' concern different
properties. If they do concern different properties, then the claim that consciousness is
naturalisable is far less interesting since it amounts to the claim that consciousnessN only
is naturalisable. Further, the fact that I have argued that qualia are unnaturalisable - and
therefore consciousnessp is unnaturalisable since it is understood in terms of qualia seems to suggest that these two aspects of consciousness do indeed concern different
properties. Only if we can understand consciousnessp and consciousnessN as aspects of a
single concept is it at all plausible to claim that consciousness is naturalisable. Below, I
argue that these two ways of understanding consciousness are mutually dependent on
each other, and their mutual dependence implies that they are effectively aspects of the
same concept. That is because the idea requires us to think of consciousnessp and
consciousnessN as distinct and yet we cannot think of the one independently of the

This same basic point has been made by P.F.Strawson (1959). Essentially Strawson
argues that we can ascribe conscious states to ourselves only if we can ascribe them to
others, and we do this in virtue of certain bodily states we observe others to have. If, on
the other hand, we did not for example ascribe pain to others according to certain
behavioural and physiological states we observe, then it could not be explained how we
ascribe pain to ourselves. Or as Strawson puts it, "[t]he condition of reckoning oneself as
a subject of such predicates [i.e., predicates concerning conscious states] is that one
should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates" (1959, 100). And one can only

Let us see how consciousnessp and consciousnessN are mutually dependent. In general
the mutual dependence of two concepts concerns our being unable to possess the one
concept without possessing the other. In this respect the concepts of being coloured and
of being red are dependent - a dependence understood in terms of the determinate/
determinable relation between these properties in this case. We cannot possess the
concept of being red without possessing the concept of being coloured. In other words,
we cannot acquire the concept of being red unless we possess, or acquire at the same
time, the concept of being coloured. However, one might object that this dependence is
not mutual in the sense that conversely one could possess the concept of being coloured
without necessarily possessing the concept of being red - we can plausibly imagine, for
example, a person who has not specifically acquired the concept of red but knows how to
use other colour terms. But we can strengthen the example by imagining instead a
superconcept consisting of the disjunction of colours, call it 'D\ such that '£>x = x is red or
blue or green or yellow or...'. Here the concepts of being coloured and D are mutually
dependent in the fullest sense, i.e., the dependence is symmetrical. In order to acquire the
concept of D one must also acquire the concept of being coloured and vice versa. But, it
still seems possible to imagine a person who has acquired the concept of D, i.e., who
knows how to use all of the colour terms that comprise the disjunction but who does not
know how to use the term 'coloured'. Faced with such a person we would have to

ascribe such predicates to others according to observable behavioural and physiological
features. For Strawson this claim is used as a solution to the problem of other minds.
How do we know that others have minds, i.e., are persons to use Strawson's terminology?
In order to assume we each have minds it is necessary that we can ascribe mindedness to
others first. In other words, the question how do we know others have minds is spurious
given that it can only be asked when we think of others as minded to begin with.
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conclude that she has tacitly acquired the concept of being coloured, and her inability to
apply the term 'coloured' simply reflects the fact that her grasp of this concept is not
explicit. Of course this example is hypothetical given that we do not imagine a person
would ever use such a disjunctive concept. But it should be appreciated that the use of
example is heuristic, the aim is to illustrate the idea of mutual dependence.
The mutual dependence of conciousnessp and consciousnessN is analogous to the way
the concepts of D and being coloured are dependent, granted that conciousnessp and
consciousnessN are standardly thought of as and seem to be distinctive concepts. Their
inseparability in this respect can be shown by the following reductio argument. Assume
instead that consciousnessp and consciousnessN constitute independent concepts, so that it
is possible to possess the 'concept' of consciousnessp without possessing the 'concept' of
consciousnessN and vice versa. Thus, we could each understand that others are consciousp
like ourselves without concern for their behaviour and physiology. But then, how could I,
under these conceptual circumstances, hold that a chair, for example, is not consciousp?
Short of discovering that we have a sixth sense that allows us to detect when others are
consciousp, it would be impossible for me to assume anyone else is consciousp. Perhaps I
could simply suppose that everything is consciousp, i.e., adopt a full-blown panpsychism.
But, by this measure the concept becomes too liberal, too general, for it to be of any use.
Moreover, we saw with Chalmers' view that pansychism is very implausible, if not
absurd.
Still, might it be possible to form the concept of consciousnessp on the basis of
evidence of others' behaviour and physiology without having to suppose that they really
are consciousp? I know that I am consciousp and all that is needed for me to share the
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concept of consciousnessp is to correlate my behaviour and physiology with my being
consciouSp, and from the evidence of others having similar behaviour and physiology
surmise that they understand what I mean by the term 'conscious'. However, by this
account I do not ever suppose that others are conscious, i.e., hold it true. If the term
'consciousness' refers only to my phenomenology, then there is no sense in which others
can know what the term refers to. Of course, we do suppose that others are conscious as
we ourselves are. But to hold this as true we must assume that others are conscious on the
basis of behaviour and physiology. That is to say, we must assume they are consciousN.
But that is what is denied in the reductio.
Conversely, imagine that we only possess the concept of consciousnessN. You would
assert that others are consciousN on the basis of their behaviour and physiology, but this
bears no relation to your being consciousp. It requires you to dissociate behaviour and
physiology from how you experience things, i.e., from the first-person viewpoint. So, for
example, if you see someone bang her knee and then groan and grimace you would not
associate this activity with how such an activity would feel to you. This is of course very
difficult to imagine. You would effectively have to imagine yourself as if you were an
entirely alien creature so that there is no sense in which people's behaviour and
physiology concerns how things seem to you. What, accordingly, would attributing
consciousnessN to anyone amount to under these circumstances? This concept would be
empty and consequently there would be no reason for it to originate at all. And, as I shall
argue later, in a zombie world, i.e., a world populated entirely by beings behaviourally
like ourselves, there would be no motivation, no reason, to talk about consciousness. The
concept would be useless under such circumstances.
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Thinking of consciousnessN on its own essentially would amount to a behaviouristic
conception of consciousness, i.e., construed not only in terms of a person's actions but
also in terms of the movement or physical activities of the person generally, right down to
neurological activities. Accordingly, it might be suggested that we can attribute to a
person activities that can be thought of as conscious insofar as they fit specific
dispositional states. For example, the sudden movement of an object in the periphery of
someone's visual field (input) tends to lead to the person visually focusing on that object
(output). But if such activities are understood solely in physical terms, i.e., as we
understand them from the third-person viewpoint, then we need a reason to think of them
as manifestations of consciousness, i.e., as conscious behaviour. In terms of their physical
descriptions these activities are essentially no different from those activities we in fact
judge not to count as conscious behaviour. In general, in order to possess a purely
behaviouristic conception of consciousness we would need to be able to pick out those
activities which are relevant to the concept. In other words, we would require a criterion
by which to judge what does and does not qualify as conscious behaviour; and again from
the third-person viewpoint no such criterion exists so that what we count as someone
being consciousN becomes arbitrary.
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Dennett, however, seems to suppose that consciousness can be thought of entirely
in such behaviouristic terms. As noted earlier, he argues that we can understand
consciousness wholly from the third-person viewpoint, in purely
'heterophenomenological terms' as he puts it. He asks us to imagine an advanced
civilisation of Martians who visit Earth (2005, 25-56). These Martians might even be
thought of as phenomenally unconscious, i.e., as so-called zombies, if, unlike Dennett,
one thinks of such creatures as possible. Also they have a different set of perceptual
apparatus to us. Over all, the idea is that these Martians' point of view, if they can be said
to have one at all, is alien to us, that is, there is nothing we share with them in terms of
how we are phenomenally conscious. In other words, the only way for them to come to

Therefore, it is very implausible to suppose that we can think of consciousness only in
terms of either consciousnessp or consciousnessN. And so we must conclude that
consciousnessp and consciousnessN are mutually dependent - we cannot think of
consciousness without taking these two perspectives into account.

4.2.2 The Zombie Hypothesis
If these perspectives on consciousness are inseparable in this way, however, it ought to be
impossible for us to entertain the zombie hypothesis. That is, it ought to be the case that if
we think of someone as consciousN we must also understand how she is consciousp, i.e.,
her being consciousp should be transparent to us; and this is not so. In reply, we can only
superficially think of someone's being consciousN separately from her being consciousp.
To understand how this is so again consider the example of the concepts of being red and
being coloured. We can imagine someone thinking 'this snooker ball is red' without
thinking 'this snooker ball is coloured'. This is a possibility in the sense that the person
understand consciousness is from the third-person viewpoint, i.e., from the perspective
they do share with us. Dennett argues that this is possible. What the Martians do have in
common with us is the ability to adopt what Dennett calls an intentional stance, that is,
they are able to understand and talk about complex behavioural systems in terms of
ascribing beliefs, desires etc., to such systems (see 1987, 13-35). This ability at least
allows them to interpret .our folk psychology. That said, it is clear from this description of
the Martians that they themselves would possess no concept of consciousness. How,
therefore, could they distinguish conscious from non-conscious behaviour from the start?
Insofar as they would have developed their own folk psychology in virtue of being able
to adopt the intentional stance, it would not include any allusions to how things seem to
them and so on. Dennett essentially bypasses this difficulty by stipulating that the
Martian scientists' aim is to understand our concept of consciousness, beginning with our
folk theory of consciousness, from the third-person viewpoint. He writes that "[a]mong
the phenomena that would be readily observable to these Martians would be all our
public representations of consciousness" (2005, 26). What they take conscious behaviour
to be, in other words, is determined by us given that we do understand consciousness in
two ways at once, namely, from the first- and third-person viewpoints.

does not explicitly know how to use the term 'coloured'. Nonetheless, again, the person
must have tacitly acquired the concept of being coloured if she understands the term 'red'.
That said, the difference in the zombie hypothesis seems to be that even when someone
explicitly knows how to use both terms, i.e., 'consciousp' and 'consciousN', she can still
think of them separately. However, this claim is false. So long as someone has acquired
the concept of consciousnessN she must at least tacitly have acquired the concept of
consciousnessp. That is obvious. Why it is not obvious ordinarily vis-a-vis the zombie
hypothesis is that the hypothesis is not presented in terms of these two mutually
dependent perspectives or understandings. Consider Chalmers' presentation of the
hypothesis for example:

...consider my zombie twin. This creature is molecule-for-molecule identical to
me,...but he lacks conscious experience entirely...To fix the ideas, we can imagine
right now that I am gazing out the window, experiencing some nice green sensations
from seeing the trees outside, having pleasant taste experiences through munching
on a chocolate bar,...What is going on in my zombie twin? He is physically identical
to me, and we may as well suppose that he is embedded in an identical environment.
He will be identical to me functionally... He will be psychologically identical to
me...It is just that none of this functioning will be accompanied by any real
conscious experience. There will be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing that it is
like to be a zombie (1996, 94).
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Here we see that Chalmers equates consciousness with consciousness? alone, that is, he
has in mind only a phenomenological understanding of consciousness. Thus, according to
Chalmers, when we attribute consciousness to ourselves or to others we are not thinking
in terms of behaviour and physiology - these are at best symptoms of our being
conscious. By this measure, we are not justified in terms of a person's behaviour and her
physiological characteristics to hold that someone is conscious, i.e., consciousp, hence the
apparent possibility of a zombie.
But in that case the zombie world Chalmers imagines may be a lot closer to the actual
world than he appreciates. If behaviour and physiology are not sufficient evidence for
consciousness, then we are, or rather I am, not justified in thinking that others are
conscious. I genuinely could not know that others are conscious. I could be living among
zombies, nothing rules out this possibility.45 But even if this were a logical possibility,
still, I know that others are conscious; and were I to deny that I know this, there would be
good reason to doubt that I am fully rational.
Now, Chalmers and other zombists might reply that it is indeed irrational to deny that
other people are conscious even though we cannot strictly speaking know that this is the

Chalmers rules out this possibility by insisting that consciousness supervenes
naturally in the actual world. He explains that this "weaker variety of supervenience
arises when two sets of properties are systematically and perfectly correlated in the
natural world" (1996, 36). He gives as an example how the pressure of a mole of (ideal)
gas supervenes naturally on a given temperature and volume, as described by Boyle's
law, i.e., pV = KT. This relation between these properties of a gas is not the stronger
logical supervenience since it is logically possible that K's value (Boyle's constant) could
be different such that for a given pressure and volume of a mole of gas the temperature
would be different. However, in the case of the consciousness, understood purely
phenomenologically, we cannot assume such a relation of natural supervenience on a
person's physical properties because consciousness so understood is not observable.
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case. This, as we have seen, is essentially Jackson's response to the problem of other
minds; where he remarks that scepticism about other minds can be dismissed given that
the assumption that others are not minded is very implausible (see Jackson 1984, 294).
But knowledge is an achievement - at least such propositional knowledge - quite
generally we cannot make a knowledge claim without justification. Yet, independent of a
naturalistic perspective on consciousness, we cannot justifiably believe that it is true that
others are conscious phenomenologically since there can be no evidence for this belief.
And again, this fact relates to Nagel's assumption that bats are conscious. He claims that
we know that there is something that it is like to be a bat, i.e, that bats are conscious
phenomenologically, and yet he claims we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. If
someone were similarly to claim that he knows that Peter is tall but he has no idea of
Peter's actual height, i.e., he does not know that Peter is not one metre high for example,
we would regard his claim as contradictory. For it cannot be the case that someone knows
that Peter is tall but does not know that Peter is not one metre high - assuming that Peter
is an adult of course. The only way to save Nagel from such a contradiction is to suppose
that we know that bats are conscious in virtue of their behaviour and physiology, but we
cannot know what it is like to be bat.
We see that how the zombie hypothesis has traditionally been presented assumes we
possess only one way of understanding consciousness, namely, as it is understood from
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The assumption behind this reply is that consciousness can legitimately be thought
of in strictly phenomenological terms, and so we must accept as a genuine possibility that
we do not know that others are conscious. My point is that we do know that others are
conscious, and this fact indicates that we do not think of consciousness in strictly
phenomenological terms, as evidenced by our not being able to acquire a purely
phenomenological concept of consciousness on its own.

the first-person viewpoint. Accordingly, behaviour and physiology have no bearing on
whether someone is conscious or not; hence the possibility of zombies cannot be ruled
out. The position I have outlined makes the zombie hypothesis incoherent. It is
incoherent because a zombie is essentially a person who is justifiably consciousN, e.g.,
your zombie twin, and understanding someone as consciousN is dependent on
understanding him as consciousp at the same time.
The zombie hypothesis is superficially plausible in that we are tempted to think of
consciousness only from the first-person viewpoint. That is to say, we are inclined not to
suppose that we possess a third-personal understanding of being conscious since
consciousness for each of us is primarily equated with its phenomenological qualities.
But how we use the term 'conscious' dictates that we possess a third-personal
understanding. Only by being justified in attributing consciousness to others do we have a
fully shared notion of consciousness. And we can only justifiably attribute consciousness
to others in terms of observable evidence, be it direct or indirect, i.e., in terms of
behaviour and physiological characteristics. I, like everyone else, believe that others are
conscious, but this belief can only qualify as knowledge if there is some way of justifying
it as true. If I were to understand consciousness wholly in phenomenological terms, then I
would never be justified in this belief since there could be no evidence that others are
conscious. But I do know that others are conscious.47

Still, the assertion that we do know that others are conscious might seem
unwarranted by some on the grounds that the possibility that others are not conscious
cannot be ruled out, a la scepticism about other minds. Clearly we do imagine that we can
conceive of the possibility that others are really not conscious phenomenologically. But
this very thought requires grasping the concept of consciousness and this is impossible
unless we also think of consciousness in terms of behaviour and physiology. We cannot
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4.2.3 The Problem of the Explanatory Gap
I have argued that that the concept of consciousness has two aspects to it, what I have
called consciousnessp and consciousnessN, which together constitute a single concept
because of their mutual dependence. In general, concepts are individuated on the basis of
their independence from each other, that is, the statements they are employed in have
distinct truth conditions. So the mutual dependence of consciousnessp and consciousnessN
implies that when someone asserts 'S is conscious', for example, its truth conditions
involve both aspects of consciousness, that is, 'S is conscious' is true if and only if S is
consciousp and conscious^ Here 'S is consciousp and consciousN' should be distinguished
from 'S is consciousp and S is conscious,/ where the latter entails treating consciousnessp
and consciousnessN as distinct concepts and the former does not. Formally this distinction

even entertain this doubt unless we think of consciousness in this way too. Such doubt
consists in the thought 'I know that I am conscious because this is what it is to be
conscious, but I cannot know that others are conscious in this way.' But to think of
consciousness as this is to think of it in a way that no one else can share. The question
'How can I know that others are conscious like thisT has no answer. If you ask yourself
this question there is no answer since you cannot in principle confirm or disconfirm the
possibility that others are conscious like this. If you ask others this question they cannot
answer since they cannot in principle know what you mean by 'this'.
Going back to Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box example, the owner of a box can
understand beetle as both the contents of the box and as this, i.e., the thing she alone sees
inside the box. If asked how do we know there is a beetle in someone else's box we can
straightforwardly reply that there must be a beetle given that beetle is thought of as what
is in the box, even if the box has nothing in it. Accordingly, to doubt there is a beetle in
the box makes no sense. The question seems to make sense if we think of a beetle not as
the thing in the box but strictly as this, i.e., as that which only I can see, as a member of
the box-owning community. But that is not what 'beetle' means. To use the term 'beetle'
requires thinking of it as the contents of a box. The term 'consciousness' is like the term
'beetle' in this respect. And importantly ^beetle' does not simply mean , i.e., refer to, the
box. That is because the concept could not have originated unless there had been
something in the box.

might seem to be representable by the difference between 'Fx & Gx' and '(F & G)x', but
this latter formula is not well-formed. The ill-suitedness of this distinction to description
reflects the peculiar or unique nature of the relation between consciousness? and
consciousnessN. These aspects of consciousness are best understood as concerning two
perspectives, namely, how we understand consciousness as a property pertaining to
objects, consciousnessN, and how we understand it as the property that we, as phenomenal
subjects, are manifestations of. And our grasp of the concept depends on having both
these perspectives.
However, the conclusion that these two aspects of consciousness cannot be thought of
apart from each other will strike many as implausible. After all, this conclusion suggests
that consciousnessp and consciousnessN are aspects of, or ways of thinking about, the
same property. But, we cannot understand how they could concern the same property.
The best way to illustrate why is by considering the problem of the explanatory gap.
The explanatory gap describes a crucial epistemological difference between identity
statements about physical entities, e.g., 'water is H2O', and psychophysical identity
statements such as 'pain is C-fibre stimulation'. Physical identity statements can help us
explain what something is. For example, understanding that water is H2O explains why
water has certain properties such as being an agent in various chemical reactions. By
contrast, thinking of pain as C-fibre stimulation does not explain what pain is, that is, it
does not allow us to understand why our pain experiences have the phenomenological
quality they do. This is obviously a facet of the problem of consciousness since it

See Levine 1983

concerns our inability to understand how consciousness understood phenomenologically
is identical with some physical property, as physicalism assumes it is.
Now, to assert that to think of consciousness phenomenologically is also to think of it
in physical terms, as is suggested above, would be to assume the explanatory gap is
essentially illusory. If to think of pain phenomenologically is also to think of it in
physical terms - in ways that make it reducible to C-fibre stimulation for example - then
the identity statement 'pain is C-fibre stimulation' should be transparent. That is, once we
understand that such-and-such behaviour and physiology, that we think of pain as being,
essentially reduces to C-fibre stimulation, we will see that the identity is true. But as the
explanatory gap attests, this clearly is not the case. Therefore, consciousness? and
consciousnessN cannot be thought of as concerning the same property.
This objection gains purchase so long as it is possible to assume it is true that the
phenomenological quality of an experience is identical with some behavioural or
physiological characteristic of the experience. But, to think of consciousness? and
consciousnessN as concerning the same property is already to think of them as
independent concepts. My claim is that they are aspects of the same concept. This is not
to say anything about how consciousness? and consciousnessN concern the same property.
But, more importantly, I have argued that qualia are unindividuable. Therefore, we
cannot in fact identify the quale of some type of experience as any of the physical
characteristics of that type of experience. In general an identity statement 'a = b' is truthevaluable only if its terms' references are determinable. If one of these terms has an
indeterminate reference then the statement can be neither true nor false. And since qualia
are unindividuable no term can be employed to refer to any quale-type, e.g., a pain quale.

Therefore, we can never judge a psychophysical identity statement to be true or false,
contrary to the assumption motivating the explanatory gap.
But, it is fair to ask why we cannot see straightaway that a term we use to refer to the
phenomenological quality of an experience fails to refer - such terms seem to refer. To
answer this question it is helpful to revisit Carruthers' example of a recognitional concept.
The example concerns a chicken-sexer Carruthers calls 'Mary' who can consistently
separate chicks into two distinct types, A and B, which correspond reliably with the
chicks' sexes. It is stated that Mary cannot explain how she is able to distinguish A-hood
from 5-hood, rather these concepts are purely recognitional for her, i.e., her grasp of
them is immediate or intuitive. Qualia, as Carruthers notes, are likewise assumed to be
recognitional concepts. To the extent that we are supposed to be able to distinguish a pain
quale from an itch quale, for example, we cannot explain how we are able to do so. With
respect to A-hood Carruthers observes that we would not suppose that A refers to a nonphysical property despite Mary's being unable to identify it with any physical properties
of chicks. Indeed, according to Carruthers it is clear that A is the property of being a male
chick.
But why should Mary herself identify A-hood as maleness or any other physical
property of the chick? To her, the one in possession of the concept of A-hood, there is no
reason to assume that they are the same. Carruthers states that to reason so would be
fallacious and that we know that "the property picked out by her recognitional concept is
in fact the property of being male" (2001, 57). Certainly, Carruthers is justified in
assuming this in that Mary would judge a chick to be A by observation, albeit guided by
intuition, hence it is absurd not to assume that what she 'subconsciously' detects is a

physical, i.e., observable, property of the chick. But let us focus our concern simply on
whether A-hood is identical with the specific physical property of maleness. Why must
Mary assume that this is the case? Why could she not think instead that A-hood and
maleness are correlated but that they are not the same property? Mary could think this,
but her problem is that no one else would know what she means by A in that case. If she
were to insist that by A she does not mean male chicks but something else, the rest of us
would be left in the dark. By assuming A-hood is identical with maleness, on the other
hand, she is able to use the term A'. A' is then synonymous with 'male chick'. This
describes what actually happens with respect to chicken sexers.
But let us now change the situation in one important way and imagine that everyone
has an ability to distinguish between A-hood and 5-hood, i.e., these become universal
recognitional concepts. By this measure it would seem to be no longer imperative for
Mary, or anyone else, to suppose that A-hood is identical with maleness since others
would 'understand' what she means by A-hood without having to identify it as maleness.
But what would everyone understand by A under these circumstances? If they assume it is
not some physical property of chicks, i.e., maleness, then it is unclear what the term
refers to. At best each of us would be able to say that A refers to 'you-know-what', i.e.,
that thing we each detect some chicks to have. Over all this is a useless concept since
there would be nothing to determine that we each mean the same thing by A.
Accordingly, we could not use the term A' so 'understood' to communicate anything. We
would not in fact understand anything by the term.
Now, in the case of qualia, understood as universal recognitional concepts, they are
not observable. We do not grasp the concept of pain qualia, say, by intuitively detecting
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some physical property of pain experiences. Therefore, we seem free of any rational
obligation to assume that qualia must be physical properties in the same sense as we
would be obligated to think of A-hood as a physical property. More importantly, as
universal recognitional concepts, it would appear that we do not have to identify them
with some physical property of experience in order that others may understand what we
each mean by the term 'pain' in this sense. But just as in the case of A-hood being a
universal concept in this sense the term 'pain' could mean nothing to us, i.e., it amounts to
a useless concept. But we are tempted to think of such terms as being meaningful in the
sense that everyone claims to understand what the term means because it has the air of
universality - everyone reports that their experiences have some phenomenological
quality. It is this air of universality that creates the illusion that qualia terms do refer.
We can again illustrate this point by using Wittgenstein's example of the beetle-inthe-box (1958, 293). We are told that the owner of each box is able to see what is inside
it, but that no one else can know its content. Because everyone has a box and the term
'beetle' refers to its content, whatever it may be, they can use the term 'beetle' to mean
roughly the 'thing-in-the-box'. But the term cannot, and does not, refer to the 'thing' in the
box, since no one else but the utterer of the term could know what this thing is. The term
'beetle' can at most mean whatever is in the box given that our concepts are shared and
that is all the speakers share across their experiences. The fact that everyone can
confidently use the term 'beetle' tempts them each to think that what the term really refers
to is the thing they see in the box. But the term understood in this way is useless since
their experience cannot be shared by anyone else. Likewise, by the term 'pain', for
example, we are tempted to think that we each essentially refer to the phenomenological
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quality of this experience, since we can all confidently use the term and we each have
direct acquaintance with this quality. But, as we have seen, pain can only constitute a
concept to the extent that we can all use it, and what we share vis-a-vis pain is not its
phenomenological quality but the experience's observable characteristics as manifested
behaviourally and physiologically. These characteristics play the same role as the box in
Wittgenstein's example, that is, they are the means by which we can conceive of such an
experience at all. That is not to suggest that the phenomenological quality of an
experience is irrelevant to our understanding of an experience; rather, it is to note that
pain or any other experience cannot be thought of independently of its observable
physical characteristics, even though we are tempted to think otherwise.
Something more needs to be said about the claim that the conceptual inseparability of
consciousnessp and consciousnessN does not necessarily imply that they concern the same
property. The relation between these two aspects of consciousness should not be thought
of as one of identity, understood as a metaphysical relation. One thing can only be judged
to be identical with another when they fall under a common concept. For example, we
can judge that Mark Twain is identical with Samuel Clemens in virtue of the fact that
both singular terms refer to the same person. 'Person' is a sortal predicate in this context
that allows us to count individuals, i.e., persons, so that then we can judge whether or not
two singular terms refer to the same individual according to an identity statement.49 Thus
we cannot, for example, make sense of the identity statement 'Julius Caesar is the number
17' given that we cannot determine a sortal predicate under which both these terms fall.
This example concerns what is referred to as the 'Caesar Problem', originally expounded
49

See P.F. Strawson 1959, 168-175.

by Gottlob Frege. The problem, as Frege saw it, is that we do not have a definition of
number to allow us to decide if 'Julius Caesar' is the name of a number or not (Frege,
68). A definition of number would give us a principle by which to determine the sortal
predicate number such that we can exclude Julius Caesar, the conqueror of Gaul, from
falling under it. Frege thought our inability to refute such identity statements as the one
above is a problem because he assumed that singular terms like 'Caesar' and '17' pick out
individuals however we conceive the world. Or as Paul Benacerraf explains it: "To speak
from Frege's standpoint, there is a world of objects - that is, the designata or referents of
names, descriptions, and so forth - in which the identity relation has free reign" (1982,
286). Thus, Frege held that such identity statements must be either true or false, i.e.,
truth-evaluable, and insofar as we cannot evaluate them this is a result of our conceptual
shortcomings.
This line of reasoning, notably, echoes Nagel's complaint about our inability to
explain how phenomenological qualities, i.e., the what-it-is-like of experiences, are
identical with physical properties. Nagel tells us that we require a conceptual bridge
between the first- and third-person viewpoints to resolve this the problem of
consciousness (Nagel 1974, 449). But, as I stated earlier (section 4.1), we can identify
properties only if they fall under a concept; that is to say, we cannot think of properties
outside of some theoretical framework. In general, therefore, in order to determine if
some property F is identical with or distinct from some property G we need to have
grasped the sortal predicate property. But this we can do, stating that a property =df a
characteristic or attribute of an entity. Accordingly, it seems to make sense to ask if
qualia, as properties so defined, are identical with some physical properties. But
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importantly, such judgments are only possible when these properties themselves fall
under a concept such that they are individuable. Ordinarily this is not a problem. For
example, blue is a property in virtue of its falling under the concept of colour. Qualia,
however, are not determined to be properties in virtue of falling under some theory, that
is, as posits of some theory. Rather, qualia are properties simpliciter with which we are
acquainted without their being posited because of our special relationship to them. As has
been noted by many commentators, e.g., Dretske and Rowlands, what is peculiar about
qualia is that they are the properties with which we apprehend things in the world. Again,
qualia are special properties, therefore, because they are the properties that in some sense
are constitutive of us rather than properties we apprehend.

4.3 Making Sense of Qualia Talk
There remains one worry that needs to be addressed. If it is assumed that qualia are
unindividuable such that the term cannot be used in any verifiable statements, then we are
left to conclude that such statements are meaningless. But this seems plainly wrong. For
example, the statement 'I am now having a red quale looking at this ripe tomato' seems
both meaningful and truth-evaluable. I agree. There is a sense in which such statements
are verifiable. Someone could observe, for example, that the tomato I am looking at is
indeed red and this would verify my claim, or if this witness were to observe that it is in
fact green, say, the claim is disconfirmed. The claim is confirmable, therefore, insofar as
it is broadly interpreted as saying something along the following lines: T am now looking
at this tomato, and there is something that it is like to have this experience'. This is not to
suppose that what this something is is identifiable.
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But, of course, a likely response to this claim is that my having a red quale is not
logically entailed by the object I am looking at being red. It is conceivable that even if the
tomato is in fact red I am not having a red quale. This is simply another way of
expressing something like the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Therefore, these kinds of
statements about qualia, interpreted in this narrow sense, are not verifiable on these
grounds. But our concern, recall, is to determine whether holding that qualia are
unindividuable entails holding that qualia do not exist. As such, to deny this entailment
only requires that the statement can be plausibly interpreted in the original broad sense,
whereby it is verifiable. Because, according to this interpretation, it is supposed that there
is something that it is like for me to see red. And it seems clear that this statement can be
plausibly interpreted in this broad sense.

4.4 Summary
The problem was how to maintain that qualia are unindividuable, and hence
unnaturalisable, given that I have argued that they are properties of consciousness and
that consciousness is naturalisable. These appear to be contradictory claims. My reply has
been that we cannot think of consciousness understood in terms of qualia independently
of our understanding of it in terms of behaviour and physiology, i.e., our naturalistic
understanding of consciousness. Accordingly, qualia are aspects of the same concept of
consciousness that we understand in naturalistic terms. Nevertheless, this is to stop short
of holding that qualia are identical with certain naturalistic properties of consciousness.
That is because to assert such identities requires there to be a theory spanning both these
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aspects of consciousness, and no such theory can exist given that qualia are beyond, or
more precisely at the limit of, our theories as indicated by their unindividuability.
In addition, in the next chapter I argue that we can understand how we are acquainted
with qualia while being unable to subsume them under our scientific theories so long as
we think of them as the properties in virtue of which we apprehend things, rather than
properties we apprehend. In order to subsume some properties under our theories, after
all, there must be some means of confirming statements concerning them as posits of
some theory, which requires them to be either directly or indirectly observable. And as
properties by which we observe things qualia cannot themselves be Observed.
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Chapter 5
Demystifying Qualm

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to consider two difficulties that present
themselves for my view of the problem of consciousness and to summarise how I think
qualia can be accommodated from a naturalistic perspective. First, I outline two possible
objections to my position; namely, its leading to the endorsement of property dualism and
its implying a troubling form of mysterianism. These objections are replied to in sections
5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Then in section 5.3.11 follow up on an issue related to the
second objection; this concerns the worry that because qualia are unnaturalisable
neuroscience can have nothing to say about consciousness. In reply, I argue that because
our understanding of consciousness in terms of qualia, i.e., phenomenologically, is
conceptually inseparable from our understanding of it in physiological and behavioural
terms neuroscience is relevant to the study of consciousness. Moreover, I argue that the
unnaturalisability of qualia is unproblematic so long as we think of qualia as what I call
epistemically originating properties. And in section 5.4 I outline more precisely what this
conception of qualia amounts to.

In my discussion of the relevance of neuroscience to the study of consciousness the
idea of a zombie is reintroduced. Now, I had concluded that the idea of a zombie is
conceptually incoherent, that is, we cannot think of a person physically and behaviourally
indistinguishable from you or me who is non-conscious phenomenologically. However,
the notion of zombiehood we shall focus on relates to Dennett's example of zombie
Martians, i.e., alien automata, studying human consciousness. This creature is a zombie
in the sense of being phenomenally non-conscious but nonetheless able to communicate
with us, while not being physically indistinguishable from us of course. I argue that there
would have to be a behavioural difference between us and these Martian automata,
namely, that in this Martian speech community statements about what it is like to have
some experience would never be expressed. This linguistic difference between us and
them would imply that automata, i.e., non-conscious creatures, could not originate the
concept of phenomenal consciousness.
However, in section 5.41 argue that the nature of zombiehood in this sense would be
such that they could not conceive of much at all. Here, it is worth noting that the
possibility of zombies in the fullest sense, i.e., as non-conscious creatures physically and
behaviourally indistinguishable from us, is rarely considered beyond their intuitive
plausibility. So in this section I take on the idea of zombies on the assumption that there
is nothing that it is like to be such a being. This crucial fact, I suggest, implies that they
would lack a self, i.e., subjecthood, such that it is very difficult to think of them as
epistemic agents. The aim of the relatively detailed discussion about zombies that follows
is to elucidate the notion of qualia as epistemically originating properties. I end the

chapter with a summary of my overall position, suggesting that the problem of
consciousness can be dissolved.

5.1 Two Objections
I have argued that qualia are real, i.e., they do exist. However, conjoining this conclusion
with the claim that qualia are unnaturalisable would suggest that qualia, and a fortiori
consciousness, are, to paraphrase Gilbert Ryle, mysteriously occult properties.50
Moreover, if qualia cannot in principle be captured or subsumed under our scientific
theories then there is no reason to assume they fall under the laws of nature, i.e., the laws
of physics. Therefore, while consciousness is a property of certain kinds of physical
things such as human beings, it is not itself physical. Accordingly, my view seems to
collapse into property dualism.
If, on the other hand, qualia were naturalisable, then there would be the possibility at
least that by observing a creature's brain in operation we could determine whether it is
phenomenally conscious. It seems, therefore, I must deny this possibility on the grounds
that we cannot ever relate the physical properties of the brain to the properties of
conscious experiences, i.e., qualia, since qualia are unnaturalisable. Thus, the practice of
observing and investigating the physical processes of the brain, i.e., the practice of
neurophysiology or neuroscience more generally, has nothing to do with consciousness
understood in phenomenological terms. Jaegwon Kim acknowledges a similar kind of
50

The worry is that I am committing what Ryle famously called a category mistake,
namely, I am treating qualia as entities that exist in the same way as ordinary physical
properties. Ryle points out that thinking of the mind, as he puts it, as being like the body
is like thinking of the average taxpayer as someone who one could meet on the street.
This way of thinking of the mind makes it seem like a wholly mysterious entity (see Ryle
1949,19).

difficulty for his own view, which he articulates in terms of the problem of trying to
engineer a machine that feels pain.51 Kim argues that pain experiences are
functionalisable, and hence subsumable under our theories in terms of physiology and
behaviour, but that their phenomenological quality is not functionalisable. He states: "We
can...easily design into a machine a device that will serve as a causal intermediary
between the physical input and the behavioral output" (2005, 168). However, he adds that
we cannot begin to understand the connection between the causal function of such a
machine and the realisation of pain qualia when the machine is activated; consequently
he concludes that "[t]he machine would try to flee when its skin is punctured even if we
had, wittingly or unwittingly, designed itch or tickle into the box [i.e., that part of the
machine 'designed' to realise pain qualia]" (ibid). The unnaturalisability of qualia in the
same way would appear to rule out the possibility of our ever knowing how and when
qualia are realised physically.
These worries about my view point to two distinct difficulties. First, there is the
danger that the view amounts to property dualism. I seem to be forced to conclude, or at
least I cannot defend against the charge, that qualia are non-physical properties; and with
this come the usual problems, e.g., epiphenomenalism. Second, my view appears to be
strongly mysterianist in tenor. Most starkly expressed the view seems perhaps fatally
sceptical - 1 am led effectively to assert that it is impossible in principle to know if others
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For Kim qualia are subsumable under our theories in terms of their relational
characteristics as manifested physiologically and behaviourally. But he distinguishes
these characteristics from the felt qualities of conscious experiences which he argues are
not subsumable. Kim distinguishes between the physical and phenomenological aspects
of consciousness because he equates qualia with phenomenal states (see Kim 2005, 1011)-
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are conscious understood strictly in phenomenological terms.' I shall next reply to these
difficulties in turn.

5.2 Why Qualia Are not Non-Physical
The immediate worry about adopting a naturalistic attitude is that it seems antithetical to
physicalism. Physicalism, after all, is a claim about the world as such, i.e., reality. It is a
metaphysical doctrine based on the thesis that everything that exists is physical. One
might say that physicalism is not a hypothesis about how the world is in some respect,
but rather it is a hypothesis about how it is in the most general sense. Thus, it is hard to
see how it can be viewed as a scientific hypothesis - to the extent that it does not concern
any specific features in the world.
But, any scientific hypothesis is held true so long as it is not contrary to our
observations in conjunction with our theories. By this measure physicalism can be
straightforwardly thought of as a scientific hypothesis. We can assume that everything is
determined by the physical facts so long as there is no evidence against this assumption.
What accordingly might falsify physicalism? One way Quine imagines is if there were
convincing evidence of extrasensory perception. Imagine, for example, some experiment
were to indicate that thoughts are transferred reliably, i.e., at a far greater success rate
than can be explained by chance, between two physically isolated persons. If this were to
happen then we would perhaps have good reason to think that not all causation is
physical. Accordingly, these 'thoughts' could in effect be thought of as non-physical in
that their interaction would not be governed by the laws of physics. That said, Quine
notes that in such circumstances "it would still not devolve upon psychologists to

supplement physics with an irreducibly psychological annex. It would devolve upon the
physicist to go back to the drawing board and have another try at full coverage, which is
his business" (1998, 430). Quine's point is that physics is universal in scope, that is, its
aim or business is to conceive of every phenomenon in its own right. Therefore, if some
phenomenon, such as extrasensory perception, were to fall outside of our present physical
theories this would not in itself show that it is non-physical; instead this aberrant
phenomenon likely would tell us that our physical theories need revising, given that
physics covers everything. Only if we were unable to incorporate this aberrant
phenomenon in our physics could we conclude as a last resort that it is non-physical, and
consequently that physicalism is false.
Moreover, Quine takes physicalism to rest on naturalism; more precisely, he writes: "I
do embrace physicalism as a scientific position, but I could be dissuaded of it on future
scientific grounds without being dissuaded of naturalism" (2004, 281). It is in this way
that physicalism can be thought of as a scientific hypothesis. What makes the hypothesis
'metaphysical' is its generality. Again, it is a claim about everything, i.e., all phenomena,
rather than about certain aspects of the natural world as conceived according to our
particular interests, as in the case of higher sciences such as biology.
This naturalistic conception of physicalism can be summed up as follows: everything
is physical, but this is a scientific hypothesis that could be falsified by the right kind of
evidence. This evidence would have to be inconsistent with our scientific theories and
require revisions to them in order to overcome this inconsistency. Moreover, the least
radical way of revising our theories would have to be to abandon the physicalist
hypothesis. If such evidence were to present itself, then we would be led to accept

dualism. This dualism would amount to the claim that some phenomena are not governed
by the laws of physics as we understand them. Let us call the resultant dualism
naturalistic dualism (not to be confused with Chalmers' position which he gives the same
name). Certainly, such dualism would be radical inasmuch as, initially at least, there
would be no theory enabling us to explain the phenomena concerned. There would
suddenly be a conspicuous gap in our scientific theories. However, naturalistic dualism
would not threaten our scientific worldview in that it would itself be a scientific
hypothesis. We would still be able to suppose that the dualist hypothesis could in
principle be incorporated into our theories. This possibility would still be left open,
however difficult this might seem to be to do.
That said, it would be very difficult to imagine such a dualism since it would be
contrary to the causal closure of the physical. We could not assume mental phenomena
are epiphenomenal because the evidence against physicalism that we imagined was the
transference of thoughts non-physically from person A to person B, which would imply
that thoughts are non-physical but detectable behaviourally. Epiphenomenalism, of
course, would not allow us to suppose that A's thoughts effectively caused B's behaviour,
as would be the case. And giving up the principle of causal closure of the physical is
barely conceivable. In terms of Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation rescinding
physicalism is very much a last resort, close to calamitous vis-a-vis maintaining the
overall coherence of our theories.5
Importantly, naturalistic dualism must be distinguished from what I call nonnaturalistic dualism. According to this dualism there are phenomena, e.g., qualia, that

See Quine 1992, 14-15.

cannot in principle be incorporated into our scientific theories. This is the brand of
dualism advanced by the early Jackson and Chalmers. Here, Chalmers is a nonnaturalistic dualist because, as noted earlier, the reforms to science he envisages, that
would allow us to incorporate consciousness as he understands it, are intolerable (see
3.2). These reforms would involve abandoning the requirement that any natural scientific
hypothesis be empirically testable, either directly or indirectly. Such a reformed science
would not be science at all. And the early Jackson's non-naturalistic dualism is betrayed,
for example, in the introductory remarks to his 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', where he writes:

I think there are certain features of bodily sensations especially [i.e., qualia],...which
no amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical
there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain,...and be I as clever as can be
in fitting it all together, you can't have told me about the hurtfulness of pain, the
itchiness of itches..."(1982, 127).

In other words, he claims that it is impossible to relate qualia to physical facts, that is,
facts that are describable in physical terms and hence incorporable into our theories quite
generally. He takes qualia to be non-physical and epiphenomenal in this sense. The
promise of incorporating qualia into the rest of our theories is ruled out - it can never
happen, according to Jackson.
The worry is that my position entails this more problematic non-naturalistic dualism.
Qualia, I have maintained, are in principle unnaturalisable. But, if qualia cannot in

principle be subsumed under our scientific theories, then there is no reason to assume
they fall under the laws of nature and hence under the laws of physics. Therefore, my
position not only seems compatible with this dualism, it even suggests it. But, this
property dualism is only entailed, I argue, if qualia are thought of as individuable. Let me
explain.
Implicit in this objection is the following conditional: for every phenomenon, if it is
physical then it is naturalisable. And since I claim that qualia are unnaturalisable, it
follows modus tollens that qualia are non-physical. Now, this conditional is arguable. The
conditional is inapplicable to qualia. The conditional would only apply if qualia were
individuable; and because they are umndividuable, there is no sense in which we can
think of these properties as falling or not falling under the laws of physics. Another way
of putting this is to say that qualia are not candidates for naturalisation; they are not posits
in our theories, such as properties like being red, being neuronal, having a length, etc.
The claim above might however elicit the response that if qualia are not entities in any
sense, i.e., identifiable and thereby quantifiable as individual properties, then we cannot
understand them as real, as existing in the world. It seems qualia have been eliminated.
But, what marks out qualia as properties is their self-evident existence, that is, the lack of
need to justify - or indeed the impossibility of justifying - our believing they exist. One
might put it this way: qualia exist in virtue of there being a (phenomenal) world for each
of us. In other words, none of us can be said to know that qualia exist, or more generally
to know that we are conscious phenomenologically, in the sense of being able to justify
the belief as true. That is because qualia are the properties by which we apprehend things
in the world, i.e., the things we ultimately posit by our theories. Their existence is a
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precondition for the possibility of science, i.e., knowledge about the natural world. Again,
CO

this is to understand qualia as epistemically originating properties. At best we can say
that my belief that qualia exist is evidenced by the very act of believing, that is, by my
being a subject rather than there being nothing for me, i.e., there being no me. More will
be said about this shortly. It is in this sense that the existence of qualia is self-evident and
we do not need a theory by which to posit them.54 Only entities positable in our theories,
very broadly construed, can be physical or non-physical. Qualia are not such entities;
hence there is no sense in which we can think of them as being non-physical, as the
property dualist thinks.

5.3 Dissolving the Mystery
Qualia, then, are not candidates for naturalisation. However, this conclusion still seems to
leave us with a sense of mystery vis-a-vis qualia - they are properties with which we are
each intimately acquainted but about which we can say nothing. They appear to be
mysterious because they are unnaturalisable. It would seem, therefore, that my position is
a form of mysterianism. Interestingly, Seager likewise suggests that consciousness understood here in purely phenomenological terms - must be presupposed in any

The idea of a property being epistemically originating does not concern thinking of
these properties as given in the sense of being indubitable, i.e., as epistemically
foundational, such that all our knowledge is ultimately justified by our realising them.
Rather, to reiterate, the idea is that the realisation of these properties is the precondition
for knowledge in that without realising them we cannot apprehend the world in
contradistinction to ourselves as knowers. More is said about this later in the chapter.
54

The term 'theory' is used in a very broad sense. Our common sense knowledge
concerning such things as what is a table should be thought of as continuous with science.
Therefore, this common sense knowledge can be construed as theoretical in nature - we
have the concept of table, namely, as a piece of furniture that fulfils a certain set of

naturalisation of a phenomenon and so cannot itself be naturalised. This amounts to what
Seager calls a kind of methodological mysterianism. Consciousness is mysterious, i.e.,
unnaturalisable, by this measure because the conditions for naturalisation, as he defines it
in terms of the three rules noted earlier (see section 1.1), preclude our being able to
naturalise the mind or any aspects of it, including consciousness.55 Such mysterianism, he
suggests, best fits with the kind of constructive empiricism developed by Bas van
Fraassen. Very roughly van Fraassen's view is antirealist or instrumentalist. He argues
that we cannot know if any of our scientific theories describe reality, rather at best we can
only commit to these theories to the extent that they are empirically adequate, i.e., they
are predictively successful.
Constructive empiricism is indeed compatible with mysterianism since it assumes that
there is some ultimate reality and we cannot know if our scientific theories describe it.
But by contrast the naturalism I have urged is not antirealist. In this regard I again follow
Quine. Reality is what our best scientific theories describe. There is no transcendent
viewpoint from which to grasp some ultimate reality that our theories strive to describe.
What counts as real is what we posit in our theories. Quine explains:

To call a posit a posit is not to patronize it. A posit can be unavoidable except at the
cost of other no less artificial expedients. Everything to which we concede existence
is a posit from a standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, and
simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built. Nor let us
look down on the standpoint of the theory as make-believe; for we can never do
functions etc. Theories about such everyday items are of course less rigorous than
scientific ones, hence the distinction between common sense knowledge and science.
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better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the best we can muster at
the time (1960, 22).

Naturalism, therefore, leaves no room for mysterianism. A helpful way to illustrate this
naturalistic attitude is to follow Quine in using Otto Neurath's metaphor of a boat at sea.56
Science, as a boat on the high seas, is necessarily built piece-by-piece so that it can
remain afloat. We cannot take our science into a drydock so to speak and build it anew
from top to bottom all at once. In other words, there is no external or transcendent
viewpoint from which we can evaluate our scientific claims in toto. Again, there is no
higher authority than our senses to appeal to with respect to judging our claims as true or
false; and since this is the authority that grounds our scientific claims and the theories
that support them, philosophical claims must be consistent with them, i.e., with science.
Thus, as Quine remarks, the philosopher's task differs in detail from others, e.g., the
scientist's, but still it differs "in no drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the
philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There
is no such cosmic exile" (1960, 275). That is to say, there is no essential difference
between the perspective of the philosopher and of the scientist.
To put this another way, the project of science in this inclusive sense necessarily
involves constructing theories piece-by-piece rather than all at once, since to construct
our theories all at once, or anew, would require our being in the position to evaluate our
55

See Seager 2000, 95-129.
In his book Word and Object Quine quotes Neurath as follows: "Wie Schiffer sind
wir, die auf offener See umbauen miissen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und
aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu konnen" [We are like sailors who must renovate
their boat on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in drydock and build it
anew from the best components] (1960, vii).
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theories within a comprehensive theoretical framework effectively based on a secondorder theory that is independent of science. This comprehensive second-order theory
would therefore have to presuppose an external vantage point, a way of taking the boat
out of the water into drydock. But there is no 'more solid' ground because there is no
higher authority by which to appeal to the truth of any theory than that appealed to by
science, namely, our senses. Therefore, any such comprehensive theory cannot be
independent of science, i.e., cannot be of a higher order. One might say that the test of
some theory is based on its ability to stay afloat, that is, on its ultimate agreement with
our observations.
Qualia, then, are not unnaturalisable such that they ought to be naturalisable but we
are unable to naturalise them. Their unnaturalisabilty does not leave us feeling vexed.
They are unnaturalisable in the sense that they are not candidates for naturalisation.
Therefore, there is no need for us to feel something has been left out, i.e., left
unexplained. Certainly, in the same way we note that our eye cannot gaze upon itself and
therefore wonder what our eye looks like we can wonder what qualia are in relation to
other phenomena, but such curiosity is superficial. Upon reflection we realise that there
can be no way in which the eye gazes upon itself, and likewise we ought to realise that
there is no sense in which qualia can be understood in terms of their relation to other
phenomena.
Doubtless many will demur at the idea that what we count as real is determined by
our best theories; this sounds like idealism. What is real, many argue, is not necessarily
graspable by us. We saw this kind of response from Carruthers vis-a-vis his property
realism (see section 4.1). Nagel expresses a similiar response with the following remark:
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"Realism is most compelling when we are forced to recognize the existence of something
which we cannot describe or know fully, because it lies beyond the reach of language,
proof, evidence, or empirical understanding" (1986, 108, my italics). Of course this belief
in evidence transcendent truths is premissed on the assumption that there is a
transcendent viewpoint, i.e., an epistemic position from which everything can be known
in principle by some infinite mind.
It is this compelling form of realism that Hilary Putnam attacks with his famous
brain-in-a-vat thought experiment.57 Putnam imagines someone worrying that we may all
in fact be bodiless envatted brains wired up to a mad scientist's vast computer, assuming
even that others are not merely programmed into your world so to speak. How are we to
undermine this possibility? Putnam's way of undermining it is to argue that the sentence 'I
am a brain in a vat' is self-contradictory. An envatted brain cannot refer to brains such as
itself; at most by 'brain' it can refer to a certain patterns of signals from the computer, and
so the sentence 'I am a brain in a vat' sincerely uttered by an envatted brain is false. On
the other hand if someone who utters this sentence is not an envatted brain then the
sentence is false as well.
But if, as Nagel suggests, reality is beyond language one might reply that whether
each of us really is an envatted brain is independent of our ability to know this or express
it. So if in reality, in this robust compelling sense, I am an envatted brain then my
inability to express this truth makes no difference. But this inability does make a
difference. As Putnam points out, "if we are brains in a Vat, we cannot think that we are"
(1981, 50). In other words, the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is logically incoherent for us at
least. Reflecting on Putnam's observations, we can understand how the hypothesis is

logically incoherent because we are never in the position to confirm or disconfirm it,
since this would require per impossible our being able to experience our experiencing the
world. Therefore the hypothesis is empty.
In general, because there is no transcendent viewpoint from which to judge whether
our theories about how the world is, i.e., our scientific theories, are true or false - no
drydock in which we can build our theories anew - we must settle with our theories
themselves. There are tables, chairs, brains, atoms and so on in virtue of our theories .
requiring them. Talk of such things existing independently of our theories makes no sense
given that they are identified only within them. That said, qualia, despite being
unnaturalisable, can be thought of as real because as epistemically originating
properties they are the properties by which we are able to apprehend the world, and
thereby form theories in the first place. None of our scientific theories would be possible
without our having a viewpoint as constituted by qualia.58
The original concern was that qualia are unnaturalisable and consequently they are
wholly mysterious entities. There is no way in principle that we can ever explain what
qualia are, and hence there is no way we can explain consciousness. Thus, to borrow
Kim's example, if we were required to engineer a device, i.e., design it from scratch, that
realised qualia we would have to admit defeat despite qualia being physically realised in
some way. In reply, I have argued that from a naturalistic perspective insofar as
consciousness is explainable there is nothing more to know about it than what our
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See Putnam 1981,1-21.
Ted Honderich's notion of consciousness as the existence of a world is a useful way
of understanding the basis for this thought. Honderich explains: "The difference between
me now and a chair in this room ...is that for me a world exists, and for a chair a world
does not exist" (2004, 130). In this respect reality might be thought of as our world.
58

scientific theories tell us in terms of physiology and behaviour. In this regard qualia are
not properties that are in principle open to explanation - we should not expect an account
of them. But, by this measure one may wonder what the relationship between
neuroscience, as the study of the human brain and its cognitive processes, and
phenomenology, as the study of consciousness from the first-person viewpoint, is. Are
we to suppose that phenomenology is a pseudoscience? That is the question we shall take
up next.

5.3.1 Neuroscience and Consciousness
I have said that consciousness is naturalisable to the extent that it is understood as a
physical property, that is, as a complex property we attribute to physical bodies in virtue
of various physiological and behavioural manifestations. Moreover, I have argued that
consciousness is understood both in physical and phenomenological terms, and that we
cannot think of consciousness without thinking of it in both these ways. These two ways
of thinking of consciousness are inseparable - we cannot acquire the concept of
consciousness by thinking of it in only one of these two ways.
But again, this is not to claim that qualia, as the phenomenological qualities of
conscious experiences, are identical with some physical properties of the brain, say. We
cannot claim this because qualia are unindividuable. Identity claims are only possible
within a theoretical framework that provides us with a sortal concept, and qualia cannot
fall under any such theories. Accordingly, we do not observe that qualia are correlated
with brain properties, such as the firing of neurons, in the way that it was first observed,
While the details of Honderich's theory of consciousness are perhaps problematic, this
basic insight he offers about consciousness is still valuable.

for example, that the Morning star is correlated with Venus, and thus subsequently shown
to be identical with the planet. That would require our being able to pick out our
experiences in terms of qualia as such, i.e., independently of the physical manifestations
of our experiences.
But despite qualia being unidentifiable with their neural correlates we can still assume
consciousness as-we conceive of it concerns both qualia and brain properties.
Again, our concept of consciousness only exists because we can think of our experiences
in terms of their behavioural and physiological manifestations as well. And this
conceptual dependence of consciousness understood phenomenologically on
physiological and behavioural properties, and therefore ultimately on brain properties in
particular, gives us license to suppose that the study of brain processes is relevant to our
phenomenological understanding of consciousness, although how neurophysiology, or
neuroscience more generally, informs our understanding of consciousness
phenomenologically has not been made clear. Neuroscience, after all, cannot tell us what
qualia are in the sense of reducing them to such-and-such brain states either as types or
even as tokens.
Below, I aim to show that neuroscience does concern our phenomenological
understanding of consciousness. To do this I shall consider Dennett's claim that a race of
phenomenal zombies could gain a complete or completable understanding of
consciousness in terms of what he calls heterophenomenology in conjunction with
neuroscience. In reply, I argue that what such aliens would come to understand
neuroscience to be about would differ from our own understanding. Unlike us they could
only understand consciousness in naturalistic terms, i.e., they could only develop an

understanding of consciousnessN, and would do so only in virtue of our already
possessing the concept of consciousness fully, i.e., understood both as consciousnessN
and consciousnessp. This fact shows that what we take neuroscience to be about is
informed by our being phenomenally conscious creatures.
The worry is that we can study the brain as much as we like, but this will never enable
us to understand the essentially subjective aspect of our conscious experiences. Even
after the cognitive functions of the brain have been mapped out in detail the
neuroscientist will still be at a loss to explain why the brain determines our being
phenomenally conscious in this sense. Unless this can be explained, in other words, one
might think that neuroscience has nothing to say about consciousness as we understand it
in phenomenological terms. This harks back to the worry expressed by Nagel that
because phenomenological facts concerning our experiences are essentially connected to
the first-person point of view there seems to be no possibility of understanding them in
terms of properties apprehensible from the third-person point of view (see section 2.1).
However, I think we can overcome this concern; that is to say, the worry is misplaced.
Consider, first of all, Dennett's way of allaying this worry. In general, neuroscience
needs to take into account consciousness understood phenomenologically. A full
understanding of consciousness should include an account of our first-person reports of
conscious experiences. We need to make sense of such first-person reports, e.g., 'I have a
sharp pain in my arm' in neuroscientific terms. But, a neuroscientific account of
consciousness in terms of behaviour and physiology would seem to bear no relations to
our understanding consciousness from the first-person viewpoint. Phenomenology is
usually or traditionally thought of as the study of consciousness strictly from the first-

person viewpoint. In this sense it is a theory of appearances, i.e., it aims to explain
appearances or seemings as objects in their own right, analysing them purely in terms of
their relations to one another. It takes seriously the idea that we can introspect our
phenomenal states. This approach to the study of consciousness is perhaps epitomised by
Husserl's phenomenology. And as Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith explain,

Husserlian phenomenology seeks the description and structural analysis of
consciousness, as opposed to an account of its causal origin in brain activity or
elsewhere. Consciousness is to be studied precisely as it is experienced, and
accordingly the objects of consciousness, too, need to be characterized precisely as
they are given in experience, with no metaphysical reinterpretations (inspired by
reductive or other motives) (1995, 9).

Phenomenology so construed does indeed seem in principle unrelatable to neuroscience,
since neuroscience concerns such 'brain activity'. Here we are again reminded of Nagel's
assertion that understanding what it is like to be a particular kind of creature requires
taking up the viewpoint of that creature, and so if we abandon that viewpoint, i.e., take up
a third-person viewpoint, then our understanding of it is lost (1974,444-445).
However, Dennett denies that phenomenology can only be pursued from a firstperson viewpoint. He argues that people's first-person reports are essentially a form of
behaviour and as such they are analysable from the third-person viewpoint. People's
sincere reports about how things seem to them offer a publicly accessible means of
studying consciousness in phenomenological terms. Therefore, phenomenology can be

construed as a fully objective science. This approach to phenomenology Dennett calls
'heterophenomenology', which is contrasted to Husserl's awtophenomenology, i.e., the
study of consciousness by some sort of self-analysis. The immediate objection to
Dennett's idea is that what phenomenology studies is not people's reports per se but the
things their reports are about, i.e., appearances. The pertinent phenomena are the
appearances themselves and not the sentences about them.
Dennett's reply to this objection is twofold. First, he argues that Husserlian
phenomenology is flawed. It is based on a person's reports about appearances or
phenomena that are assumed to be apprehensible only by that person, i.e., essentially
private. Consequently such reports are not objectively confirmable. Moreover, it seems
that naturally people tend to believe whatever agrees with their already acquired stock of
beliefs - a phenomenon known as confirmation bias. Accordingly, this
awtophenomenological approach to the study of consciousness does not meet the
standards of scientific scrutiny. Second, it is scientifically legitimate to treat such reports
as if'they are true and then determine whether they agree with the empirical evidence. For
example, this would be the approach taken by an anthropologist studying a newly
discovered tribe. She would treat their myths as true, i.e., not immediately doubt the
veracity of their stories and dismiss them, in order to reach an understanding about their
notional world, that is, their self-consistent model of the world .59 In other words,
judgment is suspended vis-a-vis these myths - this amounts to a form of epoche.
Likewise, it is useful to think of people's first-person reports about how things seem to
them as descriptions of their phenomenological notional worlds. We can then evaluate

See Dennett 1991, 82-83.

such phenomenological notional worlds in terms of how well they agree with our
observations. °
This is to adopt a strategy based on what Dennett calls an intentional stance. The
strategy is to attribute a belief to someone, or some intentional system more generally,
insofar as it enables us to make sense of or rationalise his actions. So, for example, if
someone were to take to wearing a bicorne (a two-cornered hat), speak in French, and
refer to his wife as 'Josephine', however improbable, one could rationalise his odd
behaviour by attributing to him the belief that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. To the extent
that this belief fits with all the evidence one can hold that his believing this is true. It is
taken to be true that the man believes this irrespective of whether he really believes it in
the sense that perhaps he might only be pretending to be Napoleon and never admit to it so long, that is, as his belief that he is not Napoleon is never made apparent by his
behaviour or physiology, i.e., by any empirical evidence. The intentional stance, then, is
based on the attribution of beliefs to someone according to how he ought to behave under
the relevant circumstances, e.g., when asked if he believes he is Napoleon he answers
affirmatively; in other words, the attribution is true to the extent that the belief

Implicit in Dennett's argument is a Quinean picture of interpretability. That is, he
thinks of the heterophenomenologist as essentially being in a position analogous to the
field linguist imagined by Quine (Quine 1960). This linguist is challenged to interpret the
utterances of some native whose language is entirely unknown. So, for example, when
the native utters 'Gavagai' the linguist can only interpret the native in terms of his
observations of the scene being reported on, i.e., a scene with a rabbit in Quine's
example. We cannot suppose that in addition the native means something that is closed to
observation in any way. As Quine puts it: "All the objective data he [the field linguist]
has to go on are the forces he sees impinging on the native's surfaces, and the observable
behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native" (ibid, 28). Likewise, Dennett sees the
heterophenomenologist as interpreting people's first-person reports on how things seem
to them solely on the basis of observable evidence, i.e., real patterns of behaviour. There
is no matter of fact about how to interpret these reports.

successfully predicts his behaviour. What matters is the strategy is very successful and
useful in itself. This strategy, Dennett argues, is useful vis-a-vis the study of
consciousness.
Thus Dennett's suggestion is to hold as true a subject's first-person reports and beliefs
about his phenomenal states and to continue to do so as long as these reports fit with all
the observable data. Thus, the reports themselves are taken to be behavioural data. By
this measure, the question of whether these phenomenal states really occur in the subject,
so to speak, is irrelevant. Indeed, Dennett admits that a so-called phenomenal zombie
could effectively pass the test in that insofar as it reported having such-and-such
phenomenal states and these reports concurred with what we observe in terms of both its
physiology and its behaviour otherwise, we would accept its reports about how things
seem to it as true, despite its 'experiences' having no qualitative character at all. Dennett
takes this as evidence that the idea of a zombie is incoherent - a zombie is in principle
indistinguishable from a phenomenally conscious human being.
Our worry was that neuroscience tells us nothing about what it is like to experience
things. Another way of viewing this difficulty is to note that neuroscience and
phenomenology, while both being ways of understanding consciousness, are unrelatable
- neuroscience takes as its data that which we can observe about the brain and cognition
while phenomenology takes as its data those appearances we each introspect, and which
consequently are inapprehensible from the third-person viewpoint. Dennett's reply to this
worry is to suggest that phenomenology can legitimately be construed as the analysis of
our first-person reports about our phenomenal states - a construal he calls
'heterophenomenology' - and these reports themselves are open to observation, i.e., they

are apprehensible from the third-person viewpoint. Thus, the barrier between these two
ways of studying consciousness is removed. Hence we can relate our neuroscientific
theories to our talk about how things seem to each of us.
Dennett's suggestion is right to the extent that heterophenomenology legitimately
allows us to relate consciousness understood phenomenologically to brain processes,
ultimately. Indeed, as Dennett notes, it is an approach that has already been adopted by
neuroscientists. The trouble with this approach is that it leaves no room for qualia. A
virtue of heterophenomenology, according to Dennett, is its metaphysical neutrality, i.e.,
the fact that it lets us study consciousness understood phenomenologically irrespective of
whether there really are qualia or not. This is certainly a virtue so long as one is not
concerned to account for qualia - something that Dennett is happy with since he denies
that qualia exist.
Nevertheless, Dennett insists that he is not denying that this subjective aspect of
experience exists. He is not suggesting we are all 'zombies'. But he is suggesting that the
idea of qualia is mistaken, and that we can fully understand consciousness without it.
Dennett goes to some length to disabuse us of the belief that our experiences have such
properties (1986). But, as I have argued, the idea of qualia is essential to the idea of
conscious experience - we cannot think of any experience without thinking of its having
an irreducible quality. It strikes us that what it is like to experience things is fundamental,
i.e., it is something that is constitutive of us as phenomenal subjects, and not something
that can be explained away. What distinguishes experiences from other phenomena we
study is that they have these peculiar properties or qualities.

As already noted (section 4.3.1, n. 31), in one of his arguments for the viability of
heterophenomenology Dennett imagines the Earth being visited by an advanced
civilisation of Martians whose scientists endeavour to study us, including our
consciousness. These Martians are simply thought of as phenomenal zombies, and not as
physically and behaviourally indistinguishable from us of course. Thus, it is only through
the third-person viewpoint that we and the Martians can relate to one another. Open to the
Martians, then, is the study of our physiology and behaviour broadly construed to include
first-person reports of our phenomenal states. Therefore, the Martians are free to employ
a heterophenomenological approach to the study of human consciousness. Thus,
according to Dennett, they are able to develop a complete, or completable, theory of
human consciousness in neuroscientific terms.
But, as zombies they would not have arrived on Earth equipped with the concept of
consciousness. That is because there would have been no use for such a concept in their
world. Were one of the Martians to exhibit pain behaviour, for example, they would have
no need to state how this 'experience' felt, since there would have been nothing that it is
like to be in pain for them. They would have no terms equivalent to our 'feel' or 'seem'.
Consequently, ex hypothesi on encountering these terms on Earth, they could comfortably
define them in terms of the physiological and behavioural properties posited by
neuroscience - this would be the only way, after all, that they could make sense of such
terms and thereby be able to use them. The idea that the report 'I feel a sharp pain', for
example, alludes to an experience also understood in terms of its phenomenological
quality would be completely passed over by them. Consequently, they could not grasp the
concept of being phenomenally conscious as such. So, for example, these Martians would

be unable to distinguish between the meanings of the statements 'the tomato seems red to
him' and 'he sees (senses) the tomato as red'.
A similar point is made by Todd Moody, who argues that within a community of
zombies, who are otherwise like us, certain psychological concepts would be absent from
their language.61 Zombies could not originate such psychological terms as
'consciousness', 'seeing' and 'dream' since such mental states do not exist for them. In
reply to Moody Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger argue that while it is highly unlikely
that zombies would develop these terms it is not logically impossible for them to do so.
For example, they imagine how occasionally zombies walk into trees and these and
similar events lead their compatriot zombies to shout the warning "Watch out!" This kind
of talk would allow the zombies to develop the concept of seeing, roughly 'understood' by
them to refer to one's photoreceptors being oriented in the right direction (Flanagan and
Polger, 316). Flanagan and Polger argue that similar stories could be given for the
origination of other psychological terms in the zombie speech community. But all these
zombie terms ultimately allude to aspects of behaviour. The zombies would have no
inclination to think that there is something that it is like to see, dream, or bump one's head
against a tree. It would still be impossible for them to wonder what is it like to see a ripe
tomato as red. The idea of experiences having a qualitative character could never occur to
them. So, the term 'pain', for example, could only be used by them to allude to certain
behavioural dispositions; there would be no notion of the hurtfulness of pain, no question
of this feeling different from being tickled by a feather, say.
So, Dennett's Martians would end up 'grasping' our concept of consciousness in
naturalistic terms. On the other hand, we have a complete grasp of the concept, i.e., both
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in naturalistic and phenomenological terms - this latter understanding would be entirely
missed by the Martians. From their so-called perspective a heterophenomenological
approach to the study of consciousness, therefore, would offer the promise of a full and
satisfying theory of consciousness. But from our perspective this approach does not
accommodate our phenomenological understanding of consciousness, given that this
understanding plays no role in the resultant neuroscientific theory. Dennett does not see
such a lack of accommodation because he denies the existence of qualia.
While heterophenomenology cannot accommodate our phenomenological
understanding of consciousness I do not count this as a failure. A heterophenomenological
approach to the study of consciousness allows us to relate talk of how things seem to us
to neuroscience. But because qualia are the properties in virtue of which we construct our
theories of the world, including consciousness, they cannot themselves be posits of our
theories. Thus, by thinking of qualia as epistemically originating properties in this way
we can overcome the worry that neuroscience says nothing about qualia. There is no
sense in which it could do so. This does not point to some limitation of neuroscience. The
neuroscientist can explain consciousness as we understand it in terms of physiology and
behaviour.

5.4 Qualia as Epistemically Originating Properties
I have argued that what is peculiar about qualia is that they are epistemically originating
properties. Below, I want to explore in a little more detail what this construal of qualia
amounts to. An epistemically originating property is a property realised by conscious
creatures in virtue of which they apprehend some aspect of the world. If a person, S,
See Moody 1994, 196-200.
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apprehends something as yellow, i.e., something seems yellow to S, then S realises a
yellow quale. This yellow quale is epistemically originating because only in virtue of
realising it does S apprehend something in the world as yellow. However, this
explanation appears to be circular - S apprehends some aspect of the world, e.g., yellow,
because S realises an epistemically originating property, and S realises an epistemically
originating property because it apprehends some aspect of the world. What work does the
notion of an epistemically originating property do? Such properties have the look of
occult properties.
But we can avoid this empty way of understanding epistemically originating
properties if we think of them as the properties by which the subject is realised. These
properties seem occult so long as we think of the subject or self as existing independently
of them, so that if the subject does not realise any qualia it would nonetheless still exist;
in other words, they seem occult so long as we think of them as contingent properties of
the subject. However, if we think of qualia as properties that constitute the subject or self,
i.e., as properties necessary for there to be a self, then we can offer a non-circular
explanation of them. In explaining that S apprehends something as yellow because S
realises a yellow quale, we are led to ask: why does S realise a yellow quale? Instead of
replying because S apprehends something as yellow, we can say that S realises a yellow
quale in the sense that S is partly constituted by it. Being S is in part to realise qualia
generally. Being S, i.e., being a subject or self, is to apprehend aspects of the world. It is
important to note here that the claim is not that realising qualia is a sufficient condition
for being a self, only that it is a necessary condition.

Crucially, as noted earlier, there is no distinction to be made between an experience
having a particular quale and an experience seeming to have this quale (see section 3.2).
Qualia as ways things seem to us cannot themselves seem some way to us; they are the
appearances themselves. In this respect qualia are transparent to us. When we try to
apprehend them in this way we see right through them so to speak to the external
properties of the things the experience is of. Understanding qualia as constitutive of us as
phenomenal subjects in this way explains their perspectival nature, pointed out so
perspicuously by Nagel. Thinking of qualia as properties by which we apprehend things
in the world explains their essential connection to a single point of view. Qualia, one
might say, are epistemological properties through and through - they are what
characterise the subject in contradistinction to the world the subject apprehends and
thereby comes to know about.
We can think of realising qualia as being phenomenally conscious, so that some being
is, or realises, a self only if it is phenomenally conscious. By this measure, a zombie
cannot realise or be a self. And indeed a zombie is like a chair or some other inanimate
object, that is, there would be nothing that it is like to be such a thing. And in general a
being is phenomenally conscious if and only if it has a point of view. Without a point of
view there is no world for a being - it does not stand in contrast to the rest of the world,
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Again, this basic point is made by Saul Kripke in his Naming and Neccesity, where
he states that "in the case of mental phenomena there is no 'appearance' beyond the
mental phenomenon itself (1980, 154).
63
This general way of thinking of qualia is urged by Fred Dretske and Mark
Rowlands for example. Rowlands writes: "What it is like is an aspect of conscious
experience that exists only in the directing of such experience towards a non-phenomenal
object. It is not itself an object of such experience" (2001, p. 149). And Dretske writes:
"Conscious mental states - experiences, in particular - are states that we are conscious
with, not states we are conscious of (1995, pp. 100-101).
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so to speak. Nothing exists for a zombie. So, a zombie's walking into a tree, to borrow
Flanagan and Polger's example, is neither a good nor a bad thing since it feels no pain.
Now, one might argue that the zombie could evolve unthinking or moronic behaviour
aimed at 'avoiding' such events by the process of natural selection. Walking into trees or
any other solid object, after all, is bad at least in the sense that it is not conducive to
survival. Hence, zombies would have an interest in this minimal sense. But for this
zombie nothing happens when it walks into a tree. Its walking into a tree does not
constitute an event for it. This minimal interest in survival is external to it, that is, it
would not take it on as its interest - to do so requires it to experience pain, and a fortiori
pleasure. A zombie would be like a plant in this respect - an equally insentient being which likewise has an 'interest' in survival but no interests of its own.
However, one could perhaps argue that being a self is not essentially being
phenomenally conscious. Because a zombie has a body it is a self in the sense of being an
actor in the world. A zombie's world exists as an arena for its actions. Consequently,
zombies can at least realise intentional states, i.e., have propositional attitudes, such as
beliefs about the world. These beliefs would have content insofar as they guide the
zombie's actions. It is this assumption that allows Dennett, for example, to assume that
his zombie Martians can adopt an intentional stance. But, the difficulty is that in the case
of a supposed zombie no one is there. As a being without a particular point of view there
would be no contrast beween the zombie and the world. On the other hand, I exist in the
world as a self because I distinguish myself from the world - that is what it is to be a self.
For a zombie no such distinction exists - there is no difference between the world and the
zombie. The concepts of the self and of the world are intimately connected in this way, as
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implied by their logical relation, i.e., the self versus the not-self. It is this connection
between self and world that is key. In this sense, we could attribute intentional states to a
zombie, e.g., desires and interests, in essentially the same way that we can attribute such
states to a company, say, or to a plant under certain circumstances perhaps. However,
being able to attribute intentional states to some thing does not by itself entail this thing
is or realises a self.

5.5 Dissolving the Problem of Consciousness
We started with the problem of consciousness. How do we accommodate subjectivity in
the natural world governed by the laws of physics? The phenomenological qualities of
our experiences, or qualia, that define this subjectivity seem to bear no relations to the
world as we understand it in terms of our sciences. Consciousness is essentially
characterised in terms of qualia. What we mean when we say someone is phenomenally
conscious is that they realise these qualia, that is,, they have experiences we define in
terms of these properties. The phenomenon of consciousness, then, seems to stand
outside of our scientific investigations - none of our scientific theories can help us
understand what consciousness is. Consciousness seems to be unnaturalisable.
In the introduction I noted that Valerie Hardcastle identifies two opposing camps
concerning the problem of consciousness. One camp, the 'naturalists' as she calls them,
which includes herself, comprises those who think that consciousness is in principle
naturalisable. They claim that there is no reason to suppose that we cannot eventually
arrive at a satisfactory theory of consciousness. The other camp, the 'sceptics', comprises
those who are sceptical of this possibility. According to Hardcastle there is an
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unbridgeable gap in attitude between these camps. I said that one of my overall aims is to
show how pace Hardcastle this gap is bridgeable and to encourage a way of thinking
about the concept of consciousness that dissolves the problem of consciousness. We are
now in a position to summarise how this can be done.
We have seen that there are four ways of understanding and dealing with the problem
that relate directly to Hardcastle's analysis. For those who assume consciousness can be
explained by our sciences, like Hardcastle, the problem then comes down to either (1)
explaining how each quale is identical with some physiological state or (2) explaining
how there is nothing more to understanding consciousness than what our sciences tell us
about it. On the other side, the sceptics suppose that the nature of qualia is such that there
is no possibility of naturalising consciousness. This sceptical approach divides into two,
namely, arguing either that (3) our sciences can never provide us with a theory of
consciousness, or (4) our sciences need to be reformed in order to make such a theory
possible. (1) essentially describes the position of Flanagan and Papineau, for example. (2)
is the position adopted by Dennett, who dismisses the concept of qualia as irredeemably
confused. (3) describes McGinn's general view, where he argues that the non-spatiality of
consciousness precludes us from ever constructing a theory of consciousness. And (4) fits
with the view of Chalmers, whose recommended reform concerns thinking of conscious
properties as basic, i.e., on a par with such basic physical properties as length and having
a mass. Importantly, I have argued that ultimately none of these approaches are by
themselves satisfactory.
I began the discussion proper, in chapter 1, by distinguishing between two opposing
philosophical attitudes, which I called 'naturalistic' and 'non-naturalistic'. These attitudes

correspond to what Hardcastle calls the 'naturalists' and 'sceptics' respectively. The
naturalistic attitude I defined as one that takes philosophy to be continuous with science.
The ultimate mark of this attitude is the belief that there is no higher tribunal regarding
our judgments about reality than our senses. The non-naturalistic attitude, on the other
hand, is defined by the belief that our intuitions are equally authoritative vis-a-vis our
judgments about reality. I argued that adopting a naturalistic attitude towards
philosophical problems quite generally is better - it avoids the extravagant metaphysical
claims that a non-naturalistic attitude often entails, which result from their not being
falsifiable through the senses, i.e., of being constrained in any real sense. Moreover,
adopting this attitude is helpful in overcoming the problem of consciousness specifically.
How it helps has been a central theme of the dissertation. And in this chapter I argued
that to the extent that we endeavour to provide a scientific explanation of consciousness
this cannot be directly informed by how we intuitively understand it, i.e., in terms of
qualia.
In chapter 21 considered arguments presented by Nagel, the early Jackson, and
Chalmers that aim to show that consciousness is non-physical so that science as it is
presently practised or understood either cannot solve the problem of consciousness or
must be reformed radically to do so. These positions generally concur either with (3) or
(4). I showed, by means of well-known objections to them, that none of these arguments
are successful. The arguments, I pointed out, betray a non-naturalistic approach to the
problem. In this respect these views are characterised by the assumption that our beliefs
concerning the phenomenological qualities of experience, i.e., qualia, are in principle as
justifiably true as those concerning ordinary physical properties. I questioned this

assumption, and later challenged it outright in terms of claiming that qualia are
unindividuable.
It is in chapter 3 that I urged that we think of qualia as unindividuable. The nature of
qualia is such that there can be no criterion by which we can objectively determine if two
qualia are distinct from or identical with each other. To deny their wnindividuability is to
abandon thinking of qualia as such. The unindividuability of qualia, I argued, follows
from an understanding of them as properties by which we apprehend things in the world
rather than as properties we apprehend in the world. Ultimately I came to refer to qualia
in this sense as epistemically originating properties. This way of understanding qualia
enables us to make sense of their perpectival nature, i.e., their essential connection to a
particular point of view. In this chapter I observed that Dennett likewise thinks of qualia
as unindividuable, although he concludes from this that the notion of qualia is confused
and should be abandoned entirely. Here I marked a disagreement with his conclusion.
In chapter 41 looked at the worry that because consciousness is understood in terms
of qualia any scientific theory of consciousness misses the target, that is, it cannot explain
what is essential to consciousness and so it is useless. In reply, I argued that while how
we think of consciousness must include this phenomenological aspect of it, this way of
thinking of consciousness only exists because we also think of it in terms of physiology
and behaviour. These two ways of thinking of consciousness are inseparable.
Accordingly, though we cannot identify qualia with certain physiological states given that
qualia are unindividuable, we cannot think of consciousness solely in phenomenological
terms so that we might suppose that science has nothing to say about it.
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So in reply to Hardcastle's claim that the gap in attitude she describes is unbridgeable,
that is, there seems no way to persuade members from one camp to adopt the attitude of
the other, we now see how this is not the case. The non-naturalistic attitude of the
sceptics is seriously disadvantaged by the fact that their appeal to intuition means their
metaphysical claims are ultimately unfalsifiable. Consequently, there is no constraint on
the claims they make. Chalmers speculates that conscious properties are ubiquitous so
that everything realises them, but unfortunately the protophenomenal properties he
postulates are in principle unobservable. McGinn thinks that non-spatial properties that
constitute consciousness, which again are in principle unobservable, can be incorporated
into science by some sort of a priori method. How this is at all possible is unclear. All he
tells us is that it requires a degree of intelligence beyond our reach. The naturalist, on the
other hand, has at his disposal a tangible means of grounding our theories about
consciousness. This concerns supposing that there is no higher authority regarding our
judgments about the world than the tribunal of our senses. Having this anchor so to speak
allows us to measure the ultimate plausibility of any theories we might devise. This is an
overwhelming advantage for the naturalist.
So, how exactly does the naturalistic attitude help us dissolve the problem of
consciousness? The problem is motivated by the assumption that qualia are individuable.
By thinking of qualia as individuable one is led to ask why we cannot understand them in
terms of other natural phenomena, that is, why we cannot naturalise them. But qualia, I
have argued, are unindividuable and understanding them to be so dispels the problem - it
makes the problem nonsensical. That said, it is difficult to think of qualia as being both
unindividuable and real. If we cannot ultimately determine whether one quale is distinct
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from or identical with another quale, then it is hard to imagine how qualia can be thought
of as properties at all. A major part of my project has been to reconcile these claims,
namely, that qualia are unindividuable and that they are real, i.e., they exist.
In reply, I have argued that qualia are properties that determine our particular point of
view, that is, as phenomenal subjects we are constituted by qualia. This is to think of
qualia as properties by which we apprehend things in the world as epistemically
originating properties. Without them we can apprehend nothing in the world, i.e., no
world would exist for us. Further, they cannot be distinguished from one another because
they are the very properties in virtue of which we are able to make such distinctions visa-vis every property that we posit in our theories about the world. Likely this construal of
qualia as epistemically originating properties will strike some as dubious, as a sleight of
hand. One might suspect that it is an attempt to wallpaper over the problem of
consciousness rather than facing up to it: it is to treat qualia as occult properties - we do
not have to explain them because they are the properties by which we are able to explain
everything else. Thus, qualia are intrinsically mysterious properties.
This worry, I argued, again results from presupposing that there is a viewpoint from
which everything is graspable, that is, a perspective from which we can make judgments
about anything at all including those properties constitutive of our powers of judgment, as
if we have limitless powers in this regard. In other words, it results from adopting a nonnaturalistic attitude. But as finite creatures our theories about the world are constructed
through our senses. The world understood in terms of our theories is always apprehended
from some particular point of view. As Quine points out: "Our talk of external things, our
very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and control
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the triggerings of our sensory receptors in light of previous triggerings of our receptors"
(1981, 1). We have no other means of judging ultimately what is and what is not the case
than our senses, no extrasensory perception. The triggerings of our sensory receptors are
all we have to go by. In virtue of such triggerings you and I exist, that is, somehow these
triggerings lead to a contrast between the world and its apprehension, manifested as the
self. How does this contrast arise? We can tell various stories about how the brain
represents these triggerings as something in the world, or about how these triggerings. as
input are related to other inputs as well as to various behavioural and physiological
outputs, and so forth. But if one were to go on to ask why these representations,
functional roles, etc. feel some way rather than like nothing at all, our only reply can be
that that is how it is. We reach the limit of our explanations. Does this amount to a
mystery? Yes, it amounts to the same kind of mystery expressed by the question 'why is
there something rather than nothing at all?' And such questions have no answers.
How do we understand consciousness as a phenomenon in the world governed by the
laws of physics? Insofar as consciousness is thought of in terms of physiology and
behaviour there is no difficulty in explaining it scientifically. As far as consciousness
understood in phenomenological terms is concerned, there is no 'hard' problem of
explaining it scientifically because the properties that define this understanding, i.e.,
qualia, are epistemically originating and hence unindividuable. They are not entities
which we can quantify over and therefore subsume into our theories. When, for example,
Chalmers asks "[w]hy should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
(1995, 201), we answer that the 'life' he alludes to is not inner, it is not something we
each grasp in some privileged manner by glancing inwards. The subject does not

apprehend the phenomenological qualities of experience, rather they are constitutive of
the subject - qualia are the manifestation of a subject. In this sense each experience is an
episode of the subject. It is not hard to incorporate consciousness understood in terms of
qualia, i.e., phenomenologically, into our scientific theories, it is impossible. But
understanding why it is impossible, namely, for the reasons I have given, we can see that
there is nothing science fails to explain.
In conclusion, the claims I have made are obviously not without difficulties. For
example, more needs to be said about the idea of an epistemically originating property.
The phrase is slightly misleading in the sense that it might suggest to some that such
properties are the grounds for our knowledge, that is, it alludes to the sort of
foundationalism Wilfrid Sellars famously railed against in terms of the Myth of the
Given.64 The idea which one might be misled to think of is roughly that our beliefs about
natural phenomena are ultimately founded on a set of basic beliefs about qualia that are
non-inferentially acquired; moreover, having these basic beliefs about qualia is not
dependent on having any other beliefs. This is not what I mean by epistemically
originating properties. They are not properties which in virtue of realising we can acquire
some set of foundational beliefs. Rather, the idea is that they are properties in virtue of
which we are able to apprehend the world, that is, they are the grounds for our acquiring
beliefs about the world, i.e., natural phenomena, very generally. This difference is
important and may be worth exploring in its own right.
Lastly, throughout I have remained largely unconcerned with the truth of physicalism.
That is, from the beginning I have stated that my principal concern is to understand how
consciousness is naturalisable, and not to defend physicalism per se. But this lack of

concern with the truth of physicalism might seem to be intolerable with respect to my
construal of qualia in terms of causation. Consider specifically Joseph Levine's
observation that while we cannot understand how experiences picked out by their qualia
can be identical with some physical states, i.e., the problem of the explanatory gap, this
fact does not entail such identities are false. But more importantly, the truth of
physicalism seems the only way to allow us to understand how mental phenomena in
general are causally efficacious. This is to assume epiphenomenalism is incompatible
with physicalism. As Levine puts it: "It seems overwhelmingly obvious that mental
phenomena are both causes and effects of non-mental, physical phenomena."65 We want
to say that physicalism just has to be true but damned if we know how it is. Given the
unindividuability of qualia I concluded that psychophysical identities concerning them
cannot be asserted, and so I deny that we can hold such identities as true.66 But, one
might worry that so long as qualia are taken to be causally efficacious they must be
thought of as physical. Yet I have effectively denied that we can understand qualia as
physical properties. This would make physicalism an incoherent doctrine. If physicalism
is true then qualia, as real properties, must be causally efficacious. But if qualia cannot be
identified with any physical properties it seems we cannot know whether they are
causally efficacious or not. Therefore, we cannot determine whether physicalism is true
or false.
In reply, I would say that the unindividuability of qualia and the consequent
impossibility of identifying them with anything does not indicate the incoherence of

SeeSellars 1963, 164-167.
Levine 2001, 5.
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physicalism simpliciter. Rather, I think that this difficulty points to physicalism not being
entirely coherent. Indeed, here I would point to our inability to define the term 'physical'.
This difficulty is analogous to that of accommodating irrational numbers on the
continuum. If the continuum is thought of as a sequence of contiguous points each
expressible as a fraction, i.e., as a rational number, there seems to be no place for
irrational numbers like it and V2, which cannot be reduced to fractions, hence their
irrationality. No matter how many decimal places one calculates the value of TC, for
example, one only arrives at an approximation to it. There is no point on the continuum
that can correspond with 7t's value. This suggests that not every number is on the
continuum, which is a paradoxical conclusion. Some numbers are larger than % and some
are smaller and as such it has a place, so to speak, among numbers quite generally. In
other words, the idea of the continuum seems incoherent. The generally agreed on way of
making the idea of the continuum coherent is to accept Richard Dedekind's suggestion.
Dedekind urges that irrational numbers be understood as cuts in the continuum. A cut is
thought of as existing between contiguous points on the continuum, i.e., as a partition
betwen rational number sequences, rather than as a gap in it, which contradicts the very
idea of continuity of course.
The approach that this Dedekindian solution to the problem of accommodating
irrational numbers on the continuum adopts is entirely naturalistic in tenor.
Mathematicians did not reject the idea of the continuum as incoherent, rather they

And the unindividuability of qualia rules out our being able to assert their identity
with anything at all, including functional roles and behavioural dispositions as well as
physical states.
More precisely, an irrational number is thought of as the partition of two disjoint
subsequences such that all the members of one set of a rational number sequence are
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adjusted their conceptions of numbers to make the idea as coherent as possible. I would
urge the same approach with respect to physicalism. As a scientific hypothesis I take
physicalism to be true. And insofar as understanding qualia as unindividuable makes it
impossible to see how it is true, one should try to conceive of qualia in a way that makes
them compatible with the truth of physicalism. Therefore, to paraphrase Jaegwon Kim,
we should accept physicalism as near enough true in this sense.68 That is what I have
endeavoured to do. This naturalistic approach to understanding consciousness, I hope to
have shown, is the best one to take.

larger than all the members of the other set, e.g., V2, is defined as the following ordered
pair of sets <{x: x > 2}, {x: x < 2}> (see Borowski and Borwein, 145).
68
See Kim 2005, 174.
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